

ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY

**CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN ENGLAND:  
CHIMERA OR CHAMELEON?**

ANASTASIA TWIGG

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## ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF ARTS, LAW & SOCIAL SCIENCES

### MASTER OF ARTS

#### CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN ENGLAND: CHIMERA OR CHAMELEON?

By ANASTASIA TWIGG

Drawing on Michel Foucault's theories of discourse and genealogy in undertaking a literature review of primary and secondary sources, this paper explores the concept of citizenship education within the wider concept of citizenship in England and their interrelationship. It identifies and analyses how this interrelationship manifests in both formal and informal sites of education practice currently offered to young citizens. It also draws on the educational theory of Paulo Freire in analysing the interconnection between the context and content of educational programmes and their effects in terms of the types of citizens they aim to produce and their likely outcome. The main findings show that whilst academic discourse consistently acknowledges the dynamic, multi-dimensional but essentially political quality of the concept of citizenship, official discourse, evident in educational policy, is predominantly concerned with controlling it. By reconstructing the mythical concept of a-political citizenship, defined by particular individualistic behaviours conducive to the maintenance of the dominant, 'free' market, economic system, citizenship education, within the increasingly homogenised, target driven state system, is effectively preparation for this limited and limiting role. This reinforces the undermining of collective ties alongside expanding the gap between those that can access citizenship and those that progressively struggle to do so. This paper, in line with Foucault, recognises that the proliferation of discourse, awash with official rhetoric, creates opportunities for alternative perspectives and therefore for actions that can challenge the sincerity of official policy and hold successive policy makers to account. The paper is structured by an introduction, followed by three separate sections, each divided into two chapters, and a conclusion.

## INTRODUCTION

Citizenship and education in all their manifestations exist in a symbiotic relationship to each other. However no concept is without a measure of contestation, particularly those regarding social phenomena, and the concept of citizenship is no exception. In fact it is often said that to state this particular fact is to indulge in cliché. Education is integral to the concept of citizenship, and like citizenship, education is necessarily a contested concept. Osler and Starkey, (2005, p.1), suggest education in democratic states has always been explicitly or implicitly about strengthening democracy, in the sense of both preparation for and contribution to democratic participation, but the extent of that preparation and the quality of the contribution depend on how citizenship, democracy and participation are understood in a given cultural context. It is my contention that any discourse on citizenship education needs to include a recognition of contestation because essentially contestation is fundamental to the concept of citizenship. It is also the aspect that has the potential to link other more disparate associations and therefore is increasingly used to define citizenship's dynamic, multi-dimensional character within the context of post-modern discourse.

### Description:

This study seeks to identify the main discursive developments of the concept of citizenship education within England, identifying how these conceptions have shaped the construction, implementation and outcomes of citizenship education for young citizens within the secondary school age range, in both formal and informal sites of state maintained education.

### Research Questions:

- How is citizenship understood in England?
- In what ways have these understandings informed the citizenship education offered?
- Does the citizenship education available contribute to an enriching of the meaning of citizenship?

### Methodology and Applied Theoretical perspectives:

The paper is based on a literature review of both primary and secondary source materials. The analysis is informed by the post-modernist theoretical ideas of Michael Foucault with particular reference to his conceptions of discourse and genealogy. Sarah Mills succinctly summarised Foucault's theory of discourse when she said that for Foucault, discourse was the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated

practice that accounts for a number of statements. According to Danaher, Shirato and Web, Foucault doesn't subscribe to the idea that there is an 'essential' truth to be discovered,

“On the contrary, he argues that knowledge and truth are produced out of power struggles (between different fields, disciplines and institutions) and they are used to authorise and legitimate the workings of power...The way in which this (power) flow moves around depends very much on how different groups, institutions and discourses negotiate, relate to and compete with one another...Because there are so many competing ideas, institutions and discourses, no single, authorised truth, ever emerges to dominate a society ”(Danaher, Shirato and Web 2000, pp.64,80)

Mills also suggests it is more complex than the Marxist notion of ideology which is 'always negative and constraining' because of Foucault's ideas on power and resistance. (Mills 2003, p6)

“Discourse does not simply translate reality into language; rather discourse should be seen as a system which structures the way we perceive reality.” (Mills 2003, p7)

Anthea Williams, (2005), describes Foucault's genealogical methods as beginning with the 'problematization' of common aspects of life. Foucault then applied an 'archaeological' historical investigation, to identify the development of the underlying and uncontested assumptions affecting the present situation. The archaeological method was aimed at uncovering what was hidden from official discourses which presented a fixed, teleological version of the relationship of the past to the present. It attempted to de-construct dominant 'truths' and 'knowledges' by revealing the conditions of their emergence, which were contingent upon the historical and cultural relations of power that they descended from; “power and knowledge directly imply one another,”(Foucault, 1975, p.27) It also attempts to highlight the contradictions and discontinuities in the 'chaotic becoming of the present'.

“They are not univocal; they define innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power relations.” (ibid)

This study is also informed by the pedagogical theory of Paulo Freire, outlined in, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1996). For Freire, like John Dewey before him, education was not a neutral process. It

either served to domesticate and produce conformity to the system or to liberate via the 'practice of freedom'. The primary method of domesticating education is what he describes as the 'banking system' which presents the binary distinction of the absolute ignorance of the students, in contradiction to the all knowledgeable teachers. The teaching process is unidirectional in the transmission of knowledge, and controlled from teacher to student as objects to be acted on, "changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them," (1996, p.55). He believed that one of the characteristics of oppressive education, which is part of the process of 'cultural invasion', is the self-deprecation of the oppressed, an internalising of the oppressor, which creates a self-fulfilling prophesy, (ibid, p.42). "Almost never do they realise that they, too, 'know things' they have learned in their relations with the world." (ibid, p.45) In contrast Freire advocated a participative, experiential education; a continuous cyclic process of action and reflection, which he called 'praxis', where students and teachers are jointly responsible for the learning process. "Liberation is Praxis: the action and reflection of men and women upon their world in order to transform it." (ibid, p.60) Communication in the form of 'real' dialogue, which is based on a commitment to others in associations of equality, trust and respect, is central to his pedagogic ideas. His methodology was to begin with facilitating an exploration of the concrete existential situations of the participants as the subjects of their learning process. This would enable the identification of a number of areas of interest which could then be 'problematized'. Jointly the group would agree on an area to investigate in an progressively challenging process of deconstruction and reconstruction. In critically analysing the interaction of the constituent parts from the different perspectives of the group, a clearer picture of the whole can be developed. Critical skills and awareness are increased and inform the creative process of transformative action from which new themes emerge and are problematized. "The unfinished character of human beings and the transformational character of reality necessitate that education be an ongoing activity." (ibid, p.65)

#### STRUCTURE:

This paper is divided into three sections, followed by a conclusion. Each of the three sections is divided into two chapters. Section 1 is an exploration of the main historical and discursive developments in the discourses of citizenship and provides the context for the following sections. Section 2 explores the historical and discursive developments of citizenship education in relation to the meanings identified in section 1. Section 3 provides an analysis of the current situation of citizenship education in England. The conclusion will summarise the findings in the corpus of the study, provide an evaluation and offer recommendations for the further development of citizenship education.

## SECTION 1: DESCENT

### INTRODUCTION:

Discussions about citizenship in 'Western' discourses usually begin by tracing the emergence of the concept to the ancient Athenians, where it is bound with emergent ideas about 'democracy'. Smith (2002, p.106), states that the oldest meaning of citizen is a participant in political self- governance and derives from; the Latin 'civis/civitas' meaning member of an ancient city-state, and the Greek 'polites' meaning membership of the Greek polis; therefore making citizenship conceptually inseparable from political governance. However, Burchell (2002, p.89) describes ancient citizenship in which the citizenry is its own political master as a utopian ideal turned into myth.

Aristotle's model of good government, incorporated a belief in the principle of excellence, personified in the 'Aristoi' (Crick, 2000, p.191) and embodied in an idealised concept of aristocracy, where the few ruled with the consent of the many. He viewed democracy, the direct participation without qualification of the whole citizenry, which excluded women, children and slaves, as the next best option; a political compromise which needed to be kept in check by aristocratic experience and knowledge (Crick, 2000, p.191).

Aristotelian attitudes to democracy are contradictory. Whilst recognising; the legitimacy of democracy, the limitations of choice, a capacity for development of the whole citizenry and the opportunities for this via democratic participation; in promoting the nurturing of citizens by the condescension of the 'Aristoi' he nonetheless saw a need for maintaining control. The exercise of democracy can thus be perceived as simultaneously a means for promoting freedom and control. Participation was encouraged but not enforced. Therefore citizenship here is an amalgamation of status, practice and aspiration incorporating the personal, social and political responsibilities of organising collective life. Embedded within these models of governance are tensions and contested ideas of rights, legitimacy, equality and responsibility. In summary, discursive elements can be identified which in various combinations continue to inform perceptions and create a basis for contestation. "Modern images of ancient citizenship do not come to us directly from the ancient texts themselves. Rather, in good measure are a product of the highly charged political controversies of the early modern world." (Burchell, 2002, p. 89)



## CHAPTER 1: EXPANSION AND THE NATION STATE

Whilst the ideal of self-governance has often served as an inspiration and an instrument for political efforts to achieve greater inclusion and democratic engagement in political life, equally the idea is politically threatening to many rulers with consequent attempts to abolish or redefine the category through-out its discursive history (Smith, 2002, p.106). In contrast to ancient citizenship, Burchell (2002, p.89) highlights the construction of individualised identities in relation to the state within modern citizenship “citizens are aware that they owe a primal obligation of obedience to some supreme sovereign ruler, and that this subjection limits their personal political autonomy in a quite profound manner.” Described as vested in the people, it is in the context of an elaborate system of political representation at a distance, with citizenship expressed only passively as a form of constraint upon action or delegation of action to others,(ibid). Revisions to the concepts of democracy and citizenship to incorporate ambitions of territorial expansion, overlaid the corner stones embedded within ancient Athenian culture, to form the foundations of the dominant 'Western' discourse, and underpinned what Greaber calls the 'Atlantic' system.

“ (R)epresentative systems modelled on the Roman Republic... were later redubbed, under popular pressure, 'democracies' and traced to Athens...I would suggest that this process of democratic recuperation and refoundation was typical of a broader process that probably marks any civilisational tradition.”(Greaber, p.291)

One of the most significant figures to affect the discourse on citizenship was T.H. Marshall. He argued that the process of extending citizenship rights progressively developed over several centuries, within the context of the developing construct of the nation and modernisation,

“This national closure of citizenship was achieved on the one hand, by the extension of rights and benefits to different strata of the civil society; on the other, by attributing some distinctiveness - 'shared' values, language, blood, history or culture – to the collective citizenry.”(Cesarani and Fulbrook, 1996, p.17)

He classified these rights into three groups; civil, political, and social, which he believed were each contingent upon the establishment of the former, whilst recognising the process was not entirely linear. He suggests civil rights were established in something like their 'modern' form by the early 1800's, that political rights were gradually extended over the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, although not universal until the 20<sup>th</sup>;

“The story of civil rights in their formative period is one of the gradual addition of new rights to a status that already existed...it was essentially the status freedom... When freedom became 'universal', citizenship grew from a local into a national institution.”(Marshall, 1950, p.17)

It was not until the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with the notable exception of education, that social rights attained an equal partnership,(ibid). Marshall described post-war U.K as the hyphenated society comprising of a balance between three distinctly separate elements, 'Democracy-Welfare-Capitalism', none of which, he believed, could be subordinated to the others. Each were understood to operate according to its own principles and each were seen as essential for the enrichment of life. Theoretically, this 'tripartite' model produced a system of checks and balances created via the inherent systemic tension, maintaining the overall structure of social democracy. Civil rights provided the foundation for capitalist forms of wealth production; political rights provided the foundations for the contestation of inequalities, and social rights provided the access to material and symbolic goods which provided the basis of equal participation in civil and political society. The aim was to ensure an equality of opportunity to engage in, and benefit from, such a society, measurable, in part by the level of social mobility, (Lewis, 2004, p.15).

This view that was steeped in the optimism of the post-war era, of continued egalitarian movement towards progression in the extension of rights, (Bottomore, 1996, p.58), coinciding with continuous development of wealth and full employment. “Status differences can receive the stamp of legitimacy in terms of democratic citizenship provided they do not cut too deep,” (Marshall, 1950, p.44).

Many factors led to the development of the welfare state including the political, social and recreational struggles of working class communities during the inter-war years, the aftermath of the second world war, the extent and costs of mass unemployment during the 1930's depression and the “rise of a particular intellectual configuration in which certain forms of state activity and collectivism attained a position of orthodoxy”, (Lewis, 2004, p.40). The subject at the heart of these developments was the working class, collectively and individually, especially that of the white male with a dependent wife and family, to be more fully incorporated into the 'democratic' state, (ibid). The vast inequalities that led to the high levels of deprivation, squalor and indignities, experienced by millions of the working classes could no longer be tolerated (Lewis and Fink, 2004, p.41) particularly when set alongside developing discourses of inclusive nationhood.

According to Bottomore (1996, p.59) the post-war period of exceptionally high growth rates was one of 'managed capitalism'; a 'mixed economy' brought about by 'class compromise'. Underlying was an equation of social justice with welfare, a focus on ameliorative measures, affecting the consequences not the foundations of poverty, (ibid: 60). Amelioration against the excesses of capitalism and the expansion of the notion of citizenship came at a high price. The cost was the constraints on freedom of expression through social and cultural diversity. Diversity was perceived as problematic to the process of furthering the construction of national and imperial identities which were based on the dominance of male, white, middle class, heterosexual and able bodied cultural norms. The new social rights intended to enrich citizenship, were premised on assimilationist ideas and still lacked substance for many who struggled to fit the mould. Lewis and Fink, (2004, p.43), taking the lead from Foucault, suggests that the state, in increasingly directing its intervention towards the maintenance of a minimum standard of living, developed mechanisms for administration and delivery of services and benefits through 'bureau-professionalism', fostering a particular moral attitude. This reflected and legitimised a sensibility of 'constrained collectivism', the roots of which, they suggest, lie in the extension of the franchise in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and in the proliferation of discourse which led to the emergence of new social subjects. These newly formed subjects were deemed to be problematic, requiring new forms of governance and a re-conceptualisation of the state. This led to a general view that a strong interventionist state operating in a context of collectivism was necessary, although there were political divisions over the character and form of the state and collectivism, (ibid).

Gramsci identifies the concept of 'the ethical state' within bourgeois societies as essentially the construction of an interventionist state, which provides a level of protection for the working classes. By incorporating an enabling and educative role in the constitution of specific values, behaviour and attitudes, citizens regulate themselves, reducing the need for the state to use its monopoly of the instruments of force and coercion. 'This hegemonic success along with an ethical dimension, underlies the conception of the state and people as a unified entity';

“the ethical or educative principles and practices of the state inculcate within the people particular habits of mind, dispositions, normalized practices, ways of being, and identities in which homogeneity and limited diversity are both imagined and assumed. Thus, the ethical state is tied to formation of nation and nationalist sensibility as part of its evocation of citizens and citizenship.” (ibid:46)

This expanded national citizenship gave rise to a number of tensions between; the perceived need to balance a degree of collectivism with the interests and workings of a capitalist economy, the promotion of a sense of individual and collective responsibilities and the gap between the vision and the provision. Paradoxically the repackaging of the individual and collective identity as predominantly national meant a loosening of other ties to family, community, class and other sectional interests; so despite material gains the resulting limitations, on personal lives – in terms of sense of self, identity and opportunities for alternative ways of being 'were clearly understood and deeply resented', (ibid, p.78). Nicos Poulantzas identified this process of the production of a particular kind of subject as an atomised member of the public, as being a key feature of statecraft and which he described as the 'isolation effect', (cited in: Trouillot, 2001, p131).

The economic situation of the working classes improved substantially as a result of economic growth, full-employment and expansion of welfare services and there were also opportunities for social mobility determined mainly by changing occupational structure and improved access to education. Its social situation also changed through the acquisition of improved civil, political and social rights. These developments led to the 'embourgeoisement' of the working class and the emergence of a new type of middle class society, (Bottomore,1996, p.75). Continuation of the dominant discourse, progressively rejecting working class and other non-dominant cultures, as inferior and/or problematic, promoted assimilation of middle class, individualistic norms, values and aspirations. Liberal concepts of self-help, charitable giving and increased material consumption, created the blue-print for citizenship and the social, economic and moral corrective to 'cultural deficits'.

“The British case...exemplifies the fluid nature of national identity, its interaction with nationality and citizenship...The struggle over the definition over an exclusive or an inclusive national identity is still not resolved, but the treatment of immigrants and non-white citizens bears the marks of a dominant exclusivist ethos.”(Cesarani, D & Fulbrook, M. 1996:7)

This dominant discourse characterises the less advantaged as incompetent, deviant and undeserving, and is characteristic in the development and maintenance of a stratified society, which by its nature undermines the concept of maintaining a guaranteed minimum standard of living relative to the rest of society.

From the mid 1970's increasing demands on public expenditure, the slowdown in economic growth,

recession and high rates of unemployment, coupled with the 'new economic policy' of the 'New Right', left the British economy 'in a parlous condition' and the welfare state facing 'an uncertain future' by the end of the 1980's, (Bottomore, 1996, p.78). The 'New Right', steeped in the tradition of the dominant liberal discourse, rejected what it termed as the 'dependency culture' in favour of an 'enterprise culture', and in winning the ideological battle, created new social policies into which this ideology was embedded. The post-war 'class compromise' and underlying consensus, which legitimised intervention as a role of the 'ethical' state, broke-down after a sustained ideological attack. The focus of the attack was towards both the working class as an institution, and on its traditional forms of organisation, through anti-union laws and in the remodelling of large sections of working class citizens into the continuously expanding ranks of the new middle classes.

Gradually social rights as an attribute of citizenship, were undermined in an aggressive emphasis on privatisation and reinforcement of the concept of welfare claimants as recipients of charity. This eroding of the substantive rights of citizenship by reducing the ability of the poor to assert their civil rights through the legal system or political rights through marginalisation, consequently recast them as second class citizens,(ibid. p.71). Continued pressure was exerted psychologically, socially, politically and economically, to reject non-dominant cultures. This is evidenced by a mass exodus away from working class self-ascription and illustrated by the emergence of discursive elements denying its very existence, incorporating overt racism and the concept of an 'underclass'. ;

“Through the isolation of socio-economic conflicts, notably class divisions, the state not only guarantees its own relative autonomy vis-a-vis dominant classes but also produces atomised, individualized citizens who appear all equal in a supposedly undifferentiated public sphere.”(Trouillot, 2001, p.131)

A new market-led conflation between civil society and consumerism was embraced. Consumerism became repackaged as citizenship, therein dividing society into those that have the means to compete in the market, as citizens, and those that do not and are thus excluded from participation. Here was the emergence of “an aggressive neo-liberalism armed with the new ideological construction of freedom in the form of buying power,”(Cesarani and Fulbrook, 1996, p151). Unsurprisingly the gap between the very wealthy and the poorest in society widened in Britain from the 1980's onwards and has continued to do so up to the present day under the continued adherence to a neo-liberal economic model.

## CHAPTER 2: POST-NATIONAL AND DE-TERRITORIAL

Parallel and complementary to the development of the post-war ethical state in Britain were connected developments within Europe. Creating interdependency of the powerful elites within the nation states, in terms of capital and markets, was the means by which it was believed unity and consequently peace, would be forged. Essentially the union protected the status-quo, in relation to the continued ascension of capitalism, but the horror of war and 'man's inhumanity to man' witnessed during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, allowed for a recognition of the sacrifices of ordinary people and a general consensus regarding the basis of humanity and the right of all to live a life of dignity.

The EU, in contrast to Britain, continues to maintain a vision of itself as an ethical (super) state through redistributive measures and pro-actively championing human rights, whilst actively promoting 'the free market', the panacea of the neo-liberal ideological position. The 'Maastricht' Treaty 1993 was agreed on the ideological basis that continued wealth creation, via a free market economy with limited regulations, allowing the flow of capital, goods and people across Europe and beyond, creates its own equilibrium. "What we have is a trend towards a new model of membership anchored in deterritorialized notions of personal rights,"(Cesarani and Fulbrook, 1996, p151). The treaty gave the concept of European citizenship form and substance, stipulating all citizens of the member states would also be afforded the status of EU citizenship;

"Through successive treaties the European parliament's power over union legislation had gradually increased. Union citizenship enhances the political rights to the European parliament of those who have exploited the opportunities for mobility."(Follesdal, 2002, p.72)

However the established operating system of subsidiarity, "incongruously, in as much as the ascription and codification of rights move beyond national frames of reference, post-national rights remain organised at the national level," (Cesarani and Fulbrook, 1996, p.24), means each state has its own parameters for deciding who belongs to the state, and consequently who does not, which can differ significantly, creating what Weil, (1996, p.84) describes as 'near absurd conditions'.

"Regional citizenship is both competitive with and complementary to Westphalian citizenship," (Falk, 2002, p.23), and therein was created a tension within the construction of European citizenship, which characterises the discourse of European identity and citizenship. British

citizenship in the context of European citizenship is confused and contradictory. The conflation between nation and state, particularly for the English, developed over centuries of hegemonic dominance, gives rise to a confusion, between nationality and citizenship; “Britain is an 'old country' with a reputedly stable constitutional system, but a weak notion of citizenship and a confused definition of nationality,”(Cesarani and Fulbrook, 1996, p.5). In fact the concept of citizenship, until recently was only referred to in negative terms as part of a pejorative discourse of the ideological right to that of the left and/ or foreigners.

Europe’s support for minorities and variously funded social programmes, aimed at combating disadvantage and promoting diversity and equality of opportunity, alongside a pro-integrationist, centre 'left' government, went some-way to counterbalancing the elitist and xenophobic overtones of dominant British discourses. Currently austerity and the dominance of Conservatism has unfortunately led to a process of retrenchment. Nevertheless, it did have an effect of reviving and raising awareness of debate over what it means to be a (British) citizen in contrast to a (British) subject, and what either meant in the context of membership of the EU;

“Union citizenship invokes the notion of citizenship. This commits the European political order to the equal standing of all individuals, including democratic control over the institutions that shape their lives” (Follesdal, 2002, p.80).

Mainstream discourses, almost systematically, present Britain's membership of the EU as negative, preferring to reconstruct a xenophobic and isolationist vision of Britain, geographically and ethnically separate from the 'foreignness' of Europe, and enjoying a 'special relationship' with the US, despite evidence to the contrary. The nostalgia for homogeneity is thus in sharp contradiction to the embracing of European diversity, particularly in light of the movements towards greater autonomy for Wales and Scotland. “The sense of living in a heterotopic world of an infinity of different and often conflicting spaces can produce a crisis of identity.” (Danaher, Shirato and Web, 2000, p113) Although criticisms of democratic deficiency have some basis, it could equally be argued that the existing democratic credentials are not publicised and many deficiencies can equally be levelled at the model of liberal democracy also favoured in Britain.

In many respects post-national conceptions of citizenship in Europe stem from the same paradigm as national conceptions, in that it is consciously built onto the nation state system, which both legitimises, and by the same logic, de-legitimises the premise of its basis, not only at the level of new or micro nationalisms but also at the level of supranationalism.

“An identity politics – energised by narrations of collective 'pasts' and accentuated cultural differences – becomes the basis for participation and affords the means for mobilizing resources in the national and world polities.”(Cesarani and Fulbrook, 1996, pp.26-27)

Its configuration is also geographically determined and therefore reinforces a primary relationship between citizenship, nationality and a territorially defined, albeit multi-dimensional, nation state. De-territorial perceptions of citizenship are de-limited, articulated in terms of global or world citizenship, and also beyond the globe and humanity, by cosmopolitan, environmental and systems approaches;

“It is becoming evident today that far from being unitary, the institution of citizenship has multiple dimensions only some of which might be inextricably linked to the nation state.”(Sassen, 2002, p.277)

The initial usage of the term Cosmopolitan, also grounded in antiquity, was a philosophical recognition of connection between the cosmos, as the community of all humanity, and the resultant rationality of concomitant duties as 'citizens of the world' toward creating a better world. Although there is also likely to have been a more pragmatic basis to these philosophical musings in terms of expanding, if limited, experiences of trade and travel.

In more modern uses of the term, cosmopolitan was used to denote an individual whose horizons were not limited by the territorial, social, economic or cultural boundaries that shaped the lives of the majority. Contemporary discourses on cosmopolitanism have attempted to disassociate it from charges of elitism;

“The cosmopolitanism of our times does not spring from the capitalized 'virtues' of Rationality, Universality, and Progress; nor is it embodied in the myth of the nation writ large in the figure of the citizen of the world. Cosmopolitans today are often the victims of modernity, failed by capitalism's upward mobility,” (Pollock et al, 2002, p.6)

However, in terms of the choices to operate beyond the nation state in any meaningful capacity these are still limited or non-existent for the majority of citizens of the world; “Mobility and control over mobility both reflect and reinforce power. Mobility is a resource to which not everyone has an equal relationship.”(Skeggs cited in Sheller, 2004, p.3)



Linked to, and influenced by, contemporary discourses of cosmopolitanism and underpinned by the near global consensus regarding human rights, is the concept of 'global citizenship' which can be conceptually conceived as a product of the process of 'globalisation'. This process describes the explosion of impacts from actions taken in one part of the world reverberating on others; facilitated by the explosion of information and communication technologies progressively reducing spacial and temporal distances across the globe. Globalisation is intrinsic to the (ideo)logic of capitalism and the continuous search for, access to, and exploitation of; new markets, cheaper raw materials and reduced production costs. "Global capitalism is best analysed as a system of structured inequality."(Axtmann, 2002, p.108)

Concerns about environmental sustainability, social justice and the inability of existing state governments to exert influence over, or hold to account, the proliferation of multi-national organisations, has produced a lot of criticism of the nation-state system in terms of world governance.

"(E)xtraterritorial 'global' forces both invade the political space of the nation-state and, because of their extraterritoriality, are operating outside its controlling reach."(Axtmann, 2002, p.102)

Much consideration has been given as to whether the nation-state is capable of, or even inclined to, uphold its duty to protect its citizens in the arena of a global free-market alongside what it means to be, if in fact we are, 'global citizens' and how a global citizenship could be effectively mobilized. The main arguments congregate around whether there is a desire to create a new form of world polity with the power to hold these bodies to account; "Justice must be backed up by a set of political and economic institutions with the power to enforce,"(Van den Anker, 2002, p.162), and it is arguable whether without this there can in fact be such a thing as global citizenship; or to build the effectiveness of existing international structures.

"A new model of global citizenship would not require the existence of a global state but of a global community that provides protection against the overwhelming power of the nation-state to its own citizens and the power of multi-national corporations over people's lives,"(ibid, p.167),

Currently it is only the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organisations that could be in a

position to undertake the role but first their democratic credentials need improving.

“Underfunded, and subject to political interference in its humanitarian role, the UN's ability to help the world's poorest and most vulnerable, the one billion of the global underclass, will suffer most by this neglect. The only political choice for global citizens is to maintain the case for reform,” (Imber, 2002, p.124).

Some commentators maintain that it is only through the power of democratic states that these inequalities, which disproportionately benefit rich countries, can be challenged; “democratic practices within states make wider institutions both possible and legitimate.” (Axtmann, 2002, pp.108-9).

The area of discourse there does appear to be a level of consensus, is in the desire to retain and imbue the concept of citizenship and improve the level of practice, in terms of democratic participation, at all levels, as the 'emergent matrix of citizenship: complex, uneven and fluid', (Falk, 2002, p.15), means these concepts, encompassing many different meanings, which are and need to be, consciously and consistently contested.

## SECTION 2: CONSTRUCTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

### INTRODUCTION

As illustrated by the previous discussion, historically education was perceived both in terms of providing the desired qualification to access citizenship and as a product of the process of active participation. Thus the ideal of democratic citizenship was a 'virtuous' learning cycle of action and consideration, leading to knowledge and skills. It was also understood as a means by which the elite could cultivate specific knowledges and attitudes within the citizenry. In this sense the conflicting aims of liberation and domestication are embedded from the early discourses of education and citizenship.

### CHAPTER 3: FORMAL

Although social rights were denied by all but the most enlightened public thinkers in 19<sup>th</sup> century England, education was increasingly recognised as a fundamental right of the citizen to be educated. A concession to allowing the state power of intervention was justified by the argument that education enabled the fulfilment of the requirements of citizenship. Only an educated electorate was seen as having the capacity for exercising their rights and duties to self and others. "A community that enforces this duty has begun to realise that its culture is an organic unity and its civilisation a national heritage." (Marshall, 1950, p.16). For some the notion of compulsory education was to be contested on the basis of conflicting with the notions of existing civil rights. Nevertheless by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century a national system of free, elementary education was introduced. Instead of creating the necessary social support to make schooling accessible, responsive and attractive to the children of the working classes, it was made compulsory.

As stated by Carr and Hartnett, (1996, p.76) the 'system' evolved in a fragmented, 'voluntaryist' and unco-ordinated manner, effectively maintaining aristocratic and feudal elements. It was built onto an existing patchwork of religious, voluntary and charitable provision, incorporating the industrial and 'ragged schools'. These were established consecutively for the correction and protection of children from the 'dangerous' and 'perishing' classes incorporating elements of informal welfare provision alongside training and instruction.

“(A)n enormously ambitious attempt to determine, through the capture of educational

means, the patterns of thought, sentiment and behaviour of the working class ...- to raise a new race of working people - respectful, cheerful, hard-working, loyal, pacific and religious.” (Johnson, 1970, p.119).

This clearly illustrates Fanon's understanding of education systems within capitalist societies which he asserts are established to cultivate pacification as part of the process of colonisation;

“all these aesthetic expressions of respect for the established order serve to create around the exploited person an atmosphere of submission and of inhibition which lightens the task of policing considerably.” (Fanon, 196, p.29)

According to Dewey, (Osler and Starkey, 2005, p.19), this newly nationalised system changed the role of teachers, which had previously been influenced by the ideas from the early Renaissance and Enlightenment in the provision of a humanistic curriculum, into agents of the state where 'education' became more a form of training.

“I must say in passing that on the few occasions that I have been inside a Board-school, I have been much depressed by the mechanical drill that was too obviously being applied there to all the varying capacities and moods.”(Morris, 1888)

Private provision exclusively continued to educate those children from wealthier backgrounds, maintaining a segregated system, which divided between those that were privileged enough to chose their education and those that were not. Marshall recognised that; “a divided education system, by promoting both intra-class similarities and inter-class difference, gave emphasis and precision to a criterion of social distance...The limited service was class making at the same time as it was class abating.”(1950, p.34)

However he believed that the solely instrumental nature of education developed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was changing in recognition, albeit minimal, of the concept of the 'educational ladder' which was gradually incorporated into the system. Initially the offer was to be in the form of competition for the limited number of free places available for secondary and higher education. At the time Marshall was writing secondary education was provided universally but still adjusted to occupational demand within a two tiered competitive system.

“The right of the citizen in this process of selection and mobility is the right to equality of

opportunity. Its aim is to eliminate hereditary privilege. In essence it is the equal right to display and develop differences or inequalities; the right to be recognised as unequal...through education in its relations with occupational structure, citizenship operates as an instrument of social stratification.”(ibid, p.38-39)

T.H. Marshall's optimism stemmed from the consensus within contemporary discourses, which encouraged him to believe that “(a)pparent inconsistencies are in fact a source of stability, achieved through a compromise which is not dictated by logic,” (ibid, p.49) His conclusion recognised that a system constructed on tension can only tolerate a certain amount of flexibility but it was underpinned by a number of assumptions linked to the continuing stability of normalised institutional models. Essentially the social structures of family, community, and the nation, in line with the economic base was not expected to change dramatically.

The segregated state school system was widely criticised for severely limiting the opportunities of the majority of working class children and young people from the age of eleven. The eleven plus examination tested children in order to assess their academic suitability for selection into the grammar schools. Those that failed to pass were placed into one of the secondary modern schools where the curriculum offered was less academic than the grammar schools, and incorporated more technical subjects; “The more confident the claim of education to be able to sift human material during the early years of life, the more is mobility concentrated within those years, and consequently limited thereafter,”(ibid, p.38). This process illustrates the argument that 'meritocracy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century replaced aristocracy in the 19<sup>th</sup> as the new agency of exclusiveness and exclusion; with the vast majority of children, at the age of eleven publicly excluded from most opportunities to pursue higher education and upward mobility', (Carr and Hartnett, 1996, p.76). The force of public opinion against this most obvious illustration and re-creation of the class divide, was articulated by what had become accepted as part of the dominant discourse. It was an appeal to the equal opportunities that had been the promise of the state to citizens in the construction of post war Britain. This meant that the two tiered state system of secondary education was gradually replaced by the comprehensive system from 1965 onwards. Although some grammar schools were maintained most became comprehensives. Those wealthier sections of the population who would likely have availed themselves of a grammar school education most probably swelled the ranks of existing private provision, known paradoxically as the 'public' school sector. “Public schools and the ancient universities remained hardly touched by democratic and egalitarian ideals.”(ibid)

These structural inequalities within the 'system' were also reflected in the content of the curriculum;

“for those who were not expected to take up positions of responsibility or power, the school subject of 'civics' emphasising responsibilities and respect for those in power,... was designed to encourage a sense of uncritical patriotism. In contrast, the education of elites has laid considerable stress on preparing the young for their responsibilities as future leaders.”(Osler and Starkey, 2005, p.1)

As previously noted citizenship was not a term much associated with mainstream educational discourse prior to the late 1980's. The emphasis in mainstream education was still one based around the teaching of 'civics', which taught the constitutional framework and a particular view as to how it developed. The teaching of civics was delivered as part of, and complimentary to, the cultivation of specific attitudes and behaviour via the whole school ethos. Generally this 'ethos' could be described as the promotion of an unquestioning respect for authority, obeying rules, observing norms of behaviour and developing a sense of personal responsibility. Pearce and Hallgarten (2000, p.3) referencing David Kerr, highlight the identification of a national trait in the perception of overt official, government direction to schools, regarding political socialisation and citizenship education, as vulgar and 'un-English'.

Chomsky, suggests that schools, reinforced by other state institutions, function as a mechanism of socialization into the norms of behaviour endorsed by the dominant class. “(A)utocensorship begins at a very early age through a socialization process that is also a form of indoctrination that works against independent thought in favour of obedience.”(Chomsky and Macedo, 2004, p.24) His ideas are reminiscent of Gramsci's concepts of the ethical state and hegemony. The concept of 'autocensorship' suggests an uncritical internalisation of acceptable behaviours and attitudes, which are external to the self and through which, consciously or unconsciously, individuals modify to perceived expectations. These ideas are also closely connected to Foucault's in perceiving state education as part of the structure of disciplinary institutions;

“Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude', a 'capacity', which seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.” (Foucault, 1975, p.138)

By the late 1970's, according to Tomlinson (1996, p.122), there was considerable agreement by educationalists that the curriculum needed changing. Change was necessary to reflect the multi-cultural/racial quality of British society and its changing post-imperial position in the world, especially in light of consideration that “education and schooling in England, far from reducing the impediments to citizenship, have magnified, legitimated and fossilized them,”(Carr and Hartnett, 1996, p.78). Bernard Crick was at the forefront of an educational movement to introduce the emerging 'World Studies' within mainstream education. It was to incorporate consideration of human rights, peace, the environment and developmental education within and beyond the nation in the context of interdependence. However, the subject was not wholeheartedly embraced. Changes to the curriculum of this nature received little popular support from parents of both minority and majority backgrounds, (Tomlinson, 1996, p.123), and according to Jeffs (2005) schools were actively discouraged from offering political education.

The late 1980's saw a rise in interest in the concept of citizenship. This is likely to have been generated, in part, by the challenge from the further processes of European integration and legislation in the promotion of equalities. Consequently there was a resurgence in the discourse of fear for social disintegration, linked variously to the changing economic and social structure in Britain. As we have seen this was intersected by divisive and racist discourses which served to undermine existing social bonds whilst reconstructing narrowly defined nationalist ones. “ The 'New Racism' has made citizenship itself the site of struggle over conceptions of the nation and national identity.” (Ceserani, 1996, p.67)

There was also a resurgence of traditional discourses focussed on 'disaffected and dangerous youth'. These were linked to the rejection of dominant norms and values (bourgeois) which were supported by the hugely successful ideological construction by the political right of 'the dependency culture', which they believed was created by an imbalance in favour of social rights within the welfare state. Their solution was the aggressive promotion of privatization further into the social sphere whilst reducing the levels of public service provision.

Paradoxically the responses of both the right and left of the political spectrum could both be described as variants of communitarianism, on the one hand promoting a homogeneous culture incorporating traditional concepts of liberal moral virtues, and on the other, by promoting respect for essentialised notions of multiculturalism. Both promoting an ideal of the 'good citizen' in terms of obeying laws, paying taxes, active engagement with the community, and freely giving of personal resources for the greater good. Both maintaining the existing political structure. Across

the political spectrum concern was expressed about the dangers posed by specific cultural groups that could not be assimilated or tolerated. Schools were highlighted as having a role to play in this deficit reduction, (Demaine, 1996, p.11).

Consequently in 1988 the House of Commons set up a commission on citizenship which advocated the inclusion of citizenship within the new centralised national curriculum, (Demaine, 1996, pp.20-21). This national curriculum, along with the implementation of a harsh regime of multiple testing, came into being as a result of the 1988 Education Reform Act. The Act gave the government greater control over subject content, largely decided by politically appointed working groups, reflective of Conservative views, or by direct political interference, (Tomlinson, 1996, p.124). It also offered incentives for schools to opt out of local authority control. During the same year another report specific to education was published by the recently established National Curriculum Council (NCC), entitled 'Education for Citizenship', (Demaine, 1996, pp.20-21). This report put forward arguments from educationalists of the need for the explicit inclusion of citizenship as a discrete subject within the national curriculum, upgrading it from its inclusion as a cross curricular theme without a prominent position, (McCowan, 2009, p.45), in order that citizenship education was not left “to some ill defined process often referred to as the 'hidden curriculum',” (Demaine,1996, pp.20-21).

Accordingly citizenship education was to be promoted in terms of values; which the NCC defined as those which characterise a 'civilised' society, (justice, democracy, respect for the rule of law), to ensure that pupils understand the duties, responsibilities and rights, equal to all citizens. It set out a 'framework of objectives and content where citizenship was to be considered within a range of activities, opportunities and experiences' related to the whole national curriculum. The 'Encouraging Citizenship' report emphasised 'active' citizenship in the form of voluntary and community work although included issues of wider political participation, (ibid). Crick (2000, p.101) was highly critical of the form of citizenship being advocated by Thatcher's, then Major's, government when he stated that Thatcher's rhetoric of citizenship equating to voluntary effort, couldn't fill the gap left by the deliberate under-resourcing of social services, especially for those least able to organise and exert pressure. “Citizenship became confused with charity, or is seen as part of privatization.” (ibid)

According to Gilbert (1996, p.44) the underlying approach of the Commission for Citizenship was a procedural one which focused on rules as the essence of citizenship, leading to the exclusion of the economy and the family as spheres of relations and experiences relevant to citizenship. The



educational prescriptions are thus primarily focussed on developing the skills required for participation in this institutional framework of rules, determined by the role of the individual citizen in the political system. These developments in the discourse of citizenship education were accompanied, complemented and to an extent brought into being by the wider discourses of the commodification of pupils within the increasingly marketised sphere of educational provision. “In competitive markets, children are constructed as objects of the educational system, to be attracted, excluded, displayed and processed, according to their commercial worth, rather than subjects with needs, desires, potentials.”(Gerwartz, cited in Lucey, 2004, p.114)

This discourse was centred on the individual (parent) consumer as the archetypal model of the citizen, consciously choosing from a range of available options in a post-modern global society. This model of citizenship emerged alongside notions of the 'risk society', where rapid local, national and global changes impact on the social world to create unavoidable risks beyond government control, for which the citizen-consumer must take individual responsibility and develop resilience, (Lucey, 2004, p.88). Nevertheless, “(p)ublic decisions have too important an effect on the lives of individuals to be left entirely to a multiplication of random individual decisions with the government pretending to be the mere umpire of natural market forces,” (Crick, 2000, p.103).

The proliferation of discourses on citizenship and citizenship education gathered apace through-out the 1990's along with continued and rapid changes in social and economic structures, facilitated by globalisation. The growing political consensus of concern about the 'democratic deficit' was articulated in multiple ways across the political spectrum. Pearce and Hallgarten (2000, p.4) suggest a number of underlying factors; the disastrously low turn outs in the 1999 local government and European parliament elections, devolution, perceived political illiteracy and alienation, particularly amongst the young.

“What is far more likely than breakdown is a gradual decay of civic spirit in Britain. I do not fear growth in the numbers of extremists of either left or right so much as a retreat into the immediate home and the materialistic consumer-self.”(Crick, 2000, p.39)

Alongside the above, engagement with emerging forms of (non-traditional) political arenas and their mediums, challenged the democratic legitimacy of the existing system. There were also fears that an enfranchised working class might be indifferent to their duties, or become radicalised, evidencing a judgement of actual or substandard citizens,(Jeffs, 2000).

In line with the apparent indifference and apathy towards local and European elections, the levels of participation in national elections in Britain, inline with other 'mature democracies' were also in decline.

“In most mature democracies, some aspects of the practice of citizenship appear to be in decline...The first national elections of the century in the USA, Britain and France were notable for record levels of abstention.”(Osler and Starkey, 2005, p.15)

Giddens (2000, p.22) highlights surveys which show a declining trust in politicians and authority figures generally, which was especially marked among young people. There was cynicism towards orthodox democratic politics, parties and leaders, and expressions of beliefs about existing political parties having hidden agendas, lacking differentiation or the power to affect change. In essence it added up to a legitimation deficit.

The National Commission on Education (1993) recommended citizenship should be part of the compulsory core curriculum and encompass a broad base of; relations between individuals and the world they live in, the institutions of democracy, the rights and responsibilities of living in a democratic society, the creation of wealth, the role of public and private employers and voluntary organisations, and the opportunities which people have to shape or play a creative part in the life of the community, (Fogelman, 1996, p.89). The commission had no official status but according to Fogelman (1996, p.90) the recommendations were reinforced by the OFSTED framework for inspections of schools under the criteria for the inspection of the 'Spiritual, Moral, Cultural and Social Education and also Equality of Opportunity, Welfare and Guidance', many of which corresponded directly with the objectives of citizenship education.

Despite the level of discourse about citizenship education there was little change in practice. The empty rhetoric generated criticism as it remained at the margins of the school system, if present at all, (Pearce and Hallgarten, 2000, p.4). It can be argued that the official imperative to political and educational discourse, was an attempt to wrest control and re-gain the ideological initiative. This can be seen in light of the independently developing, educational responses to the changing social, economic and political realities of Britain, within the wider context of Europe and the world. An example is the lack of political support or credibility given to the 'World studies' initiative. Once this ideological initiative was successfully achieved, in the form of the de-politicised notions of the 'good', and then additionally 'consumer' citizen, and in limiting the scope or flexibility of mainstream education for independent action, there was then little political will to change the

profile, status or delivery of citizenship education within the curriculum. In Foucault's (1976, pp. 22-36) study of sexuality he identified the 'incitement to talk as a technique of power in the transformation of activity into a discursive existence. This power mechanism, relayed and supported by other power mechanisms in the form of analysis, stock taking, classification, and specification of quantitative or causal studies, define a norm and all possible deviations are carefully described'. "I had to speak of it as of a thing to be not simply condemned or tolerated but managed, inserted into systems of utility regulated for the greater good of all, made to function according to an optimum."(Foucault, 1976, p.24) There are clear parallels between Foucault's discoveries with regard to the incitement to discourse on sexuality to those on citizenship and citizenship education. This is reinforced by Foucault's point that once established the 'norm is spoken of less and less', in fact, "nothing further was demanded of it than to define itself from day to day." (Foucault, 1976, p.38)

In 1997 the newly elected Labour government set up a further advisory group in its attempt to 'relaunch' citizenship education. The Advisory Group report, 'Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools' (QCA,1998), also known as the 'Crick Report', after its chairman, Bernard Crick, called for citizenship education to be made compulsory within the national curriculum and to promote active participation. "We aim at no less than a change in the political culture of this country, nationally and locally," (QCA.1998). Underpinning the report were three explicitly stated principles for its development; social and moral responsibility, community involvement and political literacy, all of which were perceived as interrelated and mutually dependent in 'effective' citizenship education. The report was clearly and unapologetically articulating a civic republican model of citizenship and citizenship education. Its purpose was to 'secure and increase the skills, knowledge and values related to the nature and practices of participatory democracy, awareness of rights and duties and responsibilities for becoming active citizens'. This was set within the context of communitarianism. "Citizenship education must be education for citizenship. It is not an end in itself, even if it will involve learning a body of knowledge, as well as the development of skills and values," (ibid, p.8).

The tripartite definition of citizenship education as the habitual interaction between the three separate principles, (Pearce and Hallgarten, 2000, p. 4), was complemented by advocating the development of a three stranded approach to encompass; knowledge and understanding, skills of enquiry and communication, participation and responsible action. These were to be translated into a set of very specific learning outcomes which could be delivered flexibly, and implemented in stages, according to the strengths, resources and particular needs of the school community.

“Schools must be free to prioritise their own values, to plan creatively, to take risks that may not always be successful. If they are able to innovate and excite, citizenship education will finally flourish.” (ibid, p.15)

It repeatedly stressed the need for participative methods and for schools to consider the relationship between their ethos, organisation and daily practices, alongside the aims and purpose of citizenship education, (ibid, 2000, p.13). But there are aspects where the report is confusing. It included various statements regarding outcomes and assessment which appeared contradictory.

“This introduction of new requirements will be helped...above all, by a curriculum based on suggested learning outcomes not on rigid prescriptions; but nonetheless adequate, new resources are essential.” (QCA, 1998, p.32)

Although part of a wider statement regarding building from the basis of learning in key stages 1 and 2 which are not statutory, it was linked to other more general aspects identified to support effective implementation, and so created the potential for confusion. This also raises a question as to the differential attitudes towards respecting the professional autonomy of teachers in the primary and secondary school sectors in terms of an acknowledgement that prescribing learning outcomes leads to rigidity and therefore are antithetical to effective pedagogies.

The recommendations were taken up, almost in their entirety, by the government. A notable addition was the stipulation of active community service volunteering. This was to encompass, and effectively maintain, the middle-class model of citizenship conflating the 'active' with the 'good' citizen. In reinforcing notions of duties in terms of being law abiding, tax paying individuals, that understand their moral obligations to give charitably of their resources to those less fortunate, there is a concomitant reinforcement of welfare or 'the common good' as the process and product of charity. Despite an emphasis on encouraging the use of participatory pedagogical approaches, as opposed to exclusively didactic methods, and coupled with references to a range of officially endorsed political activities, it is likely that these embedded middle-class norms would predominate in a predominantly middle-class profession.

One possible effect of this condescending model is the danger of alienation of those who would struggle to assimilate to this ideal. This could be for a number of reasons; that it does not reflect or is in opposition to familiar cultural models and that to maintain it requires a certain level of

disposable resources. As Lister says; “Being poor can take up a considerable amount of time and energy,” (1996, p.167). Additionally it could be argued that this model requires some degree of emotional distancing from personal and communal identification, and therefore promotes uncritically the traditional stereotypes of deserving and undeserving poor. Conversely, and by these same processes, the inculcation of this middle-class ideal could create further alienating effects from families and communities; in order to recreate an image of the self which is disassociated from the place of origin which has become a place in need of charity; “Working class students...do not consider themselves working class. This is another sign of real indoctrination,” (Chomsky and Macedo, 2004, p.35).

In this sense the model of 'active' citizenship projected is divisive not cohesive and undermines one of the motivating principles behind the introduction of citizenship education. Without adequate support, suitable structures and opportunities for real, not tokenistic, involvement, participatory initiatives are likely to reinforce, rather than overcome inequalities, (ibid, p.176). This view accords with those of Lewis (2004, p.25) in that the discourse of 'active citizenship' intersects with that of conditionality which is increasingly emphasised in social policy, and means that entitlement to the public provision of welfare becomes dependent on particular patterns of behaviour and duties. This increase in conditionality could create increased inequality in meeting needs as well as constituting an inequitable hierarchy of citizenship, (ibid). The report foregrounds behaviour and status without reference to social rights; not the progressively equalising effect Marshall had envisaged. Social rights are removed from the discourse illustrating the fact that concepts of citizenship can be used to exclude as well as unite a diverse population, (Osler and Starkey, 2005, p. 2).

Of course where schools are fully embedded into their locality and participation is well integrated within the communities in a reciprocal relationship, there is the possibility of strengthening empathy and solidarity within and between schools and their communities. This is only achievable within an anti-discriminatory model of citizenship. An anti-discriminatory model would necessitate an understanding of the structural inequalities that create differential power relationships and their effects on the everyday lives and experiences of citizens, as well as a commitment to minimising these wherever possible. As highlighted by Osler and Starkey, (ibid, p.90) the Crick report makes no mention of racism, sexism or any other ism, or differences in participation rates or outcomes as a threat to democracy and barrier to full citizenship entitlements. “Political marginalisation and powerlessness reinforce each other,” (Lister, 1996, p.168). Real disparities in power relations are reduced to an a-political focus on cultural differences between ethnic groups and yet again minimal,

if any, mentioning of class. Macedo, (Chomsky and Macedo, 2004, p.35), points out that in debates about education class is never mentioned despite its being a determining factor in school success or failure. Instead all sorts of euphemisms are created, ('at-risk', 'marginalised', 'disaffected' etc.), to avoid naming the reality of class oppression. They also criticise the report for what they see as its limited national focus, with the intention to make young people effective in the existing system, but without any consideration that the system is itself flawed. They like other commentators highlight the report's prioritising of 'appropriate' behaviour towards those in authority before others, raising concerns as to an unspoken, normative construction of deference underlying the acknowledged aim of influencing learned behaviour, (Osler and Starkey, 2005, p.90).

As the new requirement was to be gradually phased into the national curriculum, citizenship was not due to be made into a compulsory subject until 2002. This allowed for comments to be made and the raising of issues of concern; "(W)e need to get across that we are serious about citizenship education," (Tate, 2000, p.72). Although Jeffs, (2005), states neither MPs, teachers or young people were invited to debate or influence the content.

A significant concern regarded the support that would be needed for implementation and how this was to be accommodated in an already over stretched curriculum with no spare capacity to 'add on' without 'taking away' from the curriculum, (Atkinson, 2000, p.100). It was also envisaged that incorporating an ethos and pedagogies conducive to the delivery of citizenship education would have a dramatic impact on the life of the school, (Fogelman, 1996, p.89). Charles Clarke, also stressed the need for a culture change although his focus was on individuals, in individual schools, within individual communities, in the context of the 'risk society', as though injustice was primarily the consequence of bullying in schools. Minimal reference is given to a role for government in effecting and supporting this culture change by a commitment to reducing structural inequalities, including regarding those linked to age which compound experiences of other structural inequalities, and are reinforced by the state school system. There is also hypocrisy in the avoidance of clearly articulating that teachers, who have a part to play in developing and mediating cultures, should be subject to the same agreed standards of behaviour and disciplinary procedures as the students, (Osler and Starkey, 2005, p.48). Ignoring warnings that 'it is wrong to regard education as some kind of panacea' (Demaine and Entwistle, 1996, p.28), Clarke states;

"in opposing bullying and harassment that exclude certain people from full-participation in the school...education can and should do more to promote social justice in our communities." (2000, pp.85-6)

## CHAPTER 4: INFORMAL

Alongside the developments of mainstream compulsory education there were other developments which stemmed from the provision of the compensatory and/or complementary education and training offered within Ragged schools, Sunday schools and similar organisations. In this sense we can see similar 'civilizing' motives on the part of the philanthropic providers, to those behind the development of compulsory schooling, yet as we shall see, there is also acknowledgement of, and accommodation made, for the self-defined interests and organisational forms of the working classes. In 1863 Arthur Sweatman gave an account of how one such development of 'Youths' clubs and institutions' in Islington, London, grew out of the working men's clubs where a need for separate provision to encompass their needs for both leisure and education, was identified and then organised. Organisation was based around a recognition of the existence and development of social networks and the principle of voluntary association via the concept of a members club. Its structure included a members committee, nominated by the membership, who would also act as monitors in working alongside the adult staff, laying the foundations for an experiential and democratic learning environment. "It is thus made to be regarded as a privilege,"(Sweatman, 1863). Clubs were well attended and financially self-sustaining due to the combination of the small membership fee and wider community support, which Sweatman identified fostered a sense of ownership through independence. Recreational activities were complemented by classes each evening and bi-weekly lectures that could be entertaining or instructive. It was also clear that an understanding of the importance of a conducive physical and social environment was key to the development of the clubs.

"The members are encouraged to the freest and happiest intercourse amongst themselves, and complete confidence towards the managers; it is sought to cultivate in them courtesy of manners, truthfulness, mutual forbearance, and good temper. No coercion is exercised but what may be needful for the general comfort and propriety. And it is pleasing to state that in this, the characteristic feature of the Institute, the success has been most complete."  
(ibid)

In describing some of these first influential club organisers, Jeffs (2005) suggests,

"Their practice borrowed from this knowledge, notably the tradition of civic republicanism, wherein citizenship was a status and an activity... Although these workers organised instruction in civics or lectures on citizenship... they primarily taught

‘democracy’ as a lived experience. Albeit one nurtured within the oasis of clubs, associations or centres located in a society that disenfranchised most of their members.”

He goes on to say that citizenship classes, mock parliaments and debating clubs became regular features of club life, and involvement in local politics was both expected and encouraged. During the 1930's mounting pressure emanating from fears of totalitarianism led to calls to extend citizenship education, and youth organisations were expected to prepare members 'for their full participation in the life of the nation' (ibid).

In 1939 the Board of Education (circular 1486) had allowed for the setting up of a national and local youth committees to bring together those voluntary, statutory and civil society bodies with an interest in youth provision. It was to form an umbrella organisation for the promotion of better facilities and opportunities in 'the service of youth'. Monies were also to be made available to secure suitable leaders and instructors. It was intended to create a partnership between the voluntary and statutory sector although the overall success of the partnership is highly debatable. This is widely seen as the beginnings of what became the national youth service.

Interest in the development of youth programmes widened and in 1950 local education authorities (LEA) had sponsored 237 youth councils across England and Wales. The membership represented a range of local clubs, uniformed groups, secondary schools, churches, and some included student union representatives from universities and colleges, but political youth organisations were banned. Few survived beyond the mid 1950's coinciding with waning political activity and LEA investment, (Jeffs, 2005).

The Ministry of Education Committee (Albermarle) report, 'The Youth Service in England and Wales', (1960), after examining the state of youth provision, expressed concerns for the welfare of some young people whom, it deemed were less able to benefit from the perceived potential opportunities in education. It suggesting this could lead to a sense of rejection and delinquency. The report stated that what existed of the youth service was ill equipped to meet the needs of the day, and in order for it to become so, it would need a relatively secure statutory base. It advocating for the resources to provide full-time paid posts, supported by specialised training and a national forum to consider salaries and conditions of service.

It also set out what were to become the youth services main aims and principles. 'Voluntary participation was taken as a given' but the report questioned the validity of a number of terms



commonly used to describe some of the core practices: 'service', 'dedication', 'leadership', and 'character-building'. This had the effect of a partial de-construction of the historic value base; whilst reasserting and re-framing other core features from the 19<sup>th</sup> century originators, (Davies, 2008, p.19). These were to offer young people various educational and recreational activities, complementary to those of formal education, to develop their personal resources of body, mind and spirit. Places for association through which young people could develop a sense of; fellowship, tolerance and mutual respect, were to be provided. The report highlighted the importance of challenge, experiential learning methods and self-determination rather than presenting a 'packaged' code of values; 'principles are better when seen shining through actions including training young people in citizenship', (Maclure, 1986, pp.259-266).

Questioning the validity of what had been taken for granted, opened up space, if briefly, for debate and action. Workers bringing Black, feminist and Gay/Lesbian political perspectives were attempting to occupy this space with explicitly liberationist aspirations for their practice, although class was silenced,(Davies, 2008, p.19). Conversely “while confirming the individualistic aims which have continued to dominate ‘provided’ education in the UK ... For the committee, clearly – as, again, for the pioneers - working with and through young people’s peer relationships remained an important feature of youth work.” (Davies, 2008, p.20) Unfortunately, according to Jeffs (2005), delinquency dominated the reports agenda; it did not attempt to revive the youth councils nor did it bother with political engagement or literacy; instead giving instructions to provide clubs where young people could mix socially and play games..

In contradiction The Thompson Report (1982) revived the notion of youth work as responding to the political as well as the personal and social spheres of young peoples' lives. It continued to emphasise young peoples' active participation but related it specifically to their social and political education, learning how to “claim the right of a member of a democratic society to influence that society and to have a say in how it affects him or her.” (Maclure, 1986, pp.426-427)

Nevertheless, as early as the 1970's, but throughout the 80's and '90's increasing attempts were made, consecutively by the Conservative and New Labour governments, to steer the youth work agenda top-down, to that of pre-defined priorities and targets, increasingly narrowing its focus, (Davies, 2008, p.20). Youth work thus became the,

“victim of the Thatcher government’s constant efforts to reduce local and central government spending. And, where resources were being provided, youth workers were

increasingly told that they must target their work - prioritise groups such as the young unemployed and 'young people at risk of drifting into crime'." (Davies, 2008, p.20)

What became known as open access club work was effectively marginalised in a search for methods that used less resources and/or were more suitable for targeted intervention at 'disaffected' or 'at risk' youth, such as detached and street based work, youth counselling, mentoring, drop-in café's, constructed around specific issue based delivery.

Social policy reconstructed youth in favour of the dominant deficit model as victims and perpetrators of social problems. Both are 'fixed' within the ideological construction of 'otherness', (Bhabha 1994, p66). It reinforced the welfarist approach in a context where the social rights of citizens were being progressively eroded in favour of constructions of the 'good' or 'consumer' citizen. 'Normal' young people were considered not to need or want the youth service, which it could be argued became a self-fulfilling prophesy. When we consider the construction of the norm as: white, middle class, heterosexual male, (setting aside adult), it follows that they were less likely to access a service increasingly targeted at those considered to be 'other'. These 'others' are therefore constructed as binary opposites, potentially or actually maladjusted due to inferior cultural or hereditary norms and practices. These predispose them to delinquency in the forms of anti-authoritarian attitudes, resistance to rules, disengagement, substance 'abuse', propensity to violence, teenage pregnancy etc. Unlike their 'normal' counterparts they are also less likely to have the level of resources needed to access the increasing commercial and private forms of recreational opportunities available, therefore they make use of the ever decreasing availability of public space which in turn gives a higher visibility to their presence.

The desire for young people to associate with their peers and exercise self-determination, aside from adult imposed jurisdictions, understood and accommodated by the earliest youth leaders, are through these means, pathologised. Visible groupings of young people in public spaces are perceived in terms of risk, to themselves or others through exposure to the constant lurking dangers which are perceived to beset society, and of which they are incompetent at negotiating without direct adult supervision.

As illustrated by Said, once these 'facts' were established as the basis of a field of 'knowledge', which was essentially the making visible of material, scholarly discipline becomes a specific technology of power. Any new information is subsumed and made to fit unchallenged, even where there is contradiction and change over time, the binaries still endure and can be linked back to the

originals. (Said, 2003, p127) Therefore all visible groups of young people become a homogeneous, undifferentiated mob, arousing suspicion, requiring careful surveillance of individuals to monitor or control, and alerting 'normal' citizens to the potential danger they pose.

“Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise...Success of disciplinary power derives no doubt from the use of simple instruments; hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination.”(Foucault, 1975, p.170)

Nevertheless, training for youth workers by and large maintained the core principles and values developed within the field and was heavily influenced by the experiential educational pedagogies of Freire and Dewey. Whilst acknowledging and preparing youth workers for the situations of practice they were likely to encounter, the training reinforced the inherently political and educational nature of the profession. The curriculum illustrated an underlying commitment to social justice and collective action, voluntary association and progressive participation. It included anti-oppressive practice, influenced by feminist critical theory, equal opportunities and youth rights and citizenship, drawing on European developments, legislation and global perspectives. This created a level of tension within the youth service in terms of; providing a basis for critiquing government policy and policy-implementation, offering the more obstinate the opportunity, even if only limited, to maintain some professional autonomy, and to creating a level of toleration of subversion.

“If the effect of colonial power is seen to be the production of hybridisation rather than the noisy command of colonialist authority or the silent repression of native traditions, then an important change of perspective occurs. The ambivalence at the source of traditional discourses on authority enables a form of subversion, founded on the indecidability that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of intervention.” (Graves, 1998, p112)

In a number of local authority youth services including Hertfordshire, Norfolk and Suffolk, the tension was 'managed' by splitting the youth service into segregated delivery teams between those charged with developing targeted provision, for which there were usually adequate resources and those maintaining traditional clubs and activities for which resources were scarce. This had the effect of creating a new hierarchy; with targeted provision supported to develop innovative responses within the limitations prescribed, and the majority of clubs struggling to survive. Club

workers became second class citizens within their organisations. This process was compounded further by the government's introduction of 'Connexions', a 'universal' service targeted at young people aged 13-19 years who were to be consistently monitored to ensure progression from compulsory education into further education, training or employment. Careers services were dissolved and subsumed by Connexions and it was expected that many youth services would follow or allocate a proportion of their resources. In the latter case further tensions and resentment were created for youth workers by the disparity between the high level of resources allocated to Connexions in comparison to the youth service, which was regularly the first service to suffer when local authorities made cuts.

To some extent the traditional aspects of youth service provision continued to survive as youth workers were often proficient fund raisers. As our discussion has shown fund raising had always been an aspect of traditional youth work but increasingly externally available funding sources were incorporating the governmental discourse and attaching funding to targets. Jeffs maintains that, "other developments linked citizenship education to increasing social inclusion and lifelong learning leaving local government and the youth service no alternative but to acquire 'citizenship' programmes."(Jeffs, 2005)

The introduction of the Children Act (1989) and Human Rights Act (2000) led to specific and general requirements to involve young people in making decisions about the things that affect them. One expression of the legislation was government's development of the 'Best Value Performance Management Framework' which required local authorities to consult users and involve them in evaluating services and future policy proposals, (Davies and Markin, 2000, p.30). Many youth workers were hopeful that rights based approaches would offer the leverage needed to challenge prevailing youth policies. It was an opportunity to 'exploit policy shifts, bringing young people into consultative, evaluative and service delivery roles and into broader empowering experiences for achieving social change',(ibid) and in so doing, usher in a new era of youth citizenship.

The Children Act was narrowly defined with regard to children and young people's involvement in legal and care proceedings. Nevertheless, the precedent was embraced more widely particularly where children and young people could be considered in need. Elsewhere promoting children's rights was interpreted by government predominantly as the rights to freedom of information, expression and consideration. This manifested in expectations that local authorities set up youth councils, consultations and forums within local authority services and schools, and the UK Youth Parliament. Responses were hopeful; 'young people should have a chance to exercise real

responsibility and make an impact on schools and communities, bringing alive democracy, recognising the legitimacy of their views and concerns and promoting a positive image of young people,'(Cameron, 1999, pp.10-11); but guarded; “Poor participative mechanisms are very effective in training young people to become non-participants...The challenge is to establish a sustainable and meaningful partnership with young people.” (Davies and Markin, 2000, p.31)

Jeffs (2005) notes the 'immense efforts invested in kindling involvement in youth councils, forums and participative projects by youth workers with high motives and in good faith, seeing a chance to extend young peoples' influence and enhance services, but disappointingly he reports that, “(n)ationally the first UK Youth Parliament met early 2001 with 215 MYPs. Numerous politicians attended the launch of a body the organisers promised would be a-political – 'solely issue based'.”(Jeffs, 2005)

Yet on the horizon for 2002 was the long anticipated, eagerly awaited document, 'Transforming Youth Work - Resourcing Excellent Youth Services' which the government had led the youth profession to believe would recognise the value of youth work, restore a dedicated budget and put youth work back on a more secure statutory footing.

### SECTION 3: NEW REGIMES.

## CHAPTER 5: COMPULSORY CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

The phased introduction of the citizenship order over 2002-2003 gave all young people in secondary schools, subject to the compulsion of the national curriculum, a statutory entitlement to receive citizenship education for 5% of their curriculum time.

However, less than a decade later and heralded by the new Conservative and Liberal- Democrat coalition government, an article appeared in 'The Telegraph', (2010), by its Education Editor, Graeme Paton. It stated, “Michael Gove, the Education Secretary, has been strongly critical of citizenship in the past, fuelling speculation that compulsory lessons could be axed.” The article noted Gove's opinion that the introduction of the subject was 'politically-motivated'.

"When it comes to citizenship, community cohesion and a sense of national solidarity, why is it that we imagine a particular subject put on the national curriculum can address these

deep and long standing challenges?” (Gove, cited by Paton, 2010)

According to Jerome, (2012, p. 67), Gove rejected 'theory and ideology', which seems at odds with the post of Minister for Education. Even so, Gove raised a question which needed to be more widely addressed than it had been previously, contained as it had been within academic discourses. The question of the meaning of citizenship, the purpose of education and the relationship between them needs to be more fully debated by a wider section of the populace, and more fully utilising the findings of academics, the experiences of practitioners, students and other partners. It is in this context that further consideration can be given as to where and how citizenship education fits into the broader social picture. It is only recently that a body of evidence has become available to provide the material for evaluations that can inform the discourse. Gove's comments also provide a useful, immediately relevant topic for 'discussion and debate' and for developing the critical, political, and analytic skills, identified as desired outcomes within the citizenship curriculum.

The article was followed by several others confirming the government's intention to cut citizenship and return to a minimum, core curriculum of traditional subjects. 'The Guardian' ran an article the following January (Rose, 2011) which questioned the thinking behind the government's proposal, given that it had been promoting what it termed the 'Big Society'. On the surface the proposal was contradictory. As the headline suggested, 'Citizenship education is integral to the Big Society' or so it appeared given the government's rhetoric. The article informs us that in opposition to the government's plans, a campaign group in support of maintaining citizenship education has emerged, organised by the umbrella coalition 'Democratic Life'.

The previous week a campaign event was held in the House of Commons and indicated a broad range of support with attendees comprising of MPs, Peers, teachers, and pupils among 'others'.

“A range of legal and human rights groups support the campaign...It includes the Law Society, the Citizenship Foundation (which did much to get the subject on the curriculum in the first place), the Public Legal Education Network, Amnesty International and the British Institute of Human Rights.”(ibid)

The article highlighted some of the broad areas that are covered by the curriculum, including legal education and examples of participative community projects undertaken as part of the citizenship curriculum, which illustrate many of the 'Big Society' ideals. Interestingly the article reminds us that the concept of citizenship education is highly charged politically and therefore of the

importance of ongoing contestation.

“Part of the debate will be the extent to which schools have a role in delivering this kind of learning, as well as whether, unconsciously or otherwise, it promotes the political status quo or a certain view of the world.”(ibid)

It was also an effective example of citizenship and citizenship education in practice, and as Pike, (2007, p. 473) states, citizens should be encouraged to critique beliefs promoted by the citizenship education curriculum, as to do otherwise would be to treat them as subjects, lacking in respect, instead of as citizens. A number of recent studies and reports (Jerome, 2012; DFES, 2007) have commented that examples of effective citizenship practice are limited. The lack in examples of good practice has a knock on effect for trainee citizenship teachers. This is especially the case in terms of the implementation and delivery of the political aspects of the curriculum which is being offered to pupils.

“(D)espite the best efforts of Crick...many teachers have taken up relatively easy options for their students to volunteer or raise money for charity, without the political literacy dimension being developed.”(Jerome, 2012, p.67)

The DFES (2007) reported that issues of identity and diversity were often neglected, identifying a lack of confidence generally in handling 'sensitive' issues. In the summary they make a number of recommendations, in particular that the government needed to be more supportive in training teachers to develop the necessary competence to deal with 'challenging' issues on the ground. It claimed the government needed to ensure that there was greater clarity and better communication of what it is setting out to achieve, as it was felt that some aims, objectives and methods remained opaque. It stated that there needed to be better dissemination of a wide variety of examples of good practice, particularly with regard to whole school approaches and in building opportunities for active citizenship. It was keen to emphasise the need to avoid a one size fits all approach, which was viewed as inadequate to accommodate 'a complex and contested concept' where different approaches are legitimate and 'some would argue' necessary. The report referred to evidence from OFSTED and other sources that had suggested a more comprehensive approach is more likely to be successful compared to a single method. A plan for workforce development was seen as crucial, both for in service training but especially for full-time, post-graduate, specialist teacher training. The latter was perceived as urgent in light of the recent, but steady decline in the number of training places available. Further into the report Bernard Crick, (DFES, 2007, p.30), raises the issue that in

the past good graduates in sociology, politics and economics could not get into teaching because of the National Curriculum requirement. Additionally, a lack of valuing of appropriately qualified and trained citizenship teachers means they are often diverted into other areas of the curriculum, and not given the support needed to develop the subject. In consideration of the training of teachers and in developing the competence needed to deliver what are the suggested requirements, it is interesting that there is no mention of learning from the existing youth and community education courses. However this is unsurprising because, as noted earlier, the courses are either based around the principles of experiential education or at least highly influenced by them. These courses can be described as having a close proximity to McCowan's description of 'seamless enactment';

“Aims, here, conceived as something external to the educational process, begin to dissolve...the educational process and aims become a single instance of preparation and realization. Citizenship and education in this way become a unified process of re-imagining and recreating, both in the realm of ideas and action.”(2009, p.189)

Despite all the rhetoric about participation it appears that this is only envisaged within tightly defined mechanisms of control which create limits to 'equality' and 'democracy'. Therefore what appears to be desired is experiential methods that are divorced from the value base and holistic pedagogies of experiential education, which are difficult to assess externally. In essence this will continue to add to the confusion.

The concerns of the DFES (2007) report were specifically related to promoting 'belonging and integration' and creating the shared identity and values of 'Britishness' as a unifying force, in light of the 'home grown' terrorist bombings in London in 2005, (ibid, pp. 11-12). An earlier report had advocated incorporating a fourth strand within the citizenship curriculum, entitled, 'Identity and Diversity – Living Together in the UK', comprising of critical thinking about ethnicity, religion and race, and an explicit link to political issues and values. There was some disagreement amongst the committee members on these recommendations, raising objections to imposing a definition of 'Britishness'. Arguing that the flexibility of the curriculum already enables discussion about being a British citizen, it would be more beneficial to continue to promote the use of participative, experiential methods. The above recommendations were nevertheless endorsed by the report, stating that it was not about simply endorsing a single explanation but about emphasising the ways values connect, recognising critical and diverse perspectives and the potential to have different layers of identity that are central to contemporary Britishness, (ibid, p.14). In some respects this could be viewed as positively inclusive;



“Britishness itself will increasingly become a hyphenated identity, and that ... is something that needs to be passed on when we teach our children about citizenship.” (Miller, 2000, p.35)

However, the report fails to mention the need to address structural inequalities, racism or discrimination as important factors for analysis. To agree with Osler and Starkey, (2005, p. 126), the government is sending mixed messages. There is a duty on public bodies, under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, to not only avoid racial discrimination and other anti-democratic discriminatory practices, but actively promote race equality. This is undermined by the government's reluctance to make positive statements about the role of schools in challenging racism in society, or to acknowledge the existence of institutional racism in the education service, (ibid, p. 128).

Furthermore Osler and Starker believe that citizenship education needs to change in line with the growing consensus that education for national citizenship is an inadequate response to growing global interdependence, (ibid, p.1). They refer to the civic republican ideal of the political community as the institutional framework, to contain and work out the inevitable conflicts arising from human society, which holds onto the idea of a sharp distinction between the public and private spheres. Maintaining this sharp distinction with attempts to confine identities of class, culture, ethnicity and religion is in practice impossible, (ibid, p.18). It is at best illusory and at worst a form of exclusion and 'cultural invasion'. They suggest it should be replaced by the concept of 'education for cosmopolitan citizenship', incorporating an understanding of citizenship as it is experienced in diverse communities and in multi-cultural settings, local, national and global, (ibid, p.2). Central to this is a foregrounding of the notion of citizenship as (democratic) practice, underpinned by the conceptual framework of human rights. In response McCowan, (2009, p.33) comments that “(n)o country as yet has wholeheartedly embraced cosmopolitan citizenship,” and although government's recognise a global dimension in education it is not a funding priority.”

McCowan makes a further point regarding the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship which he suggests is questionable in terms of the absence of a global polity. It is defined by,

“an approach seen in the slogan 'think globally, act locally'...however, this can be a disempowering emphasis, favouring unthreatening local actions such as community volunteering, while shielding young people from larger-scale political actions directed at the

underlying political, economic and social order.”(ibid, p.12)

As such cosmopolitan citizenship can be perceived as an aspirational concept which needs further pragmatic consideration. Human rights are an integral aspect of citizenship education as well as being a standard by which the provision of education should be judged, but human rights and citizenship should not be conflated;

“the place of human rights education cannot be taken by citizenship education since the underpinning ideas of citizenship education and human rights education are different.”(Hung, 2012, p.37)

It is also important to point out that there are other criticisms of rights based forms of citizenship education, in the sense that human rights are essentially passive and anti-political, ideologically supporting the politics of individualism, (Kingdom, 1996). Kingdom suggests rights based approaches need to be reconciled with a renewed emphasis on the social rights of citizenship in a,

“new republicanism allied to a politics of difference (which) requires the constant review not only of realizable alternatives but also of the political discourses in terms of which those alternatives are theorized.” (ibid, p. 41)

It is also fair to say global issues, human rights and European citizenship are all given significant attention within the revised citizenship curriculum, (QCA, 2007).

Given the inherent contradictions noted above within the dominant educational discourse, which encompasses the process of depoliticising education to create the myth of a-political neutrality, it is unsurprising that teachers lack confidence in delivering a politically 'balanced' curriculum. “If you use class as a factor in your analysis you are immediately accused of engaging in class warfare,” (Chomsky and Macedo, p. 35). Power relationships and structures and their historical descent are off limits and removed from official discourse. An effect of these contradictions is confusion, which is partly acknowledged in statements relating to a general lack of clarity. Obscurity can be seen to work as a technology of power which serves to undermine effective critique or challenges and deny autonomy to those subjected to it; “He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power...he becomes the principle of his own subjection,” (Foucault, 1975, p.2002).

According to Jerome, in an attempt by Crick to,

“clarify the nature of active citizenship, there is a tendency to focus on overtly 'political' issues, often those linked to policy or party political debates, rather than adopting an approach which sees public interactions as political.”

(2012, p. 64)

It is only by defining politics in its widest sense, to encompass what Lewis (2004, p. 21), describes as the practices of the everyday, how the associational and identificatory aspects link to the dynamic concept of citizenship as a process, that the mutually constitutive relationship between social lives and social policy is evident. This highlights the elements that designate or prevent membership and the ebbs, flows and degrees of citizenship across the life course, within and between specific social groups and through historical time, (ibid, p.3).

According to Jerome, this premature induction into public policy debates as advocated by Crick serves to strengthen perceptions that citizenship educational policy aims are primarily normative in creating the ideal new citizen, (ibid, p. 65).

Another major concern of the DFES, (2007, pp.20-24), report on citizenship education was the inconsistent, and too often inadequate, level of participative involvement of students. It highlighted the need for congruence between the formal and informal contexts of citizenship education, and that it had to be more than isolated approaches; that the principles of citizenship education needed to permeate the life of the school ensuring young people have respect, clear expectations and opportunities to affect real change within their learning environments. It recognised that some schools needed help to achieve these goals and referred to the guidance offered within the government's 'Every Child Matters' initiative. This focusses on designing services around the needs of children and young people. It also referred to the government's adoption of the National Youth Agency's 'Hear By Right' standards; supporting young people's progressive participation from consultation through to initiation. Although not unanimous, the report advocated school councils' be made compulsory. These were seen as offering a mechanism for students to give feedback on the quality of teaching and learning. They were also viewed as having the potential to democratise school life. Concerns regarding a tendency towards elitism were acknowledged with recommendations that creative and inclusive mechanisms be incorporated to ensure the participation and ownership of the whole school.

Research into school councils in the UK cited in McCowan, (2009, p.80) shows they have had some positive effects but not any significantly democratising effects; tokenistic and generally limited to uncontroversial issues, they are “an exercise in damage limitation rather than an opportunity for constructive consultation.”(Ruddock & Flutter, 2000, p.83) Other more recent studies (McCowan, 2009, p.81) were more optimistic about the democratising potential of school councils but identified a number of changes needed for these to become meaningful expressions of student involvement, and it is questionable as to how democratic they are able to become within the wider context of a hierarchical system? “(C)itizenship education is unlikely to be successful if its democratic message is in conflict with the undemocratic nature of the institution,” (ibid, p186). According to Jerome (2012, p.63) the NFER report (2009) indicates a significant gap between the vision and the reality of students' experiences of democratic participation in schools.

The inherent contradictions are many when we consider the context of compulsion; attendance, the statutory product and outcome focussed curriculum, progressive marketization and competition; which all work together to undermine autonomy, co-operation and the equal participation of students and teachers. It is clear that what is maintained is an oppressive, divisive and stratified system. Gillborn, (2006) describes the National Curriculum provision as 'placebo', designed to give an impression of action towards social cohesion and inclusion, whilst simultaneously other mechanisms, such as high stakes testing, are working against these aims. Clearly the culture change necessary for an aspiration of citizenship education to become an expression of the practice of citizenship, is unlikely to happen in the immediate future. Yet the response of the Democratic Life coalition to the threatened scrapping of citizenship within the curriculum, suggests that there is a significant level of opinion which sees its value or at least potential. In support of their campaign they have produced a document (Democratic Life, 2010) which summarises the evidence in support of maintaining the subject. Under the heading 'key facts', the information provided can be perceived as complying with the doxa;

“the doxa is the cultural (or discursive) mediation through which power or non-power speaks: encratic discourse is a discourse that confirms to the doxa, subject to codes which are themselves the structuring lines of its ideology.” (Barthes 1989, p120)

This affirms the numbers that have achieved qualifications and undertaken community projects and the a-political, non-partisan credentials of citizenship. Other evidence cites OFSTED's 2009 report which noted significant improvements in provision and outcomes. It identifies the barriers to successful implementation and where improvements are needed to be made for e.g. ensuring

adequate provision of qualified specialist teachers, higher visibility and status in the curriculum. It also refers to the DfE Report on Young People and Community Cohesion, 2010, which “points to the importance of complementing efforts to promote political literacy and participation and to strengthen notions of identity,” (ibid).

However, in the final report of the Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study (CELS), DfE (2010), commissioned to assess the effects of citizenship education on young people in England from 2003-2009, the executive summary states that the picture is mixed. Nevertheless, it concludes that overall, preliminary evidence shows citizenship education can make a positive contribution to young people’s citizenship outcomes and that there has been a marked and steady increase in civic and political participation with indications that this will continue. More concerning is the findings that there has been a hardening of attitudes toward equality and society and a weakening of attachment to communities. Along with a decline in young people's participation in extra-curricular activities, community involvement is shown to be motivated mainly by personal benefits than by a sense of duty or solidarity, and 'good citizenship' is primarily associated with being law abiding. In its recommendations it reaffirms that the political literacy strand has been a cause for concern throughout the duration of the study. It suggests further policy reinforcement, support, teacher training and innovative experiential methods and materials. Another concern is that in a number of respects social class, more than any other variable, had a significantly negative impact on young people’s citizenship outcomes.

“Citizenship education is concentrated in depth in schools with middle class intakes, where the values such classes promote chime with active citizenship roles already inculcated by these establishments,”(Tonge, Mycock and Jeffery, 2012, p.590).

In recognition of these findings it emphasises that the impact of citizenship education should not be viewed in isolation, asserting the need for initiatives to tackle the broader social, political, and cultural challenges to citizenship. Finally it recommends delivery via discrete lessons, alongside the availability of examinations and accreditation.

In agreement with Pike (2007, pp.478-479), who raises a pertinent point in questioning what impact the failing of the citizenship exam could have on the citizenship outcomes of young people, it is apparent that such a prospect is incompatible with any substantive notions of citizenship and may not be the best way to promote inclusion, democracy and equality. It illustrates young people's exclusion from citizenship. They are prevented from participating equally in defining the terms of

the engagement and assessment, the processes by which differentiation and stratification, through a narrowing of opportunities and creativity are achieved and perpetuated. “Within an objective situation of oppression, anti-dialogue is necessary...the vanquished are dispossessed of their word, their expressiveness, their culture.” (Freire, 1996, p.119)

Nevertheless, even where praxis is achieved between the aims and methods of education, the possibility of resistance, in the forms of rejection or recasting means there is no definite link between the values underlying educational initiatives and the pupils emerging from it, (ibid, p.83). Consequently where there is contradiction, obscurity and confusion there are opportunities for resistance. Through subversion and hybridisation, meaning can be creatively reconstructed and reasserted.

## CHAPTER 6: A NEW DAWN FOR THE YOUTH SERVICE?

The release of the Government's strategy document 'Resourcing Excellent Youth Services' (REYS), (2002) was greeted with a decidedly mixed reception. It made references to the unique role of youth work in support of young people's development; “only the youth service has as its primary purpose the personal and social development of young people,” (2002, p.6), and in leading the way in terms of its contribution to anti-discriminatory practice, which were welcomed by many and taken for the long overdue recognition the profession had been promised. However its focus on stipulating specific targets and outcomes to be achieved shifted control towards central government, and created a much higher level of bureaucracy. This in some respects was also welcomed; in terms of specifying the resources needed to deliver an expected level of service, and by those who felt it professionalised the service and/or gave them a more definitive framework to plan, develop, assess and monitor. Sadly, for many it undermined the inherent value base of youth and community development. It pushed the youth service more firmly into the Connexions strategy in stating that all youth work, with young people aged 13-19 years, was to be undertaken as an integral part of the Connexions service, its objectives and as a key partner in its delivery. It also stated that youth service activities must be structured, and specifically linked to raising achievement and standards in education, training or employment. There were also targets aimed at promoting inclusion and participation, with an emphasis on 'excluded' or 'at risk' individuals.

The targets related to; the numbers of young people reached, the level of young people's engagement, achievement of learning outcomes and ultimately to the numbers of young people

gaining accreditation. This also meant that youth workers would be expected to target and monitor individual young people much more closely than they had done previously. Youth workers no longer had the freedom of autonomy to fully negotiate around young people's agendas or as Smith, (2002) asserts, have the flexibility to take into account particular circumstances and respond with spontaneity. "Youth and Connexions funding is not for general leisure provision or school extra-curricular activities without the youth work content."(ibid, p.35) This illustrates the lack of knowledge or regard for youth work values and developmental processes, in terms of building trust through voluntary association and working with the self-defined needs and interests of young people. Young people would no longer be equal in defining the terms of their engagement with youth workers. Viewed against the stated commitment to young people's progressive participation the document is highly contradictory.

In effect it changes the very basis of the relationship between youth workers and the young people they work with, from informal, to one that is characterised by a much greater degree of formality. In being directed to work more fully within the wider strategic partnerships, youth workers would find it increasingly difficult to stand in isolation and continue to advocate for young people's rights. This has always been difficult but becomes more so in the face of the general, and assumed consensus of other statutory professions working with young people. In essence youth workers will lose their distinct identity, traditionally operating in the middle ground between social work and teaching, (Smith, 2002). As part of the process the youth service was effectively renamed in official discourses. It became most frequently referred to within the generic 'Youth Support Services' which reflected the changed policy direction and the deliberate marginalisation of the youth work profession whilst continuing to advocate for 'youth work methods'. In setting targets that, on the one hand dictate a greater emphasis on individuals, yet at the same time also dictate quantitative outcomes in reaching a significant percentage of the youth cohort, youth workers and the youth service were effectively set up to fail. Pulled in both directions it would eventually pull itself apart.

According to Smith, (ibid) young people who did not fit into the categories to be targeted or who did not wish to undertake some form of accredited learning were less likely to be worked with. It also promoted a focus on short-termism within an increasingly tick-box culture, which works against a sustainable and developmental approach in favour of prioritising easily achievable targets. A focus on easily identifiable competencies in favour of competence, and delivery as opposed to relationship (ibid). In similarity to schools, Smith (ibid) states that by the commodification and marketisation of the youth service, youth workers are forced to 'sell the learning experience', reducing complex processes to easily identifiable packages and education from a public good to a

private good. It also undermines dialogue with young people who refuse to be negatively labelled. The universal offer 'in the service of youth' continued to be eroded as the right of access becomes dependent on the level of compliance; on the one hand with those that more comfortably fit the norm, or on the other, by the acceptance of stigmatization. Smith (ibid) also identifies that the policy forms part of a more general policy shift, away from social capital building and towards amelioration.

Despite the proposed resources, which often only replaced those lost previously, these were severely inadequate, and did not reach the levels promised. Nevertheless, in many cases youth services were still being judged by their local authorities with respect to their ability to meet targets, which were based theoretically on the full level of resourcing. Over the following eight years youth services across the country struggled to work with the targets, maintain morale and hold onto some level of professional integrity in the face of mounting pressures. The National Youth Agency (NYA) annual audit of local authority youth services, which last reported for the year 2007- 2008 shows that despite the decrease in professionally qualified staffing to an average of 15.7 per authority, there was a general increase in the average attainment across all bench mark targets, with the average figure for participation being 17% above the 15% benchmark, (NYA, 2008). "It is the one service working with young people that Ofsted have said is consistently improving." (Nicholls, 2011, p.12)

These efforts made little impact when the local authorities, under the austerity regime of the coalition government, began making cuts to services. From 2011 the majority of authorities began drastically cutting their youth services, with a number of authorities, including Norfolk and Suffolk, cutting their youth services completely. Some authorities redeployed youth workers into multi-agency teams engaging them predominantly in case work and others were intending to commission out.

"In October research by the National Youth Agency and the Confederation of Heads of Young Peoples Services found that 95% of local authorities were planning to cut their youth services and 82% of voluntary organisations were planning to close projects."(CYWU, 2011, p. 5)

These decisions were made with little, if any dialogue with young people, despite the fact that local authorities had a duty to inform young people and seek their views in making decisions that will affect them. Unless of course we can accept that consultations with focus groups is acceptable



given the proposed scale and impact that these decisions would have on the lives on significant numbers of young people. “The handpicked focus group subverts, never fortifies, democracy – transforming citizens into customers and users.”(Jeffs, 2005) These decisions were also made against the context of other cuts to services and benefits directly impacting on the lives of young people, including abolishing the Educational Maintenance Grant, and cutting grants to voluntary and community groups, disproportionately affecting those from lower socio-economic groups.

During this devastation the government announced its flagship youth policy initiative, the National Citizenship Service which was to offer a twelve week summer programme to young people finishing year 11. It was to incorporate a residential activity and a community volunteering project with young people involved in designing, delivering and evaluating the project. In its pilot year it offered 10,000 places to young people at a cost of £1,300 pounds per head, £14.2 million pounds in total. Given the cuts to services for young people that were offered throughout the year, it was extraordinary that the government was spending this amount of money on a short term project, especially where the activities were those that traditionally youth services had undertaken. They were also increasingly incorporated into the school curriculum since the introduction of compulsory citizenship education.

A recent interim evaluation report by NatCen, (2012, pp.51-2) estimated that for every 1 pound spent, another 2 were generated in kind. This compares with estimated youth service figures that for every £1, £8 are generated. (Nicholls, 2011, p. 12) NatCen suggest further findings that the programmes have a positive impact on the successful preparation of young people for adulthood. This seems a highly dubious claim given the duration of the projects and are extrapolated from answers given to indirect questions. “The proportion reporting high levels of happiness increased by five percentage points.”(NatCen, 2012, p.11) It is also worth noting Gove's point made at the start of the section, related to his belief in the unlikely impact of citizenship education on young people's development as citizens, to consider the very limited impact that an initiative such as the NCS is likely to have.

One positive outcome of the unilateral destruction of many of the services for young people has been young people's active political engagement and mobilization. Campaigns, challenging the government's disregard for the rights of young citizens to meaningful participation and dialogue have been developed with young people taking the lead. The British Youth Council has joined forces with the 'Choose Youth' coalition, in 'an unprecedented alliance of over 30 voluntary youth sector organisations and trade unions' promoting and echoing the views of young people in the

political arena. (Choose Youth, 2013).

“We campaign for all young people's services to be well funded and for existing youth services to have funding priority over new initiatives. We believe young people need youth services now more than ever.” (BYC, 2013)

## CONCLUSION

Discourses on citizenship have shown that it is a concept that has multiple, dynamic and contested meanings which make it difficult to define categorically. This is both its strength and weakness. Its descriptors are many and the most prominent include; process, feeling, aspiration, belonging, status, rights, responsibilities, duty and solidarity. All these have been identified as qualities of citizenship in various measures depending on personal experiences and perspectives. However there are a few essential characteristics that form the foundations of the concept. Citizenship is conceptually inseparable from political governance and associations, and involves the negotiation and contestation of power. The form it takes depends on the specific historical and cultural relations that have developed out of a combination of the many possibilities that were available. Possibilities can be limited or given shape by the technologies of power that are deployed and the effects they produced.

As we have seen, the concept of citizenship in England is confused and contradictory. On the one hand there is a plethora of academic discourse which is testament to a dynamic, multi-layered, multi-faceted and multiply situated concept which encompasses the personal, social and political aspects of collective life. On the other hand there have been continuing attempts within official discourse to imbue the concept of citizenship with a limited and limiting behaviourist construction of the de-politicized 'good/consumer' citizen, underpinned by an individualistic and nationalistic paradigm. Where citizenship has been translated into policy, with regard to both formal and informal sites of secondary education, the effects are similarly confused and contradictory. Evidence shows there is a lack of clarity and effective training for teachers of citizenship in terms of; values, aims, objectives, methodologies and critical analysis of how they interconnect; this could easily be rectified by employing the capacities of informal, youth and community educators and trainers who have extensive experience in these areas. However despite the continuous discourse, inaction highlights the lack of commitment or support for the establishment of citizenship education as either a principle and process across the whole school curriculum or as a discrete subject, which

illustrates the absence of the political will needed. Although there is some evidence to suggest compulsory citizenship education in schools has had a positive impact on young people's citizenship outcomes and attitudes to their active community involvement and political participation; however, this is shown to be predominantly in middle-class areas and motivated by personal benefit, with minimal impact elsewhere and accompanied by deeply concerning indications of the erosion of ties to communities.

The gradual formalization of informal sites of educational practice has left little room for anything other than targeted casework or the delivery of courses with narrow, pre-defined outcomes. With the decimation of the youth service and reduction of informal sites of citizenship education, the gradual homogenisation of state supported educational provision, has left a chasm where the need for citizenship education to offer flexible, responsive, experiential opportunities for personal, social and political understanding, knowledge and skills, for all young people to become citizens, continues to grow. Therefore, far from enriching the concept of citizenship, it can be argued that its political essence has been further diminished, reinforcing the mainstream discourse. In attempting to create the absurd, a-political politics that does not acknowledge the mechanisms of power and the creation of structural inequalities locally, nationally, regionally or globally, for significant sections of the population the concept of citizenship has been further divested of meaning.

Nevertheless, knowledge is a technology of power and therefore the production, reproduction and dissemination of knowledge is an area of political contestation and why any form of education is essentially political in nature. This is closely linked to language and culture, so a politically charged term such as citizenship encompassed within the sphere of education, will by its nature create spaces for contestation. For this reason it is important to maintain and develop all possible sites of citizenship education and welcome the debates and dialogue that they open up in the hope of critically analysing the contradictions, identifying where power is hidden and to allow for scrutiny.

Informal education needs to be acknowledged and valued as distinct and having parity with formal education, and as part of a whole system, which has a lot to contribute to the development of citizenship education in the formal sector. In order to achieve this the process of destruction of the youth and community services and the undermining of their traditional value base needs to be stopped and reversed.

By openly committing to values of equality and justice and extending their expression in democratic processes, demonstrating congruence between values and actions creates new possibilities; but in order to do so we have to participate and pro-actively support others to do so by promoting the re-establishment of the social rights of citizenship and the extension of all rights of citizenship progressively to young citizens. In this way citizenship education in England can become progressively more chameleon as it challenges the predominance of chimera.

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