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THE ROLE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN SOUTH KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS:
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND PUBLIC OPINION

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ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF ARTS, HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
MASTER OF ARTS

THE ROLE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN SOUTH KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

By CELINE D'IMPERIO
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Building on Hans Kohn's typology of patterns of nationalism and Geert Hofstede's model of cultural dimensions, this paper researches the role of ethnic nationalism, and the cultural values shaping it, within South Korean attitudes towards immigrants. In 2006, following global pressures for South Korea's adoption of the 'global standards' regarding responses to immigration and internal pressures for the respect of foreign workers' human rights, the government announced multiculturalism, *Damunhwa*, as its new immigration model and driving discursive force. This decision is at variance with South Korea's traditional ethnonationalist discourse and identity defined by the uniqueness, homogeneity and superiority of the Korean ethnicity.

Settling within a current debate in the academic literature, this research investigates the value of patterns of nationalism and cultural values for predicting and explaining governmental and public responses to immigration in a context of heightened globalisation and democratisation. Thus, it analysed South Korean immigration policy texts and public opinion survey data to determine if the nation's response to immigration corresponds with the identified expected attitudes of cultures characterised by ethnic nationalism, collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation, such as Korea. These attitudes include discrimination according to an ethnic hierarchy, assimilationist demands and exclusion.

Although this paper confirms that early responses to immigration in the 20th century aligned with expected behaviours of discrimination, repression and exclusion, it highlights that, due to the growing complexity of the national and international contexts, responses to immigration have grown increasingly multifaceted, comprising predominant ethnonationalist considerations and, to a lesser extent, multiculturalist, democratic, pragmatic and economic factors. Indeed, according to this study's findings, South Korean constructs of nationalism, identity and culture have become more holistic, and, consequently, its responses to immigrants more multifaceted. Thus, categorising these constructs into dichotomous typologies created pre-contemporary globalisation and predicting clean-cut attitudes towards immigrants based them on prove to be increasingly challenging.

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Introduction

Within the past decade, the world has observed the resurgence of nationalist movements and anti-migrant discourses in numerous Western countries (Bieber, 2018). Indeed, as globalisation ceaselessly and increasingly weaves its way into every aspect of citizens' lives, its effects are felt more profoundly. One of its major impacts pertains notably to the exponential growth of transnational migration this past century. However, as national populations gradually become more culturally diverse, tensions may arise, sometimes leading to the construction of nationalist discourses presenting migrants as "a threat to the host society" in terms of social order, domestic security and economic resources (Ha, Cho and Kang, 2016). These discourses, meaning final groupings of "formulated statements", are then dispersed through media, seemingly scientific articles, political speeches, laws and daily conversations to become embedded in people's minds as a social and discursive fact and act as a "coded mode of thinking, imagination, behaviour" (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003, p.8; Breinig, 1992, np; Foucault, 1970). Therefore, nations' policies and public opinion come to be formatted by these statements, taking the shape of exclusionary and discriminatory policies and behaviours.

However, as Denney and Green (2020), Hundt (2016) and Oh and Oh (2016) underline, previous researches on national attitudes towards immigrants and multiculturalism focus too often on advanced industrial economies of North America and Western Europe. Consequently, concepts of identity, nationalism and multiculturalism within migration studies are "almost exclusively" understood in "Western terms" (Denney and Green, 2020, p.7; Hundt, 2016, p.489). Decentralised case studies and apperceptions of these concepts remain marginal, creating an imbalance within the scholarly gaze (Oh and Oh, 2016, p.262). Therefore, this paper aims to participate in mending this gap in the academic literature by offering a research on the role of culturally-specific variables in national attitudes towards immigrants in an Asian country, South Korea (hereafter also referred to as Korea). Indeed, it does not only endeavour to bring light to another region of the world, but aims to evaluate how a nation's pattern of nationalism, shaped by cultural values and monoculturalism, can influence attitudes towards immigrants and multiculturalism. As Hoti (2017, p.194) highlights, while a considerable amount of research has analysed the effect of socio-economic and demographic factors on attitudes towards immigration, few studies have researched the extent to which cultural values can "provide a predictive and

explanatory power". Therefore, this research investigates the role of ethnic nationalism, shaped by cultural values of collectivism, conformity and homogeneity, and by monocultural national perceptions, within attitudes towards immigrants –concepts which are defined in depth in the first chapter of this study.

With the heightened omnipresence of globalisation and democratisation, opinions within recent studies on Korea's immigration policies and public attitudes have grown increasingly divided. Indeed, as this paper develops in the second chapter, since 2006, when the Korean government announced the adoption of multiculturalism as its new immigration policy, the existing literature on the topic has been split. One side of the debate argues that attitudes towards immigrants have become less dependent on ethnic nationalism and its attached cultural values, because of the perceived 'end of ethnic nationalism', to now be more determined by socio-economic factors, like Campbell (2015) and Denney and Green (2020) suggest. The other argues that attitudes towards immigration remain heavily shaped by ethnic nationalism, leading to the essentially rhetorical nature of the Korean government's claim for multiculturalism and to ethnic-based discrimination, like Kim (2015), Oh and Oh (2016), and Seol and Seo (2014) establish. Therefore, settling within this current academic debate, this paper aims to provide a possible explanation and answer by framing its research within notions of nationalism, cultural dimension and monoculturalism, and by analysing policy texts and public opinion surveys.

This study thus attempts to answer the following questions: How is ethnic nationalism shaped by cultural values and monoculturalism? To what extent does South Korean ethnic nationalism influence the nation's response to immigration? Has the growing impact of globalisation and democratisation in Korea lessened the role of ethnic nationalism and cultural values within attitudes towards immigrants?

This paper's first chapter establishes and defines the frameworks in which this research settles. Indeed, it presents Hans Kohn's typology of civic and ethnic nationalism, Hofstede's cultural dimension model, Welsch and Benessaieh's conception of monoculturalism and multiculturalism, and their discussion within the academic literature, to identify which attitudes towards immigrants can be expected from a country like Korea based on its pattern of nationalism and cultural values. The second chapter then contextualises how Korea's ethnic nationalism developed and shaped its national identity and early responses to migration. However, it also highlights how realities of the changing Korean ethnoscape in a context of heightened

globalisation and democratisation challenge Korea's ethnonationalist identity and its contemporary response to immigration. Finally, in the third and fourth chapters, it researches whether ethnic nationalism, and the cultural values constructing it, retain their explanatory and predictive value within this globalised context by analysing immigrant and immigration policy texts, the former referring to "policies dealing with admission" and the latter to "the treatment of migrants once they have entered the country", as well as public opinion surveys (Weiner, 1995, p.75, cited in Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010, p.254). Should the expected attitudes towards migrants identified in Chapter I be observable within these policies and the Korean public opinion, it would be possible to argue the crucial lasting role of ethnic nationalism, and cultural values, in shaping contemporary national responses to immigration in South Korea.

This study's approach thus relies on two assumptions established within Chapter I: responses to immigration of nations characterised by ethnic nationalism, collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, long-term orientation and monoculturalism are expected to be defined by an ethnic hierarchy and demands for the immigrants' assimilation into that nation's culture and society. To verify whether such expectations are indeed observable, this paper's qualitative research method relies on data from secondary sources, policy texts such as the *Immigration Act* 1963, the *Overseas Korean Act 1999*, the *Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea 2007* and the *2nd Basic Plan for Immigration Policy 2013-2017*, and on public opinion surveys such as the 2020 World Value Survey, the 2018 Korean General Social Survey and the 2020 South Korean Identity Survey.

Chapter I: Literature review on the expected influence of patterns of nationalism, cultural values and monoculturalism on attitudes towards immigrants

To investigate the extent to which South Korean ethnic nationalism influences Korean governmental and public attitudes towards immigrants, this paper must first present and define several key conceptual framings belonging to both intercultural communication and political studies. Indeed, Hans Kohn's typology of civic and ethnic nationalism, Hofstede's cultural dimension model, Welsch and Benessaieh's conception of monoculturalism and multiculturalism, and their discussion within the academic literature, notably appear as highly valuable frameworks that allow for the identification of a nation's expected response to immigration. Monoculturalism, cultural values such as collectivism, high power distance, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation, as well as ethnic nationalism, itself influenced by these cultural values and monoculturalism, provide crucial insights into the South Korean nation's expected behaviours and attitudes towards immigrants and multiculturalism. According to these frameworks and academic data, expected responses in the case of South Korea include the exclusion of immigrants or demands for their assimilation into Korean culture and their discrimination according to an ethnic hierarchy.

1.1. The civic/ethnic nationalism typology and its relevance to culture

Firstly, as this research relies heavily on the concept of 'ethnic nationalism', it is necessary to present the dichotomy of civic and ethnic nationalism. Indeed, as the following chapter explains, ethnic nationalism profoundly shaped Korean nation-building and identity which ultimately impacted, not only Korean culture, but also the country's response to immigration (Shin, 2006; Jeong, 2016). Widely used in the academic literature, this dichotomous framework provides an understanding of two different patterns of nationalism, meaning nation-based identification and support for the nation's interests in contrast to other out-groups' interests (Reijerse, 2013, p.613; Oxford Languages, 2020).

First developed by Hans Kohn in 1944, the civic/ethnic nationalism typology originally aimed at distinguishing between Western European and Eastern European nationalisms (Coakley, 2018, p.253; Jeong, 2016). According to Kohn, Western

European countries would display patterns of ‘civic nationalism’ within which membership to the national political community is granted to individuals living within the same national borders and abiding by a shared set of political values, rights and duties, such as liberty, equality and patriotism, regardless of ethnicity (Jeong, 2016; Kim, 2013; Roshwald, 2015; Reijerse, 2013). Conversely, Eastern European countries would display patterns of ‘ethnic nationalism’ within which membership is granted based on shared heritage, which includes common ancestry, culture, faith, history and language (Muller 2008; Shin, 2006; Jeong, 2016; Roshwald, 2015; Coakley, 2018; Kim, 2013; Smith, 1996). However, as the literature involving this dichotomy gradually broadened, academics extended the typology to other countries, arguing for a tendency of the civic identity to be more dominant in the global ‘West’ and ethnic identity in the global ‘East’ (Greenfeld and Chirot, 1994; Jones, 2000; Kolstø, 2000; Rusciano, 2003; Schöpflin, 1996 cited in Jeong, 2016, p.208). Several scholars, such as Kuzio, Nodia, Mansfield and Snyder, also suggested an evolutionary perspective to the framework, arguing for the occurrence of a natural shift from ethnic to civic nationalism with the development of democracy. Therefore, according to this view, all ethnic nations would be bound to develop into civic nations (Kuzio, 2002; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Nodia, 1994; Snyder, 1993 cited in Jeong, 2016, p.208). Even though the typology has been extended to a more general ‘West’ and ‘East’, Jeong (2016) notes a gap in the academic literature regarding its application to Asian countries specifically. Therefore, the second chapter of this research endeavours to explain how South Korean nationalism fits into ethnic nationalism.

As ethnic nationalism is based on identification and belongingness to a shared heritage, it is therefore embedded within a national culture. Indeed, ethnic nationalism takes roots in a nation’s culture and participates to its reinforcing. As mentioned and in the large majority of the literature, ethnic nationalism encompasses more than identification linked to common bloodlines as it notably includes shared culture based on a common language and history (Roshwald, 2015; Shin, 2006, p.4; Muller 2008; Smith, 1996, p.447). Ethnic nationalism does not only "draw[…] much of its emotive power from the notion that the members of a nation are part of an extended family, ultimately united by ties of blood", but it also extends national identification based on a shared cultural heritage as an ethnic community is a "population of alleged common ancestry, shared memories and elements of common culture with a link to a specific

territory and measure of solidarity" (Muller, 2008, p.20; Smith, 1996, p.447; Shin, 2006, p.4). Therefore, according to Coakley, the origins of Kohn's framework can be traced back to Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* dichotomy. *Gemeinschaft* would thus relate to ethnic nations as it describes communities "given coherence by traditional values and emotional bonds" and *Gesellschaft* to civic nations as it describes "a society held together by impersonal norms and rational calculations" (Coakley, 2018, p.254). Furthermore, as Roshwald underlines, ethnic nationalism is a dynamic process wherein "shared cultural traits and traditions are seen as a manifestation of ethnic nationalism" and "the cultivation of shared culture, in turn, reinforces the bonds of ethnic nationalism" (Roshwald, 2015, p.1). Therefore, culture and ethnic nationalism are intrinsically related and, as this paper develops further in the next chapter, Korean ethnic nationalism established itself around a particular myth of shared bloodline and cultural uniqueness (Shin, 2006).

All in all, ethnic nationalism derives from the identification to one's nation based on shared heritage which is developed upon common language and history, traditions and values that, over time, come to characterise that nation's culture. Whereas national identity in a civic nation is founded on shared democratic values of liberty and equality, national identity in an ethnic nation revolves around shared values of sameness relating to blood ties and ethnic heritage. Furthermore, ethnic nationalism is not only anchored within the belongingness to a nation's culture, but its emergence is also heavily influenced by that nation's cultural values. To grasp the distinctive features of Korea's ethnic nationalism and how they would influence national responses to immigration, it is thus necessary to delve into the values shaping Korean culture.

1.2. Expected national attitudes towards immigrants in South Korea according to Hofstede's dimensions and ethnic nationalism

Ethnic nationalism and culture thus have a dynamic relationship as they mutually influence and reinforce each other. But, further than this, patterns of nationalism also take roots in the cultural values forming the nation's culture. Therefore, it is pertinent to analyse the different cultural values shaping Korean culture to understand the inner workings of Korean ethnic nationalism and both of their potential influence on attitudes to immigration. Korean ethnic nationalism and Hofstede's

dimensions' scores for Korea allow for the identification of two expected Korean responses to immigration notably: the construction of an ethnic hierarchy favouring co-ethnic migrants to non-ethnic migrants, and of a paradigm of exclusion and assimilation according to which immigrants are either expected to assimilate to Korean culture or are excluded. For the purpose of this research, Hofstede's framework is preferred as its link to South Korean cultural values, to ethnic nationalism and expected attitudes towards immigration has more empirical evidence within the academic literature than other cultural typology frameworks such as Schwartz's, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's, and Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars', which the end of this section broaches briefly.

As Geert Hofstede defines it, culture is the "collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another" (Hofstede, 2001, p.9). The collective patterns of values, rituals, heroes, symbols and practices forming culture shape the ways of thinking and acting of group members (Hofstede, 2001, p.10). Therefore, since cultural values "drive people's attitudes, behaviours, opinions and actions" and as "such provide a predictive and explanatory power", they are notably highly useful to identify expected attitudes towards immigration (Hoti, 2017, p.194). Hofstede developed a model comprising six dimensions to better apprehend national cultures and what behaviours could be expected from them based on their positions within these cultural dimensions. The first four dimensions were developed in 1980 following surveys he conducted from 1967 to 1973, gathering a total of 116,000 questionnaires from IBM employees from over fifty different countries (Hofstede, 2001, p.41). According to this model, he evaluated South Korea to be highly collectivist and orientated towards power distance, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation (Hofstede Insights, 2021a). Korea's index scores for these dimensions are especially significant for this research as they seem to be the most impactful dimensions for shaping Korea's ethnic nationalism and response to immigration. Thus, this paper focuses on them specifically.

1.2.1. Collectivism and ethnic nationalism

Firstly, South Korea scores a 10 out of 100 on Hofstede's Individuality Index (IDV), meaning a high tendency towards collectivism (see Appendix 1)(Hofstede Insights, 2021a). Indeed, the IDV is positively related to individualism meaning having a "loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of only

themselves and their immediate families" and negatively related to collectivism meaning having a "tightly-knit framework in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty" (Hofstede Insights, 2021b, np; Hofstede, 2001). In collectivist societies, individuals are integrated into strong and cohesive in-groups for which they are willing to sacrifice their individual interests and feel a deep emotional attachment. This appears particularly valid in the case of South Korea since, as Chen, Yum and Lockett underline, East Asia is greatly influenced by Confucianism which holds the same precepts of group orientation in which faithfulness and loyalty are primordial and "priority is given to group rather than to individual development" (Chen, 1992, p.88; Yum, 1988; Lockett, 1988; Lin and Ho, 2009). Individuals see themselves "as an extension of a larger entity" (Leong, 2008, p.123). Thus, orderliness and conformity to the in-group's values, customs, behaviours or bloodline for example, are highly important to retaining in-group membership (Hofstede, 2001; Leong, 2008). As in-group identification is the cornerstone of one's identity in collectivist societies, there is a crucial and sharp distinction between the 'in-group' and the 'out-group' (Hofstede, 2001; Yum, 1988). Thus, since collectivist societies tend to identify themselves in opposition to out-groups, they "practice greater intergroup discrimination" (Leong, 2008, p.123). In this context, when faced with migrants –a foreign out-group, collectivist societies are expected to present traits of anti-immigrant discourse and behaviours, stigmatising immigrants and using them as "'scapegoat' for members of the host community group to blame for their social and economic anguish" (Leong, 2008, p.123). The emergence of foreign minority out-groups in the society is thus expected to lead to their direct exclusion and discrimination (Leong and Ward, 2006, p.807). All in all, collectivist societies are expected to be orientated towards the rejection of immigrants and multiculturalism (Leong, 2008).

As ethnic nationalism is based on collectivist values, collectivist societies seem to tend to turn to ethnic nationalism rather than civic, leading to intricate similarities between the two conceptual entities. Indeed, ethnic nationalism is also highly dependent on individual self-sacrifice for the nation's interests, and puts great importance on conformity and homogeneity within the nation through shared ancestry, language, cultural values and behaviours. In a similar way to collectivism, ethnic nationalism emphasises unity and solidarity within the nation/in-group in opposition to

other nations/out-groups (Shin, 2006; Smith, 1994). Therefore, more often than not, the development of ethnic nationalism thrives on the pre-existence of collectivist characteristics within the nation. Moreover, Lee and Ward (2008) notably reported that collectivists display more ethnocentric biases than individualists. Indeed, according to their research, collectivists were more supportive of ethnic-based community development groups, as similarity and homogeneity in these groups were heightened (Lee and Ward, 2008, p.117). Similarly, de Vries found that communities with stronger collectivist attitudes, and thus stronger group identification, would tend to have stronger ethnic supremacy aspirations (de Vries, 2002, pp.324-325). Therefore, the existence of collectivism within a nation could likely lead to ethnonationalist ideals.

As collectivism and ethnic nationalism are intrinsically linked, it is not surprising to notice a convergence between collectivist and ethnonationalist societies' expected behaviours towards immigrants. Indeed, Reijerse stressed how numerous findings in the academic literature pointed towards the fact that ethnic characteristics are inherently essentialist and exclusionist in nature and that therefore ethnic representations were associated with negative attitudes and affect towards immigrants, and with ethnic prejudice and xenophobia (Reijerse, 2013, p.615). Indeed, as non-ethnic migrants would not present traits of the nation's shared ethnic heritage, by not sharing the same ancestry, language or cultural values and traditions, they would be excluded from its membership. Jeong further highlighted this as she mentioned that previous studies, as well as her own, have demonstrated how "countries associated with ethnic nationalism tend to exclude immigrants as members of the nation" (Jeong, 2016, p.208). Indeed, based on the survey she conducted in six different countries, she noticed that, in nations with stronger ethnic identity than civic, the respondents were more reluctant to accept foreigners/immigrants as their neighbours and expressed negative attitudes towards policies on foreign workers (Jeong, 2016, p.213). Thus, she observed an overall tendency for countries with ethnic national identity, whether Asian or Western, to be "associated with unfavourable attitudes toward immigrants" (Jeong, 2016, p.213 and 216). Similarly, and in correlation with collectivism, Kaber Lewis underlined Zarate and Shaw's argument according to which groups with strong in-group identity, such as nationalist identification, are expected to "respond with more prejudice towards other groups" (Kaber Lewis, 2019, p.7). She further related this to ethnic nationalism as she demonstrated through her research that "all ethnic categories [used in her survey to measure ethnic nationalism] were

more predictive of negative attitudes towards migrants than civic measures" and that overall "ethnicity appears to be more predictive of negative attitudes towards immigrants" (Kaber Lewis, 2019, p.28). Therefore, scholars' analyses seem to concur as they predict ethnic nationalism and identity to be associated with negative attitudes towards migrants, such as exclusion, ethnic prejudice, discrimination and xenophobia. This ethnic prejudice and discrimination are thus expected to take the shape of an ethnic hierarchy within immigration policies and public opinion. According to this ethnic hierarchy, as co-ethnic migrants would likely share the same cultural heritage or at least bloodline, they would be preferred to non-ethnic migrants, and semi-ethnic migrants would occupy an intermediate position.

1.2.2. Power distance, Uncertainty Avoidance and Long-term Orientation

Secondly, Power Distance, another of Hofstede's most known dimensions, also provides insights into both Korean culture and its potential response to immigrants. Indeed, Korea scores a 60 out of 100 on the Power Distance Index (PDI), which means that some more weight is given to the status and that society tends to be organised more vertically, based on hierarchies, than horizontally (see Appendix 1)(Hofstede Insights, 2020a). The PDI is, therefore, positively correlated with the acceptance of social inequalities and negatively related to demands for the equalisation of the distribution of power (Hofstede, 2001, pp.79-85; Hofstede Insights, 2020b). In high power distance cultures, hierarchies dominate relationships and are unconsciously respected and accepted. They are perceived as a natural reality more than a social construction and as necessary to order interactions and status within society. In his studies, Leong (2008), draws some conclusions on the expected attitudes of high power distance societies towards immigrants. He states that, as high power distance cultures "see discrimination against members from a lower status group as an acceptable form of social interactions", it is not surprising for these cultures to be associated with increased prejudice and discrimination against immigrants and with less favourable perceptions of immigrants and multiculturalism (Leong, 2008, p.123; Leong and Ward, 2006). Moreover, this paper highlights that, should an ethnonationalist country present cultural traits of high power distance, the likelihood of the construction of the previously mentioned ethnic hierarchy would be greater and perhaps more rigid. Indeed, it would seem reasonable to expect high power distance cultures giving predominance to their own ethnicity, like in ethnonationalist societies,

to construct an ethnic hierarchy wherein the nation's ethnicity is perceived as superior to the out-group's, leading subsequently to hierarchies within immigrants (Seol and Seo, 2014). Conversely, low power distance cultures would likely consider all cultures equal and thus would be more accepting of immigrants regardless of ethnicity.

Two of Hofstede's dimensions also provide fundamentally important clues on South Korea's potential response to immigration. Indeed, Korean culture scored particularly high on Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) and Long-Term Orientation Index (LTO), with respectively 85 and 100 out of 100 (see Appendix 1)(Hofstede Insights, 2021a). According to Hofstede, a country evaluated as highly orientated towards uncertainty avoidance, like Korea, would tend to rely on and need rigid rules, traditions, beliefs and codes of behaviours structuring the society so that it is predictable (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede Insights, 2021b). Cultures scoring high on the UAI would thus be likely not to accept unorthodox behaviours and resist changes in society. Therefore, individuals or out-groups that do not adhere to these specific rules and traditions because of their different culture, such as immigrants, would be prone to being ill-perceived as they would jeopardise the status quo (Leong and Ward, 2006; Leong, 2008, p.123). According to the paradigm of assimilation and exclusion shaping high UA culture, immigrants would thus be either expected to assimilate within the host culture by adopting the cultural codes structuring its society, or would be excluded if they do not. High uncertainty avoidance also seems to be a defining trait of ethnic nationalism. Indeed, in both ethnonationalist and high uncertainty avoidance societies, there is a heavy reliance on conformity and cultural codes and traditions. Furthermore, Gründl and Aichholzer argue that being a nation highly orientated towards UA "make[s] it more likely" for that nation to "resonate with" populist movements and "precede" elements of nativism and exclusive nationalism, both of which could strongly be argued to be key features of ethnic nationalism (Gründl and Aichholzer, 2018, p.2 and 18). Therefore, this same paradigm of exclusion and assimilation, resulting in either demands for the immigrant's assimilation of the host culture's cultural codes or their exclusion, could be observable in ethnonationalist countries like Korea. Thus, it could be argued that, since Korea is estimated to be orientated towards uncertainty avoidance, which participates in shaping ethnic nationalism, Koreans would likely be either against immigration as migrants would display different cultural codes and as it would signify change, or would only see it as acceptable if immigrants assimilate,

meaning if they adopt the nation's customs, culture and language. This hypothesis is put to the test in the following chapters.

Korea also ranked exceptionally high on Hofstede's LTO. Being long-term orientated is most generally defined as being orientated towards the future and planning for the long-term, rather than towards the past and aiming for immediate benefits (Hofstede Insights, 2021b; Fang, 2003, p.348). Although it can be argued that Korea is also fundamentally past-orientated, meaning preferring to "maintain time-honoured traditions and norms while viewing societal change with suspicion" as mentioned previously, it seems that according to Hofstede's data, its will to prepare for the future is greater (Hofstede Insights, 2021b, np). This duality in the case of Korea resides in the fact that, when Hofstede created the LTO dimension, called initially 'Confucian dynamism', he separated 'positive' and 'negative' Confucian values into a long-term orientation category and a short-term orientation category respectively (Fang, 2003; Fang, 2011). However, since these Confucian values, whether 'positive' or 'negative', all participate in shaping Confucian-influenced cultures profoundly, such as Korea's, categorising the latter is somewhat problematic. Indeed, since Confucian-influenced cultures equally possess the values constructing both categories of Hofstede's LTO dimension, they cannot be accurately categorised in either short-term orientation, which presents values such as "respect for tradition" and "protecting your face", or long-term orientation, presenting values such as "ordering relationships by status" and "thrift" (Hofstede, 2001; Fang, 2003; Fang, 2011). Hence, the double standard in the case of Korea. In any case, if one is to focus on Korea's given LTO score and the most generally used definition of LTO, even though the existing literature does not seem to have covered the potential attitudes of long-term orientated cultures regarding immigration, this paper identifies a possible predicted response. Indeed, the nature of LTO suggests that long-term orientated cultures would formulate responses to immigration that settle within the longer term rather than responses to short-term problems. In Korea's case, its long-term orientation could likely lead to preferential treatment for migrants settling in the country for the long run rather than migrants who reside in Korea on non-permanent statuses and are bound to leave within a few years. Thus, its immigrant policy and discourse would focus more on integrating permanent migrants, such as foreign brides and multicultural families, than on tackling day-to-day discrimination that temporary immigrant workers face (Kim, 2015).

1.2.3. Limitations of Hofstede's model and alternative cultural frameworks

However, Hofstede's framework also presents a few noteworthy limitations for providing insights into expected contemporary attitudes towards immigrants. Indeed, even though the framework remains a sturdy basis for the identification of expected behaviours, two limitations must be underlined: Hofstede's Masculinity Index (MAS) score for Korea seems to contradict previous expectations of attitudes regarding migrants, and the IDV, PDI, UAI and MAS scores for South Korea have not changed since the 1970s, which counters this paper's view of culture as dynamic and evolving (Hofstede, 2001, pp.87, 151, 215, 286; Hofstede Insights, 2021a).

Firstly, South Korea's score on Hofstede's MAS points towards the rather 'feminine' nature of the national culture, which would theoretically be associated with more acceptance of diversity and immigration in opposition to Korea's previously stated expected negative attitude towards immigration (see Appendix 1)(Hofstede Insights, 2021a). Indeed, in the literature, and particularly in Leong and Ward's study, "feminine characteristics" such as preferences for harmony, caring for the weak and quality of life, proper to cultures scoring rather low on MAS, are associated with "weaker demands for cultural assimilation" (Leong and Ward, 2006, p.807; Hofstede Insights, 2021b). Conversely, high masculinity is related to "less multicultural optimism and less support for policies promoting co-existence", which until now correlated with expectations for Korean culture and ethnic nationalism (Leong and Ward, 2006, p.807). However, though it is worth keeping in mind, this does not necessarily mean that a culture with 'feminine' traits would readily and openly accept immigrants, especially if, in opposition, it scores high on collectivism, power distance and uncertainty avoidance and is characterised by ethnic nationalism. Indeed, its combination with these different dimensions, all of which shape the national culture, might lead to a different outcome than predicted for one isolated dimension.

Secondly, this paper must note that Hofstede's data for South Korea's first dates from the late 1960s and 1970s, and its scores have not changed since. Indeed, when comparing the country's results from the 2001 book *Culture's Consequence*s presenting the results of the original 1967 to 1973 surveys and the *Country Comparison* tool from the website *Hofstede Insights*, South Korea's scores for IDV, PDI, UAI and MAS remain the exact same (Hofstede, 2001, pp.87, 151, 215, 286; Hofstede Insights, 2021a). However, even though Hofstede argues that cultural values are "remarkably stable over time, […] especially national cultures", with minimal

significant changes, numerous academics, including this paper, believe culture to be a dynamic entity (Hofstede, cited in Fang, 2013, p.28; Hofstede, 2001, p.12; Fan, 2000, p.9; Lu and Chen, 2011; Fang, 2013). Therefore, as Korea underwent significant changes in the last fifty years, Hofstede's peculiarly unchanged scores for Korea might not be as valid nowadays as when they were first evaluated in the 1970s. However, overall, Hofstede's dimensions remain a valuable resource to grasp, to an extent, the essence of national cultures and how their values can impact responses to immigration. It is thus highly interesting for this research to evaluate the extent to which these predicted behaviours and attitudes are indeed present in contemporary Korea.

Other frameworks such as Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's, Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars' and Schwartz's also provide typologies of cultural values influencing a culture's members' behaviours. However, for the purpose of this research, this paper focuses rather on Hofstede's for three different reasons. First, the link between ethnic nationalism and Hofstede's dimensions appears to be more established within the academic literature. Second, the three previously stated other models seem to provide less universally applicable insights into expected attitudes to immigration specifically. Finally, South Korea's position on these dimensions' spectrum is not always researched or clear. Therefore, using their frameworks as a basis for this research could lead to logical fallacies instead of analyses based on empirical data. Even though some behavioural expectations can be hypothesised, there seems to be a lack of academic literature supporting these and most seem to concur with the previously identified expectations as their related dimensions bear resemblances with Hofstede's.

For example, some of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's dimensions might provide a few insights regarding attitudes towards immigrants. The 'Nature of humanity' dimension points to the suggestion that cultures perceiving people as intrinsically 'evil' would be warier of migrants than cultures perceiving them as 'good' (Hopkins, 2009, p.28). However, because of the many philosophical and religious influences shaping Korean culture, determining the nation's view on human nature is extremely arduous. Indeed, there are within the Confucian philosophy opposing currents regarding the nature of humanity, Mencius arguing for its inherent goodness and Xunzi for its inherent immorality. Moreover, the Yin Yang philosophy establishes that good and evil are two existing complementary forces within all (Scarpari, 2003). The encounter of these two spiritual currents with Buddhism and the recently growing Catholicism in

Korea makes it hard to discern the country's orientation on this dimension. Secondly, similarly to PDI, cultures being more 'hierarchical' on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's 'Social relations' dimension would likely perceive immigrants as inferior to nationals. For dimensions such as 'Relationship to nature' or 'Mode of activity', expectations of attitudes towards immigration seem more difficult to draw (Hopkins, 2009, p.28).

Even though Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars' dimensions are more orientated towards the business field and thus more detached from issues of nationalism and immigration policies, the 'Individualism versus Communitarianism' dimension would seem to concur with IDV expectations for individualistic and collectivist cultures respectively (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2012). Furthermore, the 'Achievement versus Ascription' dimension, for which Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars' evaluated Korea to be more ascriptive, seems fairly related to the civic and ethnic nationalism typology and to PDI (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2012, p.128). Indeed, achievement cultures assign personal status based on performance, which points to the idea that individuals are born equal and gain status through their actions, whereas ascription cultures assign it by age, class, gender or ethnicity (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2012, p.129; Hopkins, 2009, p.46). Thus, it could be expected from the latter to construct hierarchies between migrants according to these ontological features which, in the case of ethnic nationalism, would lead to an ethnic hierarchy. Conversely, in achievement cultures, civic nationalism would be more dominant, welcome all migrants and judge their value based on their individual actions within the country. However, as mentioned and except for the 'Achievement versus Ascription' dimension, Korea's position on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's, and Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars' typologies has not been researched thoroughly. Moreover, the stated above expected attitudes towards immigration remain mainly speculative because of the lack of academic literature and empirical data on the matter. Finally, they overall seem to concur with Hofstede's dimensions' expectations of attitudes towards migrants.

Finally, Hoti (2017) and Leong and Ward (2006) analysed the extent to which Schwartz human values and cultural dimensions could influence attitudes towards immigration. Hoti notably established a negative association between these attitudes and the 'Conservatism' dimension, which gathers values of conformity, tradition and security in a similar way to Hofstede's UAI (Hoti, 2017, p.196; Schwartz, 1999). Therefore, cultures displaying more 'conservatism' would likely have negative attitudes

towards immigrants. This finding would thus align with our previous expectations as cultures orientated towards a heavy reliance on cultural codes and traditions, conformity and status quo are predicted to be more exclusionary, or at least aiming for the assimilation of immigrants. However, Hoti noted that Schwartz's other human values' influence on attitudes towards immigration proved to be much less universal as "clear country specific differences were observed" (Hoti, 2017, p.188). Therefore, since Hoti's study, which was conducted on three European countries' attitudes, had noteworthy country-specific differences, applying it to Korea could very probably lead to incorrect expectations of attitudes. Furthermore, in Leong and Ward's research (2006, p.807), Schwartz's cultural dimensions, such as 'Hierarchy', 'Embeddedness' and 'Egalitarianism', were not found to be related to attitudes toward immigrants and multiculturalism. Therefore, as less evidence of correlations between Schwartz's model and attitudes towards immigration were found, and since the one that was found was highly related to Hofstede's UAI, this research gives predominance to Hofstede's theory to identify expected Korean responses to immigration.

All in all, Hofstede's IDV, PDI, UAI and LTO results for South Korea, and the literature's expectations for ethnic nationalism and these cultural dimensions regarding responses to immigration orient preliminary thoughts to this research towards Korea's predicted negative attitude towards immigrants. Responses to immigration are expected to range from exclusion, discrimination and ethnic hierarchy to demands for the assimilation of permanent migrants, aiming for their adoption of Korean traditions, values and language rather than the coexistence of different cultures through multiculturalism. Therefore, to truly grasp the factors shaping Korea's response to immigration, it is now necessary to note the differences between monoculturalism, assimilation and multiculturalism, as well as their link to ethnic nationalism and their influence on a nation's immigration policy.

1.3. Expected immigration and immigrant policy: monocultural ethnic nationalism versus multiculturalism

Since this research notably studies South Korean immigration and immigrant policies, understanding the diverse approaches to intercultural encounters, both from a political and an intercultural communication standpoint, is fundamental. Indeed, as this paper develops later, Korea is a monocultural nation that faces global pressures

for multiculturalist policies as its immigrant population grows undeniably. Therefore, defining and analysing these concepts' differences is necessary to grasp the potential shift Korea is facing and instituting.

Firstly, ethnic nationalism is intrinsically rooted in monoculturalism. Monoculturalism typically shapes nationalist movements prioritising the nation's interests over other nations' and establishing a discourse of superiority (Rings, 2016, p.9). According to Welsch and Benessaieh, monocultures are separatist, homogeneous and essentialist (Welsch, 1999; Benessaieh, 2010). In this view, cultures are seen as separate entities with clear boundaries within which intercultural coexistence is not an option. They each gather a highly homogeneous collective of individuals with a particular essence and characteristics that distinguish them from other cultures and state their belonging. Rings particularly underlines that monoculturalism "appears both double-sided and hierarchical when sharply dividing a culturally and/or racially 'pure'/superior Self from and 'impure' and inferior Other" (Rings, 2016, p.9). Therefore, monocultures often construct a discourse of cultural and/or racial hierarchy, or as designated in this paper, "ethnic hierarchy" which gathers both cultural and racial matters together, in the same way that Korean ethnic nationalism conflates both concepts into the term "minjok", meaning "nation", "ethnie" and "race" (Shin, 2006, p.4). Monoculturalism is also based on the long-standing paradigm of assimilation and exclusion since, if an individual is not part of this culture, he/she will either be excluded or forced into assimilation, meaning "incorporating immigrants into a society through a one-sided process of adaptation" (Shim, 2013, p.7). Therefore, faced with migration, monocultures would likely implement assimilationist policies according to which immigrants are "expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics, and become indistinguishable from the majority population" by adopting the customs, culture and language of the dominant social group or nation (Shim, 2013, p.7; The New Dictionary Of Cultural Literacy, 2005). Following this definition of monoculturalism, it appears quite significantly that ethnic nationalism is rooted in the monocultural viewpoint as it also presents national culture as a closed, exclusive, homogeneous and essentialist monoculture that preaches the superiority of the nation's ethnicity and interests (Reijerse, 2013). Therefore, expectations of monocultural attitudes towards immigrants could likely be found within ethnonationalist societies as well. As this paper develops in the next chapter, Korean

ethnic nationalism is a great illustration of monoculturalism since it specifically extols Korean culture's uniqueness, its homogeneity, even its "purity", hinting at the idea that tainting the superior Korean blood with another ethnicity would be degrading it to a lower status (Lim, 2009, p.1 and 2010, pp.54-55; Han, 2016).

Nonetheless, as this paper analyses in Chapter II, there seems to have been a discursive shift in South Korea, from an ethnonationalist myth of cultural homogeneity, uniqueness and superiority to a governmental discourse of multiculturalism (Lim, 2010, p.52; Han, 2016; Oh and Oh, 2016; Kim, 2015; Hundt, 2016; Durham and Carpenter, 2015; Shim, 2013; Kim, 2011). As Rings (2016) defines it, multiculturalism, in Welsch's sense and according to the intercultural communication field of study, refers to the coexistence of different cultures within society. Cultures, therefore, remain clearly defined by boundaries, but their existence in the same space does not necessitate the assimilation of one of the two culture's members into the other culture. Indeed, multiculturalism encompasses "the mutual respect and coexistence of diverse ethnic and racial groups without attempts to integrate their different cultures and values" (Shim, 2013, p.2). Individuals are therefore free to maintain their own cultural values and behaviours without risking discrimination or prejudice, and "to participate as equals in all spheres of the society without being expected to give up their own culture, religion and language" (Shim, 2013, p.6). Thus, there is no assimilation versus exclusion paradigm in this multiculturalist view, and society is no longer homogeneous (Rings, 2016). However, the previously stated expectations of behaviours for the ethnonationalist, collectivist, high power distance and uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientated monocultural Korea seem to be in clear opposition with this shift. They all pointed to expected negative attitudes towards immigrants, excluding them if they fail to assimilate and discriminating against them according to an ethnic hierarchy. Therefore, at first sight, and based on the intercultural communication field of study's definition of multiculturalism, the latter's discursive adoption by the South Korean government seems to be the antipodes of the previous analysis of Korea's expected behaviour towards migrants. As Kim wrote: "multiculturalism as a policy is largely inconsistent with Korean values'" (Kim, 2010, pp.125-127 cited in Durham and Carpenter, 2015, p.977).

Nonetheless, it is essential to note that multiculturalism, as understood from the political standpoint, can differ from its definition in the intercultural field of study. When applied to politics and policy implementation, multiculturalist policies tend to be shaped and influenced by the country's culture and type of nationalism. Thus, the concept of multiculturalism appears to be context-specific: “Multiculturalism in a country like Canada […] does not mean the same thing as it does in Korea” (Denney and Green, 2020, p.18). According to Hundt, multiculturalism “means different things to different places, including Asia” and must be understood in local terms (Hundt, 2016, p.489). However, Denney and Green (2020, p.7) highlighted a previous “almost exclusive” focus on North America and Europe in the academic literature regarding nations’ responses to immigration, and Hundt (2016, p.489) argued that too often, multiculturalism was “generally understood in Western terms”. Therefore, Oh and Oh (2016) called for the need to “decenter understandings of multiculturalism to better balance the scholarly gaze and attention” and to provide insights on how multiculturalism is practised outside of the West (Oh and Oh, 2016, p.262). This research thus aims to participate in mending this gap in the academic literature by analysing the impacts of culturally-specific variables on governmental and public attitudes towards immigrants in an Asian country.

Therefore, despite a governmental discourse of multiculturalism, or “soft talk” as Kim (2015, p.52) writes, one could expect a country such as Korea with strong in-group identification and collectivism, to develop an in-practice version of multiculturalism that would be more adapted to its own cultural values and heritage (Denney and Green, 2020). Consequently, it could be argued that, in a monocultural nation with strong ethnic nationalism, low IDV, high PDI, UAI and LTO, the discursive claim for multiculturalism would, in practice, lead to immigrant policies with assimilationist undertones instead of the harmonious coexistence and acceptance of different cultures in the same national borders, and towards the creation of a hierarchy based on the ethnic origins of migrants instead of granting an equal status regardless of ethnicity (Seol and Seo, 2014; Kim, 2015). Therefore, multiculturalism would remain a rhetoric more than a reality.

For that matter, Shim (2013) underlines a theory that could explain the divergences of country-specific multicultural policies. Indeed, Raz, Kymlicka, and Bleich have developed a comprehensive framework of “the three stages of development in recognizing the demands of multiculturalism” (Raz, 1994, Kymlicka 1995, and Bleich

2003, cited in Shim, 2013, p.7). Within this framework, the first stage is tolerance, developed thanks to media and intercultural encounters, and to socialisation between the host society and immigrants. The second stage is the legalisation of non-discrimination through the passing of laws. The final stage refers to “multi-ethnic rights” that would allow for the expression of cultural, religious and ethnic identity in the public sphere, self-government and self-representation (Shim, 2013, p.7). Therefore, it could be possible to expect a country like Korea, displaying strong collectivism and ethnic nationalism, to either, like mentioned, use multiculturalism mostly as a rhetoric rather than a practice and thus not be at any stages of this multiculturalist development, or to be at the first steps of the tolerance stage without necessarily pushing for the progress to the next stage.

All in all, this first chapter presented highly useful frameworks for identifying expected national attitudes towards immigrants. Indeed, Hofstede’s dimensions, monoculturalism and ethnic nationalism, itself heavily influenced by cultural values and monoculturalism, provide clues for predicting potential South Korean governmental and public responses to immigration. According to the literature discussion brought up in this chapter, one could thus expect South Korean attitudes to align with the paradigm of assimilation and exclusion, meaning either expecting the immigrants to assimilate to Korean culture or excluding them, and to display discriminatory responses based on an ethnic hierarchy. In the next chapter, this paper proceeds to briefly analyse the historical roots of South Korea’s ethnic nationalism and its impact on Korean identity and early responses to immigration. It also investigates how globalisation, democratisation and the global push for multiculturalism challenge these constructs. Only after this second chapter will it conduct an analysis of both immigration and immigrant policies and public opinion surveys to determine whether such expectations of in-practice assimilationist multiculturalism and ethnic hierarchy are indeed observable or if the rapid evolution of Korea these past few decades has instead oriented the country towards a more in-practice intercultural definition of multiculturalism. The later result could hint at a potential change, or lessened influence, of the cultural values forging contemporary Korean society and at a shift to a different pattern of nationalism, as predicted by other scholars subscribing to the evolutionary perspective.

Chapter II: From monoculturalism and a myth of homogeneity and uniqueness to a changing ethnoscape in a context of globalisation and democratisation

In the previous chapter, this paper proceeded to identify several expected behaviours and attitudes of the Korean nation towards immigrants. Indeed, using frameworks of ethnic nationalism, cultural typologies and monoculturalism, this research established that Korea's predicted response to immigration would be rather negative, ranging from discrimination according to an ethnic hierarchy to exclusion if immigrants do not assimilate to Korean culture. However, as the following chapters broaches, since 2006, the Korean governmental stance on the matter has been to advocate multiculturalism, meaning, according to the stricto sensu definition, the coexistence of different culture without expectations of the renouncement of one's own culture, values and language. As underlined by Kim (2015), Denney and Green (2020) and Hundt (2016), this could be explained by the fact that multiculturalism, when applied to policy implementation, is mainly dependent on the context, which here could refer to the country's cultural values, pattern of nationalism and monoculturalism.

In order to research and verify if these expected governmental and public responses of in-practice assimilationist multiculturalism and ethnic hierarchy are indeed observable in contemporary Korea, confirming the explanatory value of ethnic nationalism and cultural values for attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism, it is firstly crucial for this study to expand on how South Korean nationalism belongs to ethnic nationalism and monoculturalism. Indeed, Korea's nation-building, meaning the social and historical construction of the nation as an "'imagined' community whose members are connected to each other through imagination", was profoundly influenced by ethnic nationalism, which shaped its national identity and directly impacted early responses to immigration (Shin, 2016, pp.7-8; Anderson, 1991). However, as this chapter highlights in a second phase, the evolving national and global context led to the emergence of a factually more diverse Korean ethnoscape and to pressures for the adoption of multiculturalism, challenging traditional ethnic biases.

2.1. Historicity of South Korean nation-building and ethnic nationalism

When studying Korean immigration policy and public opinion, academics have firmly established the need to consider ethnic nationalism. Indeed, Denney and Green (2020, p.6) notably state: “Unlike studies of North America in particular, the Korean case requires overt consideration of an ethnic dimension”. This terminology is therefore often directly mentioned or heavily implied within the academic literature by highlighting how Korean national identity is based on notions of ethnicity, race, blood, homogeneity, uniqueness, ethnic community, collective cultural tradition and language (Shin, 2006; Kim, 2013; Lim, 2010; Denney and Green, 2020; Lim, 2009; Jeong 2016; Seol and Seo, 2014; Kong, Yoon and Yu 2010; Campbell, 2015; Hundt, 2016; Durham and Carpenter, 2015; Han, 2016; Lee, 2009; Ha, Cho and Kang, 2016; Draudt, 2019). Therefore, it is necessary to analyse how the Korean nation-building established itself through a historically embedded process of ethnic nationalism heavily influenced by a certain hostility towards foreign powers to understand the shaping of Korean identity and resulting attitudes towards immigrants.

2.1.1. Historicity of Korean nation-building, established around ethnic nationalism and hostility towards foreigners

In his book, *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy*, Shin (2006) explains how conflated notions of race and ethnicity shaped the Korean nation and national identity following a historically embedded process of ethnic nationalism. Indeed, Korean historical experiences, tinted by a sense of external threats, “have been largely responsible for the rise and continued dominance of an ethnic, organic conception of nation, which stressed internal solidarity and submission to collectivist goals” (Shin, 2006, p.8). According to Kuzio (2002, cited in Shin, 2006, p.10), in times of crisis such as immigration and foreign wars, ethnic factors overshadow civic ones. In Korea’s case, ethnic nationalism took root since it struck a popular chord among the Korean society as the country faced foreign aggressions in the shape of colonialism and forced assimilation (Han, 2016; Lim, 2009; Durham and Carpenter, 2015). This consequently had a profound impact on the construction of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ within Korean mindsets.

From the late 1880s to the 1910s, Korea faced a double menace, one from the ‘West’ as the latter attempted to aggressively ‘civilise’ East Asia, and one from its close

neighbour, Japan, that aimed for its imperialist expansion in Asia (Shin, 2006, p.32). As Japan turned the pan-Asianist ideology, stressing common cultural heritage and racial similarity among East Asians, into a discourse legitimising their imperialist and assimilationist endeavour in Korea, the latter searched for evidence of its uniqueness to justify the maintenance of their independence (Shin, 2006, p.224). Japan tried to prove with a "scientific basis" that Koreans belong to the same race as the Japanese while remaining inferior to the Japanese civilisation to justify the colonial rule and assimilationist policies (Shin, 2006, p.44). Korea, therefore, "reinterpret[ed] Korean history as one of an ethnic national history" to distinguish itself from Japan and invalidate its expansionist ideals (Shin, 2006, p.36). This "new historiography established a racial and ethnic genealogy of the Korean nation that emerged from *Tan'gun*, the mythic founder" (Shin, 2006, p.36). This primordialist view, according to which the Korean nation's ethnic homogeneity spans over thousands of years and is based on a single bloodline, participated in the creation of a national myth of cultural uniqueness through notions of shared ancestry, purity and ethnic homogeneity that was then widely utilised to counter foreign forces and assert Korean nationalism (Ha, Cho and Kang, 2016).

This discourse thus became the spearhead of Korean nationalism (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003, p.8; Breinig, 1992, np; Foucault, 1970; Lee, 2009, p.365). It "conceptualised nation in ethnic, cultural and racial terms" (Shin, 2006, pp.39-40; Hundt, 2016, p.487). Opposing the Korean in-group 'Self' to the foreign out-group 'Other' to protect the nation's cultural and political independence, and accentuating the distinctiveness and purity of Korean ethnicity and nation, this discourse acted as a defence mechanism against the 'white Western' and Japanese imperialisms (Said, 1979). The nation thus stressed "the importance of national language, history, customs, heroes, and identity" through textbooks, and encouraged the study and development of the Korean language and literature (Shin, 2006, pp.37-38). Nationalists preached the immortality of the Korean national spirit, as it is based on common blood and shared ethnic heritage, allowing for the revival of the nation even when its political sovereignty is lost, which then happened from 1910 to 1945 when Japan occupied Korea (Shin, 2006, p.39). This loss of sovereignty thus led Korean nationalists to defend the Korean heritage even more fervently, insisting on its uniqueness. Overall, as Lee (2009, p.364) stated, Korean ethnic nationalism was notably a "collective response to a hostile external environment during the twentieth century".

Ethnic nationalism was further strengthened in the 1930s in reaction to socialism which aimed to reorient group identity from the nation to universalist notions of class. Indeed, the rise of socialism led to the opposite effect as nationalists, in response, promoted particularism and unified "the once-split nationalist movement under the banner of Korean ethnic national unity" (Shin, 2006, p.70). According to Shin, socialists "overestimat[ed] the revolutionary potential of the proletariat and the rural poor, and underestimated the popular appeals of ethnic nationalism" (Shin, 2006, p.74). Finally, the ethnonationalist discourse was also utilised to legitimise the political regimes of Syngman Rhee (1948-60) and Park Chung Hee (1961-79). Indeed, both leaders stressed the primacy of the nation over other social cleavages and mobilised ethnic nationalism to justify their authoritarian regimes (Shin, 2006; Draudt, 2019, p.2).

2.1.2. Impacts of Korean ethnic nationalism on the Korean national identity, perceptions of 'Self' and 'Other' and early responses to immigration

After almost a century of the primacy of the ethnonationalist discourse, opposing Korea to foreign out-groups, ignoring internal social cleavages and repressing minorities' interests for the sake of the nation, and affirming the superiority and uniqueness of the Korean ethnicity, the Korean identity came to be profoundly shaped by these statements (Seol and Seo, 2014, pp.11-12; Kim, 2013; Shin, 2006). Indeed, this belongingness to the Korean nation took a hegemonic position within Koreans' identity as other competing forms of categorical identity such as class and pan-Asianism were defeated due to the previously mentioned historically contingent events (Shin, 2006; Kim, 2013). Moreover, a strong sentiment of national pride founded on shared "language, values and culture rooted in a common ethnicity" was developed (Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010, p.252; Kim, 2015). Thus, as this national identity was defined by ethnic nationalism, enhancing collectivism, cultural homogeneity and the rejection of out-groups, Korean society became "inextricably tied to and defined by a unique Korean identity, one based on an uncompromising conflation of race and ethnicity", on a sharp distinction from the "overseas 'Other'", and on the inexistence, or denial, of internal minorities (Lim, 2009, p.1; Seol and Seo, 2014, p.12). These three factors emerged as the defining features of Korean identity and culture, impacting politics, societal issues and public opinion.

This resulted, according to Lim (2009, p.1) in a "narrow conceptualization of national identity and belongingness" wherein to be "a true Korean" one should have

Korean blood, the “pure blood”, and “embody the values, the mores and mind-set of Korean society” (Kim, 2015). This national unity upon a particular and strict definition of ‘Korean-ness’ thus set clear boundaries between the Korean ‘Self’ and the foreign ‘Others’, excluding them as outsiders and potential threats due to Korea’s traumatic history and heavy reliance on ethnic homogeneity (Denney and Green, 2020; Lim, 2009; Durham and Carpenter, 2015). Korea was then the epitome of monoculturalism. Therefore, until 1990, Korea’s immigration policy was highly restrictive in admitting foreign workers, and it was rare for Koreans to see foreigners walking the streets (Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010, p.254). During early immigration movements to Korea, notably and exclusively with the settlement of the American army after the Japanese occupation, the latter was never integrated as an in-group, and “mixed-raced Amerasians”, meaning the children of Korean women and U.S. soldiers, were ostracised and suffered heavy discrimination as they were perceived as sullying the pure Korean blood and the long-standing bloodline of *Tan’gun* (Lim, 2009, pp.1-2; Seol and Seo, 2014, p.13). Thus, initial responses to immigration seem to concur with the previously analysed expected attitudes towards immigrants and to validate the explanatory value of variables such as patterns of nationalism and cultural values for attitudes towards immigration. However, this early migration influx remained very limited and mainly consisted of American military personnel. It is with the rise of Korea’s economic development and democratisation, and of globalisation that the homogeneous Korean nation started to face ethnic diversity and the challenges that accompany this change.

2.2. The changing Korean ethnoscape in a context of globalisation, democratisation and increased global pressure for multiculturalism

Beyond a century-old myth and discourse of shared ancestral bloodline and cultural uniqueness, it remains that, up until recently, South Korea was indeed an ethnically homogeneous country. Before the late 1980s, the nation was mainly a country of emigration with very minimal immigration (Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010; Shim, 2013; Kim, 2015; Seol and Seo, 2014). However, within three decades, the number of foreign residents increased from 49,400 in 1990, representing 0.12% of the population, to 1.78 million in 2019, now representing 3.4% of the total population (Lim, 2010, p.52; The World Bank, 2021; Statistics Korea, 2020a, p.4; T.-S. Kim, 2011). Although this

percentage remains far lower in comparison to Western countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom, where foreign residents represent respectively 15% and 13% of the total population, South Korea is undeniably facing the exponential growth of its immigrant community within a relatively short amount of time (Denney and Green, 2020, p.2). This upward trend can be attributed to several factors such as South Korea's regime change from dictatorship to democracy, its rapid economic growth leading to a shortage in low-skilled workers, its increased visibility in Asia thanks to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and its demographic crisis due to a low birth rate (Shim, 2013; Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010). This change within the Korean ethnoscape poses direct challenges to Korea's national identity based on ethnic homogeneity and purity, especially as the country becomes further integrated within the global community and faces international pressure for the adoption of multiculturalism (Denney and Carpenter, 2015; Kim, 2013; Seol and Seo, 2014). It is necessary to consider these factors to understand how previous expectations of contemporary attitudes towards immigration identified based on variables of patterns of nationalism and cultural values could be thwarted.

2.2.1. The reasons for the evolving Korean ethnic landscape and its demography

The shift in Korea's ethnoscape started in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the country transitioned into a stable democracy and as the effects of Korea's nationalist modernization during Park's term in office became apparent within Korean society (Oh and Oh, 2016, p.254; Lim, 2009, p.4; Draudt, 2019). Indeed, as the economic growth brought the country to the status of 'industrialised nation', Koreans, motivated by desires of upward socio-economic mobility, became more reluctant to take manual and "3D jobs", dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs, in sectors such as agriculture, hospitality and manufacturing (Shim, 2013, p.9; Ha, Cho and Kang, 2016, p.138; T.-S. Kim, 2011, p.157; Hundt, 2016). Therefore, as the government faced growing internal demands for low-skilled labour, it "gradually –yet very slowly– opened the borders to the foreigners" (Ha, Cho and Kang, 2016, p.137). The social fabric of Korean society thus started to become more multi-ethnic as workers from China and South-East Asian countries, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, were gradually 'imported' (Shim, 2013, p.9; Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010, p.253; Lim, 2010). Moreover, the country's economic development associated with these same desires for socio-economic mobility resulted in "the shortage of marriageable women" in rural areas who

often migrated to cities in the search for job opportunities, as well as in one of the lowest birth rate in the world, posing a grave issue for the generation renewal (Shim, 2013, p.9; Hundt, 2016, p.488; Denney and Green, 2020; Draudt, 2019). Therefore, private international marriage agencies rapidly emerged in the 1990s to arrange marriages between ethnic Korean farmers and women from China and South East Asia (Shim, 2013; Lim, 2010). There thus was a “sharp and continuous increase in international marriages”, from representing 3.7% of all registered marriages in South Korea in 2000 to 13.6% in 2005 (Lim, 2010, p.65; Durham and Carpenter, 2015, p.978). Even though the number of international marriages per year has since then decreased, from 9,900 in 1999 up to 42,300 in 2005 and down to 23,700 in 2019, representing about 7.7% of all marriages that year, it remains that the number of ‘multi-ethnic families’ in Korea increased drastically (Statistics Korea, 2020b). Indeed, in 2019, “multicultural households”, defined by Korean governmental statistical databases as containing either naturalised Koreans, marriage migrants or multicultural children, amounted to 350,000 households, representing 1.7% of the total households (Statistics Korea, 2020a). Moreover, the growing visibility and positive image of South Korea, especially in Asia, notably thanks to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, directly impacted immigration. As a now ‘industrialised nation’, an increasing number of South-East Asian migrants perceive South Korea as an Asian ‘American Dream’ wherein more job opportunities, higher salaries and better standards of living are attainable (J.K. Kim, 2011, p.1586; Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010; Draudt, 2019, p.6).

For the purpose of researching the role of ethnic nationalism in South Korean immigration policies and public attitudes, the new Korean ethnoscape can be understood according to three categories: ‘non-ethnic’ migrants, ‘semi-ethnic’ migrants and ‘co-ethnic’ migrants. The origins of immigrants, whether foreign workers or marriage migrants, seem to have remained constant throughout these last three decades, Korean-Chinese occupying 30.2% of the total of foreign nationals, Chinese 12.4%, Vietnamese 11.1%, Thais 10.2% and Americans 4.4% in 2019 (Statistics Korea, 2020a). As mentioned, differentiating between Korean-Chinese and Chinese people is especially crucial for this paper, as the formers have Korean ethnic descent and are thus categorised as ‘semi-ethnic’. However, since governmental statistical databases have not made this same distinction between Americans and Korean-Americans which are another 'semi-ethnic' migrant group, there is no available differentiated data for

these two groups (Seol and Skrentny, 2009, p.152). Finally, it is important to note that North Korean refugees are not legally perceived as 'transnational immigrants' since, per the South Korean Constitution, North Koreans are automatically recognised as nationals of South Korea (Seo and Seol, 2014, p.20; Ha, Cho and Kang, 2016, p.138). However, as the United Nations recognises the two countries as separate States, this research chose to refer to them as immigrants and more specifically as 'co-ethnic' migrants since, according to the ethnonationalist discourse, they share the same bloodline and ethnic heritage as South Koreans. By December 2020, a total of 33,752 North Koreans had resettled in South Korea (Ministry of Unification, 2021).

Table 1: Share of foreigners by nationality.



Source: Statistics Korea (2020a, p.5).

All in all, as the country faced the necessity to open its previously closed borders to welcome foreign workforce, marriage migrants and North Korean refugees, its ethnoscape gradually became more ethnically diverse. However, this increase in the number of immigrants brings about several challenges to the Korean identity and society founded on ethnic homogeneity, collectivism and the exclusion of the foreign 'Other' which in turns affects immigration policies and public responses to immigrants.

2.2.2. Challenges to the Korean identity and ethnonationalist discourse in a context of globalisation, democratisation and global pressures for multiculturalism

South Korea's new role as an immigration country leads the nation to encounter a dilemma. Indeed, it simultaneously faces national pressures to maintain ethnic homogeneity and secure the national identity, and global pressures to follow the global trend for multiculturalism and liberalise immigration (Kim, 2015, p.53). During the initial stages of opening its borders in the 1990s and early 2000s, the government's response to immigration was therefore orientated towards seeking to minimise the "potential disruption that globalization would bring to their national identity". This translated into highly discriminatory and short-term immigration policies and into the poor protection of low-skilled migrants from abuse and mistreatment by employers and the society (Kim, 2015, p.53). For example, in 1991, the South Korean government adopted the 'Foreign Trainee Program for Overseas Firms', later called 'Foreign Industrial Trainee System' in 1993, to import foreign workforce (Draudt, 2019). However, this system provided status to migrants for only two years, during which they were tied to a specific firm, earned uncommonly low wages and did not benefit from the same rights and protections as South Korean workers, making them dependent and vulnerable to employers (Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010, p.258; J.K. Kim, 2011, p.1585). It also led to a high number of illegal migrant workers who fled the system in search of higher wages and more mobility (T.-S. Kim, 2011). All in all, it created a "highly exploitive authority structure within the labour market on the basis of ethnicity and legal status" (J.K. Kim, 2011, p.1585; Lim, 2009). The myth of ethnic homogeneity that once serve as a defence mechanism against Japanese imperialism and cultural annihilation transformed into a "tool of exclusion" of immigrant 'Others', and "beliefs in ethnic purity […] prioritized a culturally specific form of assimilation" rooted in collectivist values "in which sacrifice for the sake of integration is valued as benefiting social unity" (Oh and Oh, 2016, p.254). Having had little to no internal minority groups, homogeneous nation-states, such as Korea, with the exclusion of the 'Other' as a defining trait of their identity, tended to "categorically refuse social and political minorities as a group" (Seol and Seo, 2014, p.9). Thus, when South Korea first faced the new influx of immigrant workers within its border in the 1990s, ethnocentrism was prioritised over cosmopolitanism leading to "the repression and exclusion of ethnic minority groups" (Kim, 2013, p.39).

However, as Korea became more democratised and integrated within the global community, internal and global demands for the respect of migrant workers' legal and social protection emerged in response (Seol and Seo, 2014, p.17; J.K. Kim, 2011). Indeed, due to "the alarming number of industrial accidents and job-related health problems among migrants", several civil society protests took place in the 1990s advocating for the migrants' adequate compensation, protection and welfare, and equal rights to domestic workers (J.K. Kim, 2011, pp.1586-1590; Seol and Skrentny, 2009, p.154). One of the first protests was a sit-in organised by foreign workers from Bangladesh, Nepal, the Philippines, and Ethiopia in 1994 at the headquarters of the Citizens' Coalition of Economic Justice, an influential NGO in South Korea, to demand the improvement of "the human rights problem of foreign labourers" (Lim, 2010, p.58). In 2007, the United Nation Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) also expressed its concern that the "'persistent ethnic-centric thinking in South Korea […] might be an obstacle to the realization of equal treatment and respect for foreigners and people belonging to different races and cultures" (Chosun Ilbo, 2007, cited in Campbell, 2015, p.496; Kim, 2015, p.54; Shim, 2013, p.13). Therefore, as globalisation influenced the Korean NGOs and civil society towards claims for democratic practices and as pressures for the adoption of the "global standards" in terms of immigrant policies, meaning endorsing the cultural diversity of migrants, surfaced, Korea's ethnonationalist identity was directly challenged (Kim, 2015, pp.53-54). Especially as in 2006, President Roh Moo-Hyun then declared: "It is time to take measures to incorporate immigrants and to adopt multicultural policies" and announced multiculturalism as their new response to the growing immigration and diverse ethnoscape (Park and Park, 2006, np cited in Kim, 2015, p.52).

Since this discursive change towards multiculturalism, opinions and research-based interpretations in the academic literature regarding Korean ethnic nationalism, immigration policies and public attitudes towards immigrants have become dissent. Indeed, on the one hand, to some scholars such as Campbell (2015) and Denney and Green (2020), the impacts of globalisation on South Korean society hint towards the 'end of ethnic nationalism' and the emergence of a new nationalism based on concepts of modernity, cosmopolitanism and status. Therefore, this change would directly impact immigration policies and the public opinion as attitudes towards immigrants would be based rather on socio-economic factors such as demonstrating "one's market

value", meeting the country's demographic needs and not representing an economic threat to natives for jobs, benefits and social services (Campbell, 2015, p.198; Cho, 2020b, pp.2-3).

On the other hand, scholars such as Shin (2006), Seol and Seo (2014), Chung (2020) and Kim (2015) identify the lasting role of ethnic nationalism and the existence of a 'hierarchical nationhood'. Indeed, Shin (2006, p.205) notably writes that globalisation did not 'end' ethnic nationalism, but rather that "globalization in Korea is shaped by a powerful ethnic nationalism". The Korean government would have pursued globalisation for nationalist goals, "ingest[ing] foreign ideas without altering the basic structure of the Korean body" and its "native culture and values" (Alford, 1999, p.151, cited in Shin, 2006, p.207; Shin, 2006, pp.208-211). Seol and Seo (2014, p.10) further state that globalisation and democratisation did "not directly impact upon the nation-state's self-understanding as an ethnic nation", but rather formalised internal minorities as recognised groups leading to the creation of a hierarchy between these groups. Korea would "tolerat[e] internal diversity and allow[…] for political and civil rights that are defined by the global human rights regime but establish[…] a hierarchy of the 'nationness' of each group by visible and invisible ordering through legal and social rights or popular perceptions" (Seol and Seo, 2014, p.10). Therefore, according to Raz, Kymlicka, and Bleich's framework mentioned in Chapter I, South Korea would be at step one of "recognizing the demands of multiculturalism", tolerance, but would still establish a discriminatory hierarchy through immigration policies and within the public eye (Raz, 1994, Kymlicka 1995, and Bleich 2003, cited in Shim, 2013, p.7). T.-S. Kim (2011), Kim (2015) and Oh and Oh (2016) further highlighted that the Korean government's claim for multiculturalism, or *Damunhwa* in Korean, "exists only as a normative suggestion with no reflection of the reality", thus remaining an ethnocentric rhetoric maintaining an ethnic hierarchy and aiming for the assimilation of immigrants (Kim, 2015, p.59). Adopted to satisfy global pressures and enhance its image in the international community while answering national interests for cultural homogeneity, *Damunhwa* would largely favour 'semi-ethnic migrants' because of their shared ethnicity and therefore predicted easy integration to society, and female marriage migrants because they would meet the nation's demographic needs (Kim, 2015). All in all, the opinions in the academic literature are conflicting.

In the following two chapters, this paper endeavours to research, based on policy texts and public opinion surveys, if there is indeed a shift towards more materialistic, socio-economic and civil concerns or if the influence of ethnic nationalism and traditional cultural dimensions remains salient within contemporary attitudes towards immigration.

Chapter III: The extent of ethnic nationalism's influence on contemporary Korean immigration and immigrant policies

Chapter I of this research relied on frameworks of patterns of nationalism, national cultural dimensions, monoculturalism and multiculturalism to identify expected national responses to immigration. Indeed, according to variables such as Korea's ethnic nationalism, its cultural values such as collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation, and its monoculturalism, South Korea's attitude towards immigrants is expected to be rather negative, creating an ethnic hierarchy between migrants and aiming towards either the rejection or the assimilation of immigrants instead of multiculturalism in the intercultural communication sense of the term. Chapter II further highlighted how Korea's ethnic nationalism crystallised itself around the hostility towards foreign powers and the perceived inferiority of the ethnically different 'Other'. Therefore, early responses to immigration were indeed in accordance with these expected attitudes as 'Amerasian' children were ostracised and suffered heavy discrimination, and as the 1990s Foreign Industrial Trainee System created an exploitative system in which migrant workers were subject to intense abuse, "treated as little more than cheap, expandable commodities" (Lim, 2009, p.2). Migrants were thus excluded and perceived as inferior to Koreans.

However, as globalisation's influence gradually seeped through the Korean civil society accompanied by democratisation and economic growth, national demands emerged to improve the migrants' rights and protection, supported by the international community's condemnation of discrimination based on race and ethnicity. Therefore, it is necessary in the following chapters of this research to analyse in further details whether the explanatory value of ethnic nationalism and cultural values still stands, or if the growing influence of globalisation, socio-economic factors, democratisation and the international community thwarted the previously mentioned expected attitudes. This chapter will thus focus on immigration and immigrant policies to verify if such expectations are indeed still observable, the governmental discourse of multiculturalism being more of a façade, or if policies did become more inclusive and egalitarian, aiming for the coexistence of cultures and their representation in the public sphere.

3.1. Visa policies: institutionalising an ethnic hierarchy between immigrants?

Following the numerous civil society protests, the pressure from the global community and the shift towards *Damunhwa*, the Korean government brought modifications to a number of its immigration and immigrant policies. However, it is now a matter of analysing whether these changes led to an egalitarian immigration system or reinforced a certain hierarchy. This first part proposes a study of visa policies, along with their associated rights, employment restrictions and respective duration. This paper notably analysed policy texts such as the *Immigration Act* as last amended in 2018, the *Enforcement Decree of The Immigration Act* as last amended in 2015, the *Overseas Korean Act* as last amended in 2013, the *Foreign Workers Employment Act* as last amended in 2017, the *Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea* last amended in 2012 and the *Nationality Act* as last amended in 2017. It also bases itself on governmental websites aimed at prospective immigrants to inform them on visa procedures such as the Korea Visa Portal, and on academic literature related specifically to Korean immigration policies such as Chung (2020), Seol and Seo (2014), Campbell (2015), Kong, Yoon and Yu (2010) and others.

According to Chung (2020, p.2499) and Cho (2020a), “visa categories in contemporary immigration policy regimes delimit a migrant’s length of residency, entry and exit rights, employment flexibility, eligibility for citizenship acquisition, and access to citizenship rights”. Visa policies and their associated rights create categories of people and “institutionalise the privileged status of some migrants over others based on occupational status, country of origin, class, gender, and ethnicity” (Chung, 2020, p.2500). Indeed, it seems unavoidable not to create categories when issuing particular visas. Previous studies on visa regulation in the US and Europe underlined how visa policies “disproportionately privileged citizens from rich countries” (Jileva 2002; Mau 2010; Finotelli and Sciortino 2013, cited in Chung, 2020, p.2498). Therefore, it is pertinent for this study to identify what variables are comprised within Korea's visas statuses and if they do forge an ethnic hierarchy as expected in ethnonationalist collectivist high power distance and uncertainty avoidance societies.

After conducting research, it appears that, even though improvements were instituted, Korean visa policies remain based on an ethnic hierarchy, wherein marriage migrants are however privileged. As the new Employment Permit System (EPS) was established in 2003 to eliminate the previous trainee systems' problems, foreign

workers' labour rights were improved to encompass the same rights as their native Korean counterparts, including a minimum wage, public medical insurance and union rights under the *Korea Labour Standards Act*, the *Minimum Wages Act*, and the *Industrial Safety and Health Act* (*Foreign Workers Employment Act 2003*; J.K. Kim, 2011, p.1590; T.-S. Kim, 2011, p.158, Chung, 2020, p.2502; Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010; Durham and Carpenter, 2015, p.977). The E-9 Non-professional Employment visa was thus created for the low-skilled foreign workers in the EPS. E-9 visa holders are however restricted to working in a single industry such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing or fishery (*Korea Visa Portal*, 2021). The E-9 visa's duration is three years, with a single one-year-and-ten-months renewal, which is two months short of the necessary five-year of continuous residency to be eligible for the permanent residency visa (*Foreign Workers Employment Act 2003*; Seol, 2012, p.123; Chung, 2020; Denney and Green, 2020, p.4; Draudt, 2019).

Similarly, the previously intra-ethnically discriminatory *Overseas Korean Act 1999* was also amended in 2004 following pressures from civil society groups. By defining 'overseas Koreans' as including "Koreans with foreign citizenship", the *Overseas Korean Act* creates a visa category, the F-4 visa, for co-ethnic and semi-ethnic immigrants, meaning Korean nationals having acquired foreign nationality or foreign nationals being "lineal descendants" of Korean nationals (*Overseas Korean Act 1999*, Article 2-2). The Act, aiming for the construction of a global Korean community, gives almost all the same rights as Korean natives to its visa holders, with property rights, investment rights, pensions, health insurance, social welfare benefits and dual citizenship eligibility. The visa duration is three years but is renewable without limit. Until 2015, it however excluded its holders from doing manual labour (*Overseas Korean Act 1999; Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea 2007*, Article 17; Chung, 2020). Nonetheless, despite the above definition of 'overseas Koreans', a provision in the original 1999 text limited its eligibility to the ethnic Koreans, and their descendants, that left Korea after the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948, therefore excluding the large majority of ethnic Koreans from China and the former Soviet Union, who were colonial-era migrants, and their descendants (Park and Oh, 2020, p.96; Chung, 2020, p.2503; Seol and Skrentny, 2009). According to Shin (2006, p.213), the aim was to target Korean-Americans since globalisation increased the Korean demand for English-speaking workers. Thus, this Act instituted two different hierarchies within visa

policies: an inter-ethnic one between semi-ethnic and non-ethnic immigrants, as “quasi dual citizenship rights” were given to F-4 visa holders with the possibility of continuous residency in contrast to basic labour rights and temporary stay for E-9 visa holders, and an intra-ethnic one between Korean-Americans and Korean-Chinese (Chung, 2020, p.2502; Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010; Berndt, 2017, p.57).

The Act’s 1999 provision was then amended in 2004 following the *Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case* of 2001 wherein the Constitutional Court of Korea judged the Act as discriminatory and unconstitutional (*Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case*, 2001; Shin, 2006). However, no F-4 visas were issued to semi-ethnic Korean-Chinese and Korean-Russians until 2007 when the government created a specific visa for the latter, the H-2 Working Visit (Chung, 2020; Seol and Skrentny, 2009, p.154). This H-2 visa does not give the same package of benefits as the F-4 visa, and provides instead the same basic labour rights and duration as the E-9 visa, with however greater labour mobility (Park and Oh, 2020, pp.102-104; Seol, 2012, p.123). As the regulations of the F-4 visa prohibited manual labour until the amendment in 2015, low-skilled semi-ethnic workers thus turned to the H-2 visa to gain entry to Korea. Therefore, until 2015, ‘professional’ semi-ethnic migrants were offered unlimited entry to Korea and were welcomed as ‘quasi dual citizens’ while low-skilled semi-ethnic foreign migrants were offered entry as temporary migrant workers. Nonetheless, thanks to the recent 2015 amendment, it appears that the intra-ethnic hierarchies based on nationality and, later, based on skills, within visa policies were mended. However, the same does not apply to the inter-ethnic hierarchy that is, until now, maintained.

From the international migration statistics provided by the Korean government statistical database Statistics Korea, this paper elaborated the pie charts below, highlighting the most issued visa categories and the nationality of visa holders in 2019. They allow for the understanding of the importance of the distinction made between ethnicities when delivering visas. South-East Asian migrants –non-ethnic migrants– are thus mainly concentrated in the E-9 category, whereas co-ethnic and semi-ethnic migrants, mostly from China and Uzbekistan, are gathered into ethno-specific visa categories, the F-4 and H-2. Ethnicity thus seems to be the most determining variable for visa categorisation, above the variable of skill level.

Table 2: Percentage of incoming foreigners by type of visa in 2019.



Source: Statistics Korea (2021).

Table 3: F-4 visa holders by nationality.



Source: Statistics Korea (2021).

Table 4: H-2 visa holders by nationality.



Source: Statistics Korea (2021).

Table 5: E-9 visa holders by nationality.



Source: Statistics Korea (2021).

Nonetheless, as mentioned, marriage migrants are the privileged exception to this inter-ethnic hierarchy. Indeed, holders of the F-6 visa, "Spouse of a Korean National", face no restriction regarding the industries in which they can work, contrary to E-9 visas (Korea Visa Portal, 2021, np). Like F-4 Overseas Korean visa holders, they also enjoy 'quasi dual citizenship rights' and can renew their visa multiple times, with even the possibility of simplified naturalisation. Moreover, they have access to 'multicultural family centres', created specifically to help and support their integration into the Korean society (*Support for Multicultural Families Act 2008*; J.K. Kim, 2011, p.1584*)*. They are the only non-ethnic migrants, aside from high-skilled professionals who represent a very meagre proportion of immigrants, eligible for long-term stay through multiple visa renewal or permanent residence, the latter endowing them with local voting rights (Chung, 2020, p.2502; Seol and Seo, 2014, pp.20-22; Easy Law, 2021; Statistics Korea, 2021).

Therefore, after analysing visa policies, it appears that from a legal standpoint, semi-ethnic Koreans have more benefits in terms of rights, permitted length of stay, employment restrictions and access to citizenship than non-ethnic migrants that are only perceived as temporary foreign workers. This is summarised in the table below.

Table 6: Major South Korean visa categories.

Visa Category	Eligibility	Employment restrictions	Rights	Length
E-9 Non-professional employment	Non-ethnic low-skilled foreign workers	Restricted to a single industry (such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing or fishery)	Basic labour rights	Three years with a single one-year-and-ten-months renewal (ineligible to permanent residency, except special cases)
F-4 Overseas Koreans	Koreans with foreign citizenship	None	Labour rights, property rights, investments rights, social welfare benefits, dual citizenship eligibility and simplified naturalisation	Three years with multiple renewals
H-2 Working Visit	Koreans with foreign citizenship from China and the former USSR	None	Basic labour rights	Three years with a single one-year-and-ten-months renewal (ineligible to permanent residency, except special cases)
F-6 Marriage Migrant	Spouse of a Korean National	None	Labour rights, property rights, investments rights, social welfare benefits, dual citizenship eligibility and simplified naturalisation	Three years with multiple renewals

Source: *Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in* Korea 2007; *Overseas Korean Act 1999*; *Foreign Workers Employment Act 2003*; Chung (2020); Seol and Seo (2014); Seol (2012); *Nationality Act 1997;* Korea Visa Portal (2021); Hi Korea (2021); Easy Law (2021); Kong, Yoon and Yu (2010); Denney and Green (2020); Cho (2020a).

Finally, North Korean refugees receive especially preferential treatment with governmental help and support. Indeed, they are not perceived by the South Korean Constitution as foreign migrants and thus do not need a visa to enter the country.

Article 3 of the *Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1948* states: “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands”, which includes North Korea (*Constitution of the Republic of Korea 1948*, Article 3). Therefore, per the *Nationality Act 1997*, North Koreans are legally considered citizens of South Korea. As nationals, they thus benefit from the same rights as South Koreans, with no employment restrictions nor limited allowed length of stay (Seol and Seo, 2014, pp.19-23; Ha, Cho and Kang, 2016, p.138). They are fully-fledged South Korean nationals. Furthermore, upon arriving in South Korea, North Korean refugees are sent to *Hanawon* facilities, North Korean Refugee Resettlement Assistance facilities, in which they are given training and support to adapt to the capitalist modern South Korean society (Park, 2003, p.739; Campbell, 2015, p.498). During the three months of training at the facilities, they are taught basic skills for living in a developed and capitalist countries like South Korea, such as how to use an ATM machine or a mobile phone (Williams, 2021). They are also taught workplace etiquette, humans rights and democratic principles in place in the country and “middle-class norms and values” (Campbell, 2015, p.498). After leaving the facilities, they are given housing arrangements, financial aid comprising about $7,000 of settlement benefits, further housing subsidy and access to free education, including university-level education (Williams, 2021; Denney and Green, p.4). All in all, North Korean refugees, which are considered by this research as co-ethnic migrants, are highly supported in terms of immigration and immigrant policies, further confirming the policies’ ethnic hierarchy.

Therefore, the study of South Korean visa policies confirms ethnic biases and the institutionalisation of an ethnic hierarchy regarding employment restrictions, associated rights, allowed length of stay, access to citizenship and political involvement. However, the significant proportion of visas issued for non-ethnic low-skilled immigrants and the exception of marriage migrants to the ethnic hierarchy are essential to underline. Indeed, they highlight certain limitations to the predictive and explanatory power of ethnic nationalism and cultural values regarding governmental responses to immigration. It appears that the nation’s demographic and economic needs can lessen, to an extent, the predominance of ethnic considerations within nationalism and the importance of values of in-group homogeneity that would rather aim for keeping national borders firmly closed to non-ethnic migrants. It is now necessary to pursue this research by analysing if another expected governmental

response to immigration is validated. This paper will thus proceed to verify whether the discourse of multiculturalism is indeed implemented within immigrant policies or if it relates rather to a rhetoric hiding assimilationist policies.

3.2. Integration policies: multiculturalism for all or rhetoric hiding assimilationist policies?

To further investigate the role of ethnic nationalism, and of the cultural values forging it, within the government's response to immigration, this paper analysed South Korea's immigrant policies, referring to the "treatment of migrants once they have entered the country", and more specifically its integration strategies (Kong, Yoon and Yu 2010, p.254). The usage of the term "integration" is purposeful as the Korean government uses it in its policy texts and notably for their "Korea Immigration & Integration Programme", KIIP (Soci-Net, 2021). It is necessary to observe which integration measures were undertaken to understand how the discourse of multiculturalism is implemented. The *2nd Basic Plan for Immigration Policy 2013-2017,* the *Support for Multicultural Families Act 2008*, the *Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea 2007* and the Korean governmental website for KIIP, Soci-Net, were notably analysed for this research, as well as scientific articles such as Shim's (2013), Kim's (2015), J.K. Kim's (2011) and Chung (2020).

The Korean government's discursive shift towards multiculturalism was notably accompanied by a linguistic shift within policies and statements, de-emphasising ethnic homogeneity in favour of cultural diversity. Therefore, terms such as "mixed-blood" were replaced by "multi-ethnic" and "multicultural" (Oh and Oh, 2016, p.1642). However, when analysing policies, it seems that multiculturalism is almost always associated with marriage migrants and their children, forming what the government refers to as "multicultural families", setting aside considerations of multiculturalism regarding foreign workers, emphasising rather, in their case, human rights and basic tolerance (*Support for Multicultural Families Act 2008;* Berndt, 2017, p.54; Shim, 2013, pp.12-13; Draudt, 2019). Overall, this paper found two major characteristics within immigrant policies. Firstly, there is a push for the promotion of tolerance and mutual understanding, and for the prohibition of discrimination. Secondly, a strong focus is put on the 'social integration' of multicultural families, which, according to the government, necessitates the extensive learning of the Korean language and culture.

The *Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea 2007* clearly states the fundamental role of the State in preventing “unreasonable discrimination against foreigners in Korea and their children” and in taking “measures such as education, publicity, and correction of unreasonable institutions, etc. to ensure that Koreans and foreigners in Korea understand and respect each other's history, culture and institutions” (Article 10 and 18). Therefore, a focus on mutual respect, equality and tolerance is put forward, hinting at stages one and two of Raz, Kymlicka, and Bleich’s comprehensive framework of “the three stages of development in recognizing the demands of multiculturalism”: tolerance developed through media and intercultural encounters, and the legalisation of non-discrimination through the passing of laws (Raz, 1994, Kymlicka 1995, and Bleich 2003, cited in Shim, 2013, p.7).

However, in the *Act*, a distinction is established between the treatment of multicultural families and other foreigners. For example, whereas the government provides “education in Korean language, education on Korean institutions and culture, support for child care and education, medical services, etc” to multicultural families in order for them to “quickly adjust to Korean society”, other foreigners in Korea are only provided “with education, information and counselling services with respect to basic common knowledge necessary to live in the Republic of Korea” (*Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea 2007*, Article 11 and 12). Therefore, while foreign workers are given basic knowledge and counselling about Korea, multicultural families are fully supported and are expected to learn the Korean language and culture. It consolidates the idea that permanent migrants such as marriage migrants are the targeted population of Korean multiculturalism through their *integration into Korean society* contrary to temporary foreign workers who are simply provided with the necessary knowledge to *live in Korea*, without necessarily being part of the Korean society (Draudt, 2019). Foreign workers thus seem to be kept at a distance from Korean society as an out-group. This links back to expectations of long-term orientated societies, as mentioned in Chapter I, wherein a preferential attention would be brought to migrants settling in the country for the long-term rather than migrants that reside in Korea on non-permanent statuses and that are bound to leave after a few years. Indeed, as previously stated and with minimal exceptions, it is almost impossible for non-ethnic workers to become long-term immigrants and thus be naturalised (Berndt, 2017, p.57; Kim, 2015). Hence why multicultural families seem to be at the core of Korea’s multicultural discourse while immigrant policies directed at migrant workers

just ensure that their human rights are respected (*2nd Basic Plan 2013-2017*, p.67; Shim, 2013). The *Act* also hints at the idea that to *integrate* and *adjust* to South Korean society, it is necessary to learn the Korean language and culture.

This is further confirmed by the *2nd Basic Plan for Immigration Policy 2013-2017* whose Action Plan has "Promote Social Integration that Respects Shared Korean Values" as one of its five pillars (*2nd Basic Plan 2013-2017*, p.44). With this aim, the government aspires to increase the social integration of immigrants through their extensive learning of the Korean language and culture, and to tighten the eligibility requirements for naturalisation so that foreigners are more motivated to become citizens because they want to "belong" to the Korean nation rather than for its long-term residency and social welfare "benefits" (*2nd Basic Plan 2013-2017*, pp.44-46). To be eligible for naturalisation, foreigners must be permanent residents and show a willingness to integrate Korean society by learning the "Korean language and understanding Korean society" through the KIIP's courses (*2nd Basic Plan 2013-2017*, pp.44-45). However, most nation's naturalisation process requires a certain knowledge of the country's culture and language. This does not necessarily mean that migrants are expected to discard their own culture and assimilate to that nation's culture. Nonetheless, the scale, scope and nature of the KIIP and other governmentally provided cultural classes reveal an ethnonationalist bias orienting the migrants towards assimilation. Indeed, migrants under the KIIP must notably complete a total of five hundred hours of courses on the Korean language and culture (Kim, 2015, p.64; Soci-Net, 2021; Ministry of Justice's Immigration and Foreigners Policy division, 2016). Further cultural classes can also be provided by the aforementioned 'multicultural family centres' created by the *Support for Multicultural Families Act 2008.* These classes notably include how to "make kimchee, prepare household shrines to honour the husband's family's ancestors, and cook on the traditional holidays" (Chung, 2020, p.2508). Thus, it seems that, for the Korean government, the integration of marriage migrants requires the teaching of the Korean paternalist traditional roles of wife, mother and daughter-in-law (Chung, 2020, p.2508; Campbell, 2015, p.494). The *Plan* also establishes its will to "help foreign-born children of immigrant spouses to adjust to Korean Society" through their mandatory attendance to the KIIP and the Korean education system (*2nd Basic Plan 2013-2017*, p.57). It also creates Rainbow schools wherein youth from a foreign background can learn "Korean language, Korean life and

culture, identity establishment, educational plans, and employment search" to have "better career" opportunities (*2nd Basic Plan 2013-2017*, p.57). Therefore, it seems that, as Oh and Oh (2016), Shim (2013) and J.K. Kim (2011) underlined, these integration policies are targeted at permanent residents, most of them being marriage migrants and their children, and places the burden of adjustment or, more accurately, assimilation, on them. Kim (2015, p.52) notably writes: "Korea's immigration policies are in practice driven by ethnocentric principles: access to citizenship for migrants is either blocked (e.g., migrant workers) or allowed on the condition that they are assimilated (e.g., for marriage immigrants)".

However, both the *Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea 2007* and the *2nd Basic Plan* also seem to want to raise awareness and educate Korean children to avoid discrimination and prejudices. Therefore, a will to share the burden is expressed. The *Plan* notably mentions the development of "multiculture-friendly schools" with "programs covering mutual understanding" (*2nd Basic Plan 2013-2017,* p.59). Another pillar of this Action Plan, "Prevent Discrimination and Respect Cultural Diversity", advance this goal further as it aims to "pursue legislation that prohibits discrimination against foreigners based on country of origin or race" and to "improve society's tolerance of cultural diversity" (*2nd Basic Plan 2013-2017,* pp.63-65). The latter aim would be achieved through the increased visibility of different cultures thanks to "performances, exhibitions, and education programs […] at cultural facilities such as museums, art galleries and libraries" as well as the promotion of multiculturalism via broadcasting and other media (*2nd Basic Plan 2013-2017,* pp.70-73).

However, J.K. Kim (2011, p.1599) notably highlights the fact that "tolerance education" reinforces cultural paternalism and "overlooks issues of 'institutionalised racism, power, and structural inequality'" as it institutes the importance of personal responsibility within non-discriminatory behaviours instead of aiming for structural change (Banks, 1993, p.15, cited in J.K. Kim, 2011, p.1599; Oh and Oh, 2016, p.255). Furthermore, one can wonder if this call for increased tolerance and non-discrimination is enough for immigrants to feel free to maintain their own cultural values and behaviours without feeling pressured to internalise Korean culture to feel included in the society and to, ultimately, be naturalised. Finally, these tolerance strategies raise another issue specific to 'traditional multiculturalism' from which *Damunhwa* draws its ideals (Rings, 2016). Indeed, in traditional multiculturalism, coexistence and tolerance

of the Other's culture do not necessarily mean bridging these differences to create interactions within a blended society. Therefore, in the Korean context where marriage migrants are often isolated from other members of their culture of origin, they have to resort to assimilation in order to not be isolated and integrate the dominant society that does not automatically perceive ethnically different migrants as their own.

All in all, it appears that Korean integration policies endeavour to promote tolerance towards cultural diversity through education, media and art, and aim to prohibit discrimination based on ethnicity. This would therefore lead the country into the second stage of Raz, Kymlicka, and Bleich's framework of multiculturalism without however reaching the third which allows for the expression of cultural, religious and ethnic identity in the public sphere, self-government and self-representation (Raz, 1994, Kymlicka 1995, and Bleich 2003, cited in Shim, 2013, p.7). Furthermore, immigrant policies and integration plans state that immigrants, notably multicultural families, are expected to integrate into Korean society through the learning of the Korean language and culture. Therefore, it does seem that it is by living on the same terms as Koreans that one can reach full embracement by the Korean society and government, in which the ultimate step is naturalisation. Even though mutual respect between cultures is advocated, foreigners are ultimately expected to *integrate* by learning and adopting, to an extent, the Korean language and culture. In conclusion, though efforts for multiculturalism are increasing, to be naturalised and included in society, immigrant policy texts underline the necessity of assimilating the Korean language and culture. Ethnic considerations of collectivism and uncertainty avoidance thus remain patent.

The analysis of visa and integration policies thus allowed for the identification of an in-between status of the Korean governmental attitude towards immigrants. Indeed, it seems that Korea is still navigating between global pressures for multiculturalism and cultural diversity, national economic interests and the rooted ethnonationalist nature of the Korean identity. Despite efforts to improve migrant workers' human rights and decrease the intra-ethnic discriminatory nature of visa policies, ethnicity continues to shape immigration policies, favouring co-ethnic and semi-ethnic migrant to non-ethnic migrants. Therefore, this confirms the expected construction of an ethnic hierarchy within policies as identified in Chapter I. It also concurs with Kim (2015) arguing for the

favoured treatment of semi-ethnic migrants, and with Seol and Seo identifying a "hierarchical national configuration" in the order of: "foreign spouses […]> North Korean refugees > Korean Americans > […] Joseonjok [Korean Chinese] > migrant workers" (Seol and Seo, 2014, pp.25-26). However, the marriage migrants' preferential status and the allowed entry of non-ethnic migrants does point towards the relaxing of borders and the lessened importance of ethnic biases and cultural values for the sake of the nation's economic interests. Though this finding links back to Denney and Green's argument according to which socio-economic concerns are taking a relatively greater importance within attitudes towards immigrants, this paper would not go as far as Denny and Green by claiming that they now "far out-weigh" ethnonationalist concerns (Denney and Green, 2020, p.20).

Moreover, the analysis of integration policies further underlines this in-between status since some aspects of multiculturalism are implemented, such as mutual respect, tolerance and non-discrimination, while an underlying pressure for assimilation remains via the process of naturalisation and the expected extensive learning of the Korean language and culture in order to be able to *integrate* into Korean society. Expectations for long-term orientated cultures are also verified since long-term residents seem to be the sole focus of integration policies and, more generally, multiculturalism. Though this paper's analysis joins Seol and Seo in highlighting that the Korean government "tolerat[es] internal diversity and allow[s] for political and civil rights that are defined by the global human rights regime", it underlines that the government does not only tolerate internal diversity, but goes further by raising awareness through education, media and art, and by promoting non-discrimination (Seol and Seo, 2014, p.10). Arguing that Korean multiculturalism is essentially only a rhetoric, as Kim (2015), Oh and Oh (2016) have discussed, would thus be an overstatement since normative and in-practice efforts for the awareness of the Korean population and for non-discrimination and tolerance are indeed undertaken. Nonetheless, as this research observed the fairly assimilationist nature of integration policies and the limits to this "tolerance policy", it joins Kim (2015), Shim (2013), Oh and Oh (2016), and Durham and Carpenter (2015) in establishing that, within Korean multiculturalism, assimilationist tendencies prevail over the recognition and protection of immigrants' "unique culture and identities" (Shim, 2013, p.14). Thus, since undeniable assimilationist undertones remain and there seems to be no push for the third step of Raz, Kymlicka, and Bleich's multiculturalism framework, one must note

the lasting significant role of Korean ethnic nationalism and cultural values of collectivism and conformity in shaping Korean multiculturalism and immigration policies.

It is now pertinent to analyse the extent to which expected attitudes of ethnonationalist collectivist high power distance and uncertainty avoidance cultures towards immigrants are also reflected within the Korean public opinion.

Chapter IV: The extent of ethnic nationalism's influence on the Korean public opinion

To conclude this research process, this chapter analyses the Korean public opinion in regards to immigrants. Indeed, Hundt (2016, p.488) underlines that even though the Korean public opinion is not always aligned with public policies, governments in democratic societies, such as South Korea, generally "base their legitimacy in part on the claim that they govern on behalf of the public". Therefore, analysing whether the government's response to immigration reflects the public opinion seems highly relevant. Is the immigration policies' in-between status, which advocates tolerance and non-discrimination while maintaining an ethnic hierarchy in visa policies and assimilationist tendencies within integration policies, also observable in the Korean population?

Based on the nature of Korea's pattern of nationalism and its position on Hofstede's typology, expected attitudes towards immigrants are the rejection of non-ethnic migrants, seeing them as an out-group in virtue of their different ethnicity, or expectations for their assimilation to Korean culture. This research notably analysed data from the World Value Survey, WVS, (World Values Survey Association [WVSA], 2020), Korean General Social Survey, KGSS, (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [ICPSR], 2018), and the South Korean Identity Survey, SKIS, (East Asia Institute [EAI], 2020) to verify if such attitudes are indeed observable, confirming the lasting role of ethnic nationalism and cultural values within the public opinion, or if a clear shift towards more materialistic and socio-economic preferences is observable. The latter result could hint at either the lessened importance of the role of ethnic nationalism and cultural values or at a transition towards civic nationalism, individualism and low uncertainty avoidance in a context of increased globalisation and democratisation.

However, since this research chose to analyse data from public opinion surveys, several limits must be acknowledged. Indeed, survey data must be treated with caution because the wording of the questions asked to respondents might orient their answer, ambiguous or lengthy questions can hinder the accuracy of the respondent's answer, and because respondents might also not be truthful in their answers. Indeed, especially when answering questions about attitudes towards immigrants, respondents might not answer honestly by fear of being perceived as racist or xenophobic (Hundt, 2016,

pp.491-501). Therefore, it is necessary to keep these elements in mind when analysing and interpreting survey results. Hence this paper's choice to analyse three different data sources to improve accuracy. It firstly analyses the public's general perception of immigrants, then, more specifically, the possible existence of ethnic preferences, and finally, the Koreans' thoughts on what it means 'to become a true Korean' and whether it necessitates assimilation. Overall, this paper found contemporary attitudes towards immigrants to be, as Cho defines it, rather "multifaceted", "reflecting a nuanced perspective" (Cho, 2020b, pp.1-2).

4.1. South Koreans' opinion on immigration and multiculturalism

Firstly, it is important to note that immigration is currently not considered by respondents as an issue of great importance in Korea, which can explain the very divided opinions on certain topics or the recurrent choice of 'I don't know' or 'Indifferent'. Indeed, when KGSS asked in 2016 "Which of these issues is the most important for Korea today?", respondents mainly replied economy (35%), crime (24.4%) and education (15.4%), whereas immigration had the lowest percentage with 2.3% (ICPSR, 2018, p.321). It appears that, overall, immigration remains a second-class topic, which might explain the lack of awareness or interest of the population on the matter.

However, that said, these surveys still allow us to discern the public's general feeling towards immigrants. Indeed, there seems to have been a certain disillusionment with the benefits of immigration and multiculturalism these last few years (Cho, 2020a; Shim, 2013, p.12). Therefore, whereas, in 2010, 60.6% of respondents were in favour of a multi-ethnic/multicultural country, this percentage dropped to 44.4% in 2020 (EAI, 2020, p.6; Cho, 2020b).

Table 7: "Do you think Korea should be a mono-ethnic/mono-cultural country? Or should it be a multi-ethnic/multicultural country where different ethnicities and cultures coexist?" (2020).

	2010	**2020**
Mono-ethnic/mono-cultural country	37.1	39.1
Multi-ethnic/multicultural country	60.6	44.4
I don't know	2.4	13.1

Source: EAI (2020, p.6).

From 2017 to 2020, the WVS asked respondents about the effects of immigrants on the development of the country, and respondents quite significantly disagreed with it "fill[ing] useful jobs in the workforce", mildly disagreed with it "strengthen[ing] cultural diversity" and were overall unsure about its impact on unemployment and social conflict (WVSA, 2020, p.32). Therefore, it appears that Koreans in the last few years fail to see a strong appeal to immigration and multiculturalism (Cho, 2020b).

Table 8: "From your point of view, what have been the effects of immigrants on the development of South Korea?" (2017-2020).

	Agree	**Hard to say**	**Disagree**
Fill useful jobs in the workforce	11.1	22.0	66.9
Strengthen cultural diversity	16.1	31.6	52.3
Increase unemployment	17.8	44.7	37.5
Lead to social conflict	12.7	46.1	41.2

Source: WVSA (2020, p.32).

It seems that the overall enthusiasm towards cultural diversity and tolerance that followed the discursive shift towards multiculturalism turned into a certain neutrality with hints of negative perceptions after a decade. Indeed, when asked to agree or disagree with the statement "We should make it easier for foreigners to obtain Korean citizenship", 66.4% of respondents disagreed (EAI, 2020, p.8; Cho, 2020a). Moreover, 57.1% agreed that "There are limitations to receiving foreigners with different racial, religious and cultural backgrounds" against 9.8% disagreeing. Furthermore, even though it seems that Koreans do not seem to care if their neighbours are immigrants, people from a different race or speaking a different language –with them not being mentioned as a group that Koreans "would not like to have as neighbours" about 80% of the time, it seems that immigrants remain a group that 80.9% of respondents do not trust very much, if at all (WVSA, 2020, pp.7-8). However, though on average 30 to 40% of the respondents answered "Indifferent" to these SKIS statements, 52.1% of respondents agreed with "We should provide equal voting rights and social security to

naturalised citizens" against 12.7% disagreeing, and 51.8% agreed with "Racial, religious and cultural diversity enhances national competitiveness" against 17.2% (EAI, 2020, p.7; Cho, 2020a). Therefore, it seems that Koreans tend to feel a certain indifference towards immigrants, not rejecting them vehemently, but not welcoming them with open arms or trusting them as part of their in-group either.

4.2. Ethnically-orientated preferences or shift to socio-economic factors?

In 2020, 57.6% of the SKIS respondents agreed with the statement: "I have different feelings towards foreigners based on their country of origin", against 12.6% disagreeing (EAI, 2020, p.8; Cho, 2020a). Hence, it seems that the country of origin and, therefore, its attached ethnicity remain significant factors within the Korean public's acceptance of immigrants.

Indeed, the existence of an ethnic hierarchy prevailing within public preferences, as expected based on Korea's ethnic nationalism, monoculturalism and cultural values, seems to be confirmed by KGSS results of a survey conducted in 2010. They surveyed participants to determine how accepting they would be of ethnically different immigrants as visitors, citizens, workers, close neighbours, close friends, spouse of the respondent's child(ren) and spouse of the respondent. A quite clear hierarchy emerges from these results since North Korean refugees are accepted as citizens at 77.8%, Korean-Chinese at 68.9% and non-ethnic migrants such as South East Asians at 56.8% (ICPSR, 2018, pp.202-208). However, as can be expected, even though they are non-ethnic migrants, Americans have a quite significantly higher acceptance rate, at 64%, as they are usually associated with professional workers and are from a developed country. This research specifically chose 'citizens' among these categories since "citizenship is the ultimate measure of social acceptance" (Hundt, 2016, p.498).

Table 9: "Accepting … as citizens of the respondent's country" (2010).

	YES	NO	DK/NA
North Korean refugees	77.8	21.9	0.3
Korean-Chinese	68.9	30.5	0.6
Chinese	52.8	46.6	0.6
East Asians	56.8	42.6	0.6
Americans	64.0	35.5	0.6

Source: ICPSR (2018, pp.202-208).

The category 'spouse of the respondent's child(ren)' is also quite telling of ethnic preferences since it reveals the population's willingness to 'mix' their 'pure' Korean blood with an ethnically different Other, since, per traditional Korean thinking, marriage implies having children. Overall, Koreans are significantly less accepting of ethnic mixing, each immigrant group being mainly rejected as spouse of the respondent's child(ren). However, an ethnic hierarchy is also observable since co-ethnic migrants (North Korean refugees) are more accepted, closely followed by semi-ethnic migrants (Korean-Chinese) and finally by non-ethnic migrants (Chinese and East Asians). Once again, the American exception is noteworthy, probably because Koreans perceive them as a synonym of higher social status due to the United States' level of development (Seol and Skrentny, 2009; Denney and Green, 2020).

Table 10: "Accepting … as spouse of the respondent's child(ren)" (2010).

	YES	**NO**	**DK/NA**
North Korean refugees	38.9	60.7	0.4
Korean-Chinese	34.1	65.2	0.7
Chinese	28.4	71.0	0.6
East Asians	28.4	70.8	0.8
Americans	40.2	59.0	0.8

Source: ICPSR (2018, pp.202-208).

Finally, the SKIS results highlight Koreans' feeling of closeness by immigrant group. It appears that, similarly to observations within visa and integration policies, North Korean refugees as well as multicultural families, which include marriage migrants and their children, are perceived as closer to Koreans, followed by Korean-Chinese, and in last position migrant workers, who are, as seen in chapter III, mostly non-ethnic workers from South East Asia (EAI, 2020, p.4).

Table 11: "How do you feel about these groups living in your country?" (2020).

	They feel like complete strangers	They feel like 'almost strangers'	They feel like 'almost Korean citizens'	They feel like Korean citizens	DK/NA
North Korean refugees	8.0	31.1	51.4	9.5	0
Migrant workers	18.6	52.5	26.7	2.1	0
Marriage migrants	9.7	33.6	48.4	8.1	0.3
Children of international marriages	6.4	26	50.2	17.2	0.1
Korean-Chinese	12.9	47.1	36.8	3.3	0

Source: EAI (2020, p.4).

All in all, ethnicity seems to remain an essential explanatory variable within Koreans' preferences towards immigrants. Indeed, a clear inclination towards the greater acceptance of co-ethnic and, secondly, semi-ethnic migrants can be observed, leaving non-ethnic migrants at the bottom of the hierarchy of preferences. However, as with immigration policies, marriage migrants seem to be an exception within non-ethnic migrants. Furthermore, even though visa policies mended the intra-ethnic hierarchy favouring Korean-Americans to Korean-Chinese, it seems that within the public opinion, Americans are overall preferred to other non-ethnic migrants, and even to co-ethnic and semi-ethnic migrants when it comes to ethnic mixing. Thus, the development level of the migrants' country of origin also plays a role. Finally, a slight preference within the type of foreign workers must be noted, since 47.5% of respondents would like the number of high-skilled workers to increase whereas only 30.7% would like the number of low-skilled workers to increase (ICPSR, 2018, p.198). Therefore, not only does ethnicity come to play a role within preferences, feeling of closeness and acceptance, but so does a country's level of development and the occupation of workers to a lesser extent.

4.3. Who are 'true Koreans': immigrants having assimilated or immigrants having acquired citizenship?

This last section aims to research whether immigrants are expected to assimilate to Korean culture in order to be considered part of Korean society. In the past decade, according to the KGSS, it appears that the public expected immigrants to assimilate to Korean culture while also maintaining, to an extent, their own culture (ICPSR, 2018). Indeed, in 2010, 64.4% of respondents agreed with the statement "It is desirable for most people in Korea to share the same tradition and custom", against 15.0 disagreeing (ICPSR, 2018, p.201). In 2013, notwithstanding very mixed opinions, 47.3% of respondents agreed with the statement "People who do not share South Korean customs and traditions cannot become fully South Korean", against 29.9% disagreeing (ICPSR, 2018, p.352). However, it appears that even though immigrants are expected to share Korean customs and traditions, respondents do not seem to demand the abandonment of the migrants' own culture for all that. Indeed, 89% of respondents agreed that immigrants should retain their culture of origin while also adopting Korean culture (ICPSR, 2018, p.356). This leads to a very split opinion on whether migrants should "adapt and blend in" (48.5%) or "maintain their distinct customs and traditions" (47.4%), especially as the design of this question does not allow an in-between answer (ICPSR, 2018, p.353). The same question was asked in the 2020 SKIS with similarly divided answers: 26.8% agreed with the statement "Foreigners should abandon their culture and habits while residing in Korea", 35.1% disagreed, and 37.9% were indifferent (EAI, 2020, p.7; Cho, 2020a). However, the percentage of respondents disagreeing decreased by 8.5 percentage points between 2010 and 2020, illustrating once again a certain disillusionment with multiculturalism.

Due to this overall split opinion, this research further analysed the matter by identifying what it takes to become 'a true Korean' in the Korean public's eyes. Is it having Korean descent and adopting Korean values and Korean language, a sign of ethnic nationalism, collectivism and uncertainty avoidance, or rather being naturalised and respecting Korean laws and political system, a sign of civic nationalism? Both the 2013 KGSS and 2020 SKIS revealed the primordial value of having Korean nationality/citizenship and speaking the Korean language to be perceived as 'a true Korean'. Indeed, in the KGSS, having Korean citizenship was the most important criteria to becoming 'a true Korean' followed by speaking Korean (ICPSR, 2018, p.197). Respecting Korean political institutions and laws was seen as 'fairly important', and

having South Korean ancestry and complying with Confucian disciplines were not perceived as 'very important', diminishing the role of ethnic nationalism and in-group conformity within Korean identity. However, the low percentage for the cultural aspect, in this case, can be attributed to the reductive nature of Korean culture within the design of the survey, which restrains it to Confucianism.

Table 12: "To become true South Korean" (2013).

	Very important	**Fairly important**	**Not very important**	**Not important at all**	**DK/NA**
Being born in South Korea	47.2	34.7	15.5	2.3	0.3
Having the citizenship	56.5*	32.9	8.7	1.6	0.2
Living most of one's life in South Korea	34.5	36.5	25.2	3.5	0.3
Speaking Korean	52.1	34.9	11.4	1.5	0.2
Complying with Confucian disciplines	15.7	30.4	36.5	16.8	0.6
Respecting Korean political institutions and laws	30.1	51.7	14.4	3.2	0.5
Having South Korean ancestry	36.6	34.4	23.5	5.3	0.3

* Significant increase from 2003, from 47.8 to 56.5.

Source: ICPSR (2018, p.197).

Similarly, in the SKIS, having Korean nationality and speaking Korean were also the top factors considered as 'very important' to becoming 'a true Korean'. Furthermore, following Korean laws and political system, and understanding Korean history and following Korean traditions and customs were the second most important elements on the list. Therefore, we notice the enhanced role given to Korean culture within this survey as its wording within the question is broader. However, having Korean descent/ancestry remains a more marginalised factor.

Table 13: "To become a true Korean" (2020).

	Very important	**Fairly important**	**Not very important**	**Not important at all**	**DK/NA**
Being born in Korea	40.7	49.1	9.0	1.3	0
Having Korean nationality	52.4	42.8	4.5	0.3	0
Living in Korea for a long time	31.7	49.1	17	1.9	0.3
Speaking Korean	47.7	44.2	7.5	0.5	0.2
Following Korean laws and political system	41.6	52.7	5.4	0.2	0.1
Having Korean descent	29.7	51.3	15.9	2.8	0.3
Understanding Korean history and following Korean traditions and customs	30.4	59	9.6	0.9	0.1

Source: EAI (2020, p.5).

Therefore, it seems that to be considered Korean, pragmatic factors are increasingly considered, illustrating a change in the perception of what constructs Korean identity. Indeed, Chapter II highlighted how Korean identity was traditionally based on homogeneity founded on the distinction from foreign Others and on shared "language, values and culture rooted in a common ethnicity" due to Korea's nation-building around ethnic nationalism (Kong, Yoon and Yu, 2010, p.252). However, as Korea was already facing the change in its ethnoscape which meant the inevitable emergence of foreign minorities in the society, Koreans had to rethink and reconstruct their national identity. Thus, these surveys underline the gradual inclusion of more pragmatic and civic features within the traditionally ethnocentric Korean identity, now encompassing having citizenship, speaking Korean, and following the country's laws, political system, cultural traditions and customs (Kim, 2013; Lim, 2009; Lee, 2009). The importance of language and culture within the respondents' answers highlights the lasting role of ethnic nationalism within Korean identity. Therefore, immigrants are not only expected to acquire Korean citizenship, but they are also still expected to learn the Korean language and culture. Once again, a certain in-between status between ethnic and civic considerations seems to establish itself.

All in all, as Cho (2020b, p.2) defined it, contemporary Korean attitudes towards immigrants are "multifaceted". Indeed, the public opinion evolved, not rejecting immigrants vehemently like during the 20th century, but neither welcoming them with open arms. It appears that, overall, most Koreans remain indifferent to the topic of immigration and multiculturalism, or at least they do not express strongly opinionated answers. Nonetheless, the impact of democratisation and globalisation seems to have brought several changes. Even though an ethnic hierarchy within public preferences remains, economic considerations such as a country's level of development and the immigrants' occupation do play a role within the acceptance of immigrants. Furthermore, civic considerations, or at least pragmatic considerations, seem to have taken on a greater role within Korean national identity as having citizenship and respecting the Korean political and legal systems became essential features to be considered 'a true Korean'. However, the lasting ethnic hierarchy and the importance of language and culture within Korean identity also prove the continuity and strength of ethnonationalist collectivist biases.

Therefore, Denney and Green's (2020) observations of the greater role of socio-economic considerations within attitudes seems to be, to an extent, corroborated by some of the surveys' data. However, once again, asserting the abandonment of ethnic nationalism or its relegation as a consequence of democratisation and globalisation appears to be an exaggeration. Indeed, ethnicity continues to profoundly shape Koreans' acceptance, feeling of closeness and overall attitude towards immigrants, liking back to Seol and Seo's study (2014). Furthermore, the immigrants' knowledge and usage of the Korean language and culture remain expected by Koreans and are oftentimes necessary for them to be integrated and considered as Korean, which corresponds with Kim's (2015), Shim (2013) and T.-S. Kim's (2011) findings on Korea's assimilationist multiculturalism. Instead of concluding that a shift from ethnic to civic nationalism is occurring, as Campbell (2015), Denney and Green (2020) suggested, this paper argues that it would be more accurate to highlight the more holistic nature of Korean identity, nationalism and culture, which gradually came to encompass not only ethnic considerations, but also, to a lesser extent, democratic and economic features. Indeed, rather than what some academics, partisans of the evolutionary perspective, identify as a natural and inevitable shift towards civic nationalism, the growing impacts of globalisation and democratisation would have enriched these notions and made them more complex to categorise in typologies created pre-contemporary globalisation. Thus, even though this research maintains the preeminent role of ethnic-based biases, it joins Kong, Yoon and Yu (2010) and Cho (2020b) in arguing for the increasingly more multifaceted, or in-between, nature of Korean attitudes towards immigrants and of the nation's cultural values and patterns of nationalism influencing it.

Conclusion

The aim of this study was to investigate the role of ethnic nationalism and the cultural values shaping it within South Korean national attitudes towards immigrants. The analysis of the evolution of responses to immigration from the 20th century to this past decade highlights a shift from the overt and heavy discrimination, repression and exclusion of the foreign 'Other' to a more multifaceted response shaped by both ethnic nationalism and, to a lesser extent, multiculturalist, democratic and economic concerns. Indeed, according to this research's findings, South Korean contemporary attitudes towards immigrants comprise a lasting ethnic hierarchy shaping visa policies and public preferences, and assimilationist undertones within integration policies and public perceptions of national belonging but also, the improvement of the immigrants' human rights and treatment, the push for tolerance, non-discrimination and mutual respect, and the greater role of economic considerations within public acceptance and of civic or pragmatic factors within the public's perception of Korean national identity. Therefore, this study suggests that, with the growing complexity of the internal and global contexts, notably due to democratisation and globalisation, Korea's identity, cultural values and nationalism have become more holistic, and, consequently, its responses to immigrants more multifaceted. Thus, classifying these constructs into dichotomous typologies such as Hofstede's and Kohn's and predicting attitudes towards immigrants based them on prove to be increasingly challenging.

Firstly, so as to mend the gap in the academic literature identified by Hoti (2017) regarding the role of cultural values within attitudes towards immigrants, this study presented different frameworks, such as Hans Kohn's typology of civic and ethnic nationalism, Hofstede's cultural dimension model, and Welsch and Benessaieh's conception of monoculturalism and multiculturalism, to identify expected national responses to immigration. These theories and their discussion within the academic literature highlighted that a country like South Korea, shaped by ethnic nationalism, monoculturalism, collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation, is expected to display discriminatory responses based on an ethnic hierarchy, and to align with the paradigm of assimilation and exclusion, meaning either expecting the immigrants to assimilate to Korean culture or excluding them.

Secondly, by analysing the nation-building process of Korea, this paper underlined the power of ethnic nationalism in shaping Korean identity and initial

responses to immigration. Indeed, South Korea's early governmental and public attitudes towards immigrants concur with the previously identified expected attitudes, validating the explanatory and predictive value of ethnic nationalism and the cultural values forging it. Therefore, for example, the American military personnel were never integrated as an in-group and "mixed-race Amerasians" suffered heavy discrimination. Similarly, the first trainee program, which opened the borders to immigrants purely by economic and demographic necessity, was exploitative and migrants were treated as inferior, cheap and expendable commodities. However, as the reality of the changing global and national contexts settled within the Korean nation, changes to immigration and immigrant policies were made, notably through the adoption of multiculturalism as a model and driving discursive force.

Nonetheless, as the study of visa policies underlined, the Korean government continues to institutionalise an ethnic hierarchy, favouring co-ethnic migrants, North Koreans, and semi-ethnic migrants, 'overseas Koreans', to non-ethnic migrants –with the important exception of marriage migrants. Moreover, multiculturalist and integration policies specifically target multicultural families, whereas migrant workers are perceived as merely temporary foreigners whose ethnic differences should be tolerated and human rights respected, but which have no purpose integrating into Korean society. Multicultural families are expected to integrate into Korean society by extensively learning, and possibly adopting, the Korean language and culture through the KIIP and naturalisation process. Therefore, though borders were gradually opened to non-ethnic migrants, the migrants' human rights were improved and tolerance and non-discrimination are advocated, ethnonationalist biases continue to shape governmental responses.

Similarly, within the public opinion, the influence of ethnic nationalism remains preeminent. Indeed, even though general neutrality is felt towards immigrants, it seems that Koreans continue to have ethnic preferences within immigrants and to expect their knowledge of the Korean language and culture to become 'a true Korean'. However, the level of development of the migrant's country of origin and his/her occupation also have a certain relevance within the acceptance of migrants, indicating the developing role of economic concerns. Furthermore, the growing importance of having citizenship or following the nation's laws within Korean identity proves that civic, or at least pragmatic, factors are also taken into consideration. However, concluding that a shift from ethnic to civic nationalism is occurring, as Campbell (2015), Denney and Green

(2020) suggested, seems to be an overstatement. This paper argues that it would be more accurate to highlight the more holistic nature of Korean identity, nationalism and culture, which came to encompass not only ethnic considerations but also, to a lesser extent, democratic and socio-economic features.

All in all, this paper would not go as far as Kim (2015), Oh and Oh (2016) by arguing the exclusively rhetoric nature of Korean multiculturalism due to Korea's ethnic nationalism, but joins them, Seol and Seo (2014), Kong, Yoon and Yu (2010) and Cho (2020b) in highlighting an in-between status. Indeed, Korean attitudes towards immigrants seem to settle between economic and demographic considerations and a push for democratic values, tolerance and mutual respect on the one hand, and the maintenance of an ethnic hierarchy and assimilationist undertones on the other. Thus, ethnic nationalism, collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance and long-term orientation maintain a lasting and predominant role within attitudes towards immigration, but seem to no longer be the only defining traits of Korean culture, identity, nationalism and, in turn, attitudes towards immigrants. As the world gradually becomes more complex through increased interconnectedness, so do constructs of identity, discourse and culture, making it complicated to categorise them into traditional dichotomies.

It is, however, important to note that, as Denney and Green (2020, p.7) state, South Korea has a "shorter histor[y] of hosting long-term immigrants in large numbers". Therefore, it could be that Korea is only at the beginning of its process and that within the following decades, if its number of immigrants continues to grow exponentially, its traditional ethnic nationalism, collectivism and strive for ethnic homogeneity will be further challenged and their influence lessened within policies and the public opinion. Therefore, even though clear ethnic biases currently remain, it would be highly pertinent to investigate the extent to which they continue to shape attitudes after several decades of intensified immigration and globalisation. Furthermore, as this study remains exploratory and Korea-focused, future research on how ethnocentric constructs of national identity and culture are further challenged by immigration, democratisation and globalisation would be pertinent.

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Appendices

Appendix 1:



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